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Today, more than fifteen years after the end of the wars that accompanied Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution, the ‘Balkan question’ remains more than ever a ‘European question’. In 
the eyes of many Europeans in the 1990s, Bosnia was the symbol of a collective 
failure, while Kosovo later became a catalyst for an emerging Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). In the last decade, however, the overall thrust of the EU’s 
Balkans policy has moved from an agenda dominated by security issues related to the 
war and its legacies to one focused on the perspective of the Western Balkan states’ 
accession to the European Union.
This Chaillot Paper, which features contributions from authors from various parts of 
the region, examines the current state of play in the countries of the Western Balkans 
with regard to EU accession. It brings together both views from the Balkans states 
themselves and overarching thematic perspectives.
For the first time the European Union has become involved in the formation of new 
nation-states that also aspire to become members of the Union. The EU’s transformative 
power has proved effective in integrating established states; now it is confronted 
with the challenge of integrating new and sometimes contested states. Against this 
background, this paper makes the case for a concerted regional approach to EU 
enlargement, and a renewed and sustained commitment to the European integration 
of the Western Balkans.
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7executive summary
Today, more than fifteen years after the end of the wars of Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution, the ‘Balkan question’ remains more than ever a ‘European 
question’. In the eyes of many Europeans in the 1990s, Bosnia was the 
symbol of a collective failure, while Kosovo later became a catalyst for 
an emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the last 
decade, with the completion of the process of redrawing the map of the 
region, the overall thrust of the EU’s Balkans policy has moved from an 
agenda dominated by security issues related to the war and its legacies 
to an agenda focused on the perspective of the Western Balkan states’ 
accession to the European Union, to which there has been a formal 
political commitment on the part of all EU Member States since the 
Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003. The framework was set, the political 
elites in the region were – at least verbally – committed to making 
Europe a priority and everyone was supposedly familiar with the policy 
tools thanks to the previous wave of Eastern enlargement. With the 
region’s most contentious issues apparently having been defused, the 
EU could move from stability through containment towards European 
integration.
There are favourable trends to make this possible: the EU has emerged 
as the unchallenged international actor in the Balkans; the region, 
exhausted by a decade of conflict, is recovering stability and the capacity 
to cooperate; the EU has no other equally plausible enlargement agenda 
in sight and could use the direct involvement of some of its Member 
States in the region to facilitate the accession process.
There are three international factors that have recently reinforced the 
EU’s role as the key player in the region: these concern the evolution of 
the respective roles of the United States, Russia and Turkey
The US. There has been a gradual convergence of European and 
American policies in contrast to the underlying transatlantic tensions 
that accompanied the two US-led military interventions in the 1990s. The 
last decade was marked by a steady Europeanisation of the international 
presence in the Balkans, while the focus of US attention continued to shift 
to other international priorities, including a ‘G-2’ with China, a ‘reset’ 
8with Russia, nuclear non-proliferation in Iran, the war in Afghanistan 
as a test for NATO and relations with Pakistan, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict as the key to peace in the Middle East, and, most recently, the 
strategic implications of the 2011 ‘democratic wave’ in the Arab world. 
The Balkans is close to the bottom of the list, something which is not 
always fully appreciated in the region. 
Although scaling down the US engagement in the Balkans is consistent 
with the process of European integration, now seen as ‘the only game in 
town’, the EU should encourage that engagement to continue, especially 
in view of the fact that the United States enjoys strong credibility in the 
region (particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia) and that its professed primary 
goal, precisely, is to assist the region’s accession to the EU. In short: 
European integration strengthened by an Atlantic insurance policy.
Russia. Moscow’s approach in recent years was to focus primarily on 
its relationship with Belgrade, acquiring a major stake in Serbia’s energy 
sector in exchange for Russian backing of Serbia’s position over Kosovo 
in the UN Security Council. After the ICJ ruling of August 2010 on 
Kosovo independence and Belgrade’s newfound pragmatism, Russia too 
has had to adjust. There is therefore likely to be only limited Russian 
obstruction in the Balkans, in the form of an occasional reminder that 
the Kosovo precedent has implications for secessionist enclaves in the 
Caucasus and elsewhere. In other words, for Moscow the Kosovo issue 
remains primarily a bargaining chip to be used for the furtherance of 
its own geopolitical ambitions in its ‘near-abroad’.
Turkey’s policies are the third positive factor in relation to the EU’s role 
in the Balkans. There have been significant positive developments in 
relations between Turkey and several Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Greece 
and Serbia), which suggest that old animosities inherited from the past 
can be overcome. Turkey opened enlargement negotiations with the EU 
in October 2005 together with Croatia. The latter, however, seems likely 
to join the EU in 2013 while the Turkish negotiation seems open-ended, 
suggesting there is no direct connection between Turkey’s accession 
prospects and those of the countries of the Western Balkans.
It remains to be seen whether the favourable international environment 
makes it any easier for the EU to shape a coherent regional approach. 
The question goes back to the debate of the 1990s about the regional 
priorities of the Stability Pact for the Balkans versus the individual 
competition encouraged by the Stabilisation and Association Process. 
Today the EU must reconcile the diverse situations and relationships it 
has established with individual countries of the region with the need 
to deal with state-building issues such as borders and minorities, as 
well as single market issues such as trade and communications, which 
require a regional approach.
 The Western Balkans and the eU: ‘the hour of europe’
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There are two ways of assessing the situation in the region. One is to 
adopt the perspective of the EU Commission in its progress reports and 
to establish, in true regatta spirit, a ranking of the Western Balkans 
countries in their onward march towards EU membership. The other 
is to combine a broader regional picture with the view from the Balkan 
states themselves (the main aim of this volume), which shows the limits 
of individual, country-by-country approaches to the shared problems 
and remaining contentious issues and to EU integration. 
The EU is dealing basically with three main categories of countries. 
Croatia is about to conclude its entry negotiations and is set to join the 
EU in 2013, although given the pace of reform of the judiciary, not even 
Croatia can afford to be complacent; the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM) and Montenegro (now about to be joined by 
Serbia) have EU candidate status; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
remain the most difficult cases of belated transition from protectorates 
to prospective EU members. Albania should have been in the second 
category but – given extreme domestic political polarisation – does not 
seem quite ready yet to give priority to the European agenda.
However, quite apart from these favourable developments, the main 
case for a regional approach to EU enlargement in the Balkans stems 
from the specific nature of the region’s predicament: to reconcile the 
apparently contradictory tasks of nation-state building and European 
integration. The major difference with the countries of Central Europe 
is not just a time-lag or the degree of democratic consolidation but the 
question of statehood and state capacity. A democratic polity requires 
first of all a consensus on its territorial framework. As long as this was 
not established in the aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia and as 
long as issues pertaining to borders and national minorities shaped the 
political agenda, the chances of democratic consolidation remained 
slim. With the independence of Kosovo the redrawing of the map has 
been completed, but the successor states are still in the making: Kosovo 
in search of sovereignty and recognition; Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
search of a post-Dayton constitution (replacing a constitution designed 
to end the war with one for a functioning democratic polity); Serbia in 
search of accepted/acceptable borders with both abovementioned states 
(an equation complicated by its non-recognition of Kosovo and the 
ambivalence of its relations with Republika Srpska); Macedonia/FYROM 
in search of an identity and a name. For the first time the European 
Union, a project conceived in order to relativise states’ sovereignty, has 
become involved in the formation of new nation-states that also aspire 
to become members of the Union. Until now the EU’s transformative 
power has proved effective in integrating established states; now it is 
confronted with the challenge of integrating contested states.
10
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The process of accompanying the creation of future Member States has 
implications for the other closely-related aspect of state capacity. It is 
one thing for EU accession prospects to facilitate a reformist consensus 
among candidate states and sometimes to help tip the political balance 
in favour of democratic forces (as was the case a decade ago in Slovakia, 
Romania and Bulgaria) at the expense of post-communist nationalists. 
It is another to facilitate institution-building and state capacity. The dual 
question of statehood and state capacity is a specific feature of South-
East Europe and invites a search for a modified, adapted EU approach 
to enlargement. The argument that border and minority issues in the 
applicant states are interdependent strengthens the case for a concerted 
regional approach to EU enlargement. The shared European roof can 
help defuse contentious territorial and institutional issues in parallel 
to the EU accession process.
This is where the role of EU Member States directly involved in the 
region is of importance, although the contentious issues concerning 
the territorial waters between Croatia and Slovenia or concerning the 
Macedonia/FYROM name dispute are a reminder that an EU neighbour 
need not be a vector of integration. No less importantly, the ‘Cyprus 
lesson’ suggests that contentious issues should be solved prior to EU 
accession when the European leverage is strongest.
It would be unwise to let the current impression of drift spread in the 
region. The ‘regatta’ approach seems to work fine for the EU, as it makes 
the enlargement process ‘discreet’ enough to make it acceptable to Western 
public opinion and allegedly stimulating enough for the political elites’ 
reformist agenda in the Balkan countries concerned. But this is also 
where ‘enlargement fatigue’ within the EU meets ‘accession fatigue’ in the 
Balkans. The latter has two faces: the region’s political elites sometimes 
use verbal commitments to EU integration as a smokescreen for politics 
as a business model while we witness the erosion of popular support for 
EU accession: strongest where it is least advanced, in Albania, weakest 
where it is most advanced, in Croatia.
The EU should strengthen the regional approach by giving all the 
countries of the region candidate status and a date for the opening of 
negotiations. The pace and completion of the process will then depend 
on each country’s capacity to deliver, thus making their respective 
responsibilities clear and the political costs involved more palatable 
to political elites in the region. But that, in turn, requires the EU to 
overcome its hesitation between containment and integration and to 
renew its commitment to the Balkans’ European future in order to 
restore its credibility in the region and at international level.
11
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profile of the Balkan countries on the road to eU 
accession
Croatia: The frontrunner for EU accession, Croatia expects to join in 
2013. However, as the chapter on Croatia suggests, its accession path 
is overshadowed by three ambiguities: (1) the political identity of the 
new state shaped by its self-perception as both a victim of and a victor 
in the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution: a victim of Serbian aggression 
who was not helped by Europe, yet a victor in the war which achieved 
most of its objectives in nation-state building; (2) Croatia clearly favours 
the EU accession of the other Western Balkan countries in the long 
run yet it also often sees its own early entry as entailing a separation 
from the Balkans; (3) Croatia’s moderate nationalist elites have become 
‘Eurorealists’, favouring early entry into the EU, while the population 
seems clearly divided about the merits of joining the EU.
Serbia: A decade after the fall of Milosevic Serbia presents a contrasting 
situation. On the domestic front, Serbia is confronted with serious crises. 
They range from economic slowdown and significant deterioration in the 
living standards of the majority of the population, resulting in widespread 
disillusionment among citizens that is easily detectable in every aspect 
of public life. Yet at the same time democratic institutions have been 
consolidated and recently progress has been made in EU integration: 
the SAA agreement in 2008, the application for EU membership in 
2009, the introduction of visa-free travel within the EU in 2010 and 
Serbia’s candidate status should be confirmed in 2011. The consensus 
on Europe has grown but so has domestic disappointment with the 
post-Milosevic democratic elites.
BiH: Bosnia is facing its worst crisis since the end of the war in 1995 
and EU integration in BiH remains a distant goal. The persistence of 
nationalism following the October 2010 elections has dealt a severe blow 
to the integration process, with ethnic blocs sidelining the EU agenda. 
Furthermore, despite indications of public support for EU integration, 
statistics paint a depressing picture of the situation in BiH, reflecting the 
depth of the country’s social divisions and its lack of a common vision 
for the future. The EU Commission’s Progress Report in November 
2010 drew attention to the BiH authorities’ failure to make progress 
on key EU reforms and clearly identified obstacles standing in the 
way of EU integration. It highlighted yet again the need for functional 
constitutional reform, including mechanisms enabling the state to 
enforce harmonisation with EU legislation across the entire country, 
and took note of the Progress Report’s assessment that there had been 
little progress with improving governance and the functionality of the 
state. The international community’s attempts to urge constitutional 
reform on the country are continually undermined by resistance among 
the political elites, particularly in Republika Srpska, which has turned 
 The Western Balkans and the eU: ‘the hour of europe’
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into a ‘state within a state’ under the presidency of Milorad Dodik . 
Unfortunately, in the current climate, it seems that in BiH the EU is 
engaged in a war against the logic of conflicting nationalisms, and it is 
not winning this war.
Montenegro: The status of EU candidate country granted to Montenegro in 
December 2010 offers many opportunities and challenges to Montenegro 
and its government. However, there are still many serious problematic 
issues that need to be addressed urgently in order to speed up the EU 
integration process and the overall democratisation of Montenegro. 
These problems are well-recognised internally and most of them are 
addressed in the seven requirements set out by the EU as a condition 
for offering a date for the opening of membership negotiations with the 
EU. It is now up to the Montenegrin government to show that it can 
meet these conditions.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM): The country, 
like the rest of the region, has been severely affected by the global 
economic crisis (with one third of the population hit by unemployment). 
The government has responded by an expansion of the public sector 
with huge deficit spending and international borrowing. There are also 
concerns about rule of law, independent media, and civil society. But 
the main obstacle to the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration process 
remains formally the dispute over the ‘name issue’ with Greece. After 
two decades of fruitless diplomatic efforts and despite more frequent 
official meetings between the prime ministers of both countries in the 
last year, the matter has not moved forward in any significant way: the 
national posture on both sides prevails.
Kosovo: Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 
none of the predicted catastrophic scenarios have materialised. Now, 
following the ruling of the International Court of Justice of August 
2010 which declared that the declaration of independence was not in 
contradiction of international law, a new context is emerging. The process 
leading up to independence was quite carefully managed although a 
number of problems have arisen since independence.
Although independence was the product of an international process it 
faces problems of international legitimacy. Since the joint UN resolution 
of 2010 was drafted by the EU and Serbia the question has moved from 
the UN to the EU. Yet Kosovo was recognised only by 22 out of 27 EU 
Member States, which hampers the unity and effectiveness of the EU 
presence there (EULEX).
Internally, Kosovo must address a number of challenges ranging from 
weak institutions to fighting organised crime. But externally it has to 
combine the search for a new relationship with Serbia and EU integration. 
13
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What are the objectives of the negotiations with Serbia? To find a modus 
vivendi? If so, in which context and for what period of time? Or is the 
aim to search for a ‘historical accord’ as part of parallel EU accession? 
For the EU Kosovo will be among the tests of the effectiveness of 
the CFSP post-Lisbon. For the first time the EU is dealing with an 
‘unfinished state’, something requiring the establishment of rule of 
law and institution-building in Kosovo and consensus and political 
commitment in the EU.
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The Balkans as a european 
question
Jacques Rupnik
In the immediate aftermath of World War I which had started in the 
Balkans, Arnold J. Toynbee observed that what was then known as the 
‘Eastern question’ was in fact a ‘Western question’.1 Today, a decade after 
the end of the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the ‘Balkan question’ 
remains more than ever a ‘European question’. Bosnia was, in the eyes of 
many Europeans in the 1990s, the symbol of a collective failure, while 
Kosovo later became a catalyst for an emerging Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. In the last decade, with the completion of the process of 
redrawing the map of the region, the overall thrust of the EU’s Balkans 
policy has moved from an agenda dominated by security issues related 
to the war and its legacies to an agenda focused on the perspective of the 
Western Balkan states’ accession to the European Union, to which there 
has been a formal political commitment on the part of all EU member 
states since the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003. The framework was 
set, the political elites in the region were – at least verbally – making 
Europe a priority and everyone was supposedly familiar with the policy 
tools thanks to the previous wave of eastwards enlargement. With the 
region’s most contentious issues apparently having been defused, the 
EU could move from stability through containment towards European 
integration. What then is the difference between Central Europe and 
the Balkans? The answer is ten or fifteen years, the lost decade of the 
Balkans wars of the 1990s. 
Before endorsing such a reassuring presentation about the Western 
Balkans we should examine the favourable regional developments 
and international trends, but also the contentious issues and obstacles 
to the process. Some have to do with the uneven pace of reform and 
democratic change in the region, others with doubts about the existence 
of sufficient political will and momentum within the EU to support a 
renewed and sustained enlargement process.
1.  Arnold J.Toynbee, The 
Western Question in Greece 
and Turkey (London: 
Constable & Co, 1922).
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       The Balkans as a european question
International actors: ‘the hour of europe’
The ‘hour of Europe’, the memorable phrase coined by Jacques Poos, 
the Foreign Affairs Minister of Luxembourg and President of the EU 
Council in July 1991, was read in the Balkans at the very outbreak of 
the war as a display of presumably involuntary black humour. But two 
decades later the EU has indeed emerged as the main international actor 
in the Balkans. There are three factors that have recently reinforced its 
role as the key player in the region and which concern the evolution of 
the respective roles of the United States, Russia and Turkey.2
The United States. There has been a gradual convergence of European 
and American policies in contrast to the underlying transatlantic tensions 
that accompanied the two US-led military interventions in the 1990’s. The 
last decade was marked by a steady Europeanisation of the international 
presence in the Balkans, while US priorities continued the shift away from 
Europe that had begun with 9/11. The list of Washington’s international 
priorities today includes a ‘G2’ with China, a ‘reset’ with Russia, nuclear 
non-proliferation in Iran, the war in Afghanistan as a test for NATO 
and relations with Pakistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key to 
peace in the Middle East, and, most recently, the strategic implications 
of the 2011 ‘democratic wave’ in the Arab world.3 The Balkans is close to 
the bottom of the list, something which is not always fully appreciated 
in the region. To be sure, the visits to the region by Vice-President 
Biden in 2009 and Secretary Clinton in 2010 showed a continuing US 
engagement that several actors in the region (the Bosniaks, Kosovars, 
Albanians and Croats) deem crucial. But the general trend is clear enough 
and is not likely to change anytime soon. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Head 
of Policy Planning at the State Department, recently presented the first 
‘Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review’.4 It lists among 
the main themes: human security (as much as the military aspects), 
development (as important today as arms control issues were during 
the cold war), conflict prevention and the response to fragile states and 
divided societies. The Balkans was not mentioned, although all three 
issues are of course directly relevant for the region.
There are occasional transatlantic differences concerning the assessment 
of the region’s stability and over Bosnia in particular,5 with some policy 
implications: should the OHR be maintained or not? Is there a need 
for a US ‘special envoy’? There is also a consistent American insistence 
on a firm European commitment to prosecute war criminals through 
the ICTY in The Hague. Finally, there is concern about the possible 
implications of European disunity over the recognition of Kosovo.
Although scaling down the US engagement in the Balkans is consistent 
with the process of European integration now seen as ‘the only game in 
2.  To assess the contrast with 
the situation a decade ago 
see the relevant chapter on 
the US, Russian and Turkish 
policies and the transatlantic 
assessment by Pierre Hassner 
and Dana Allin in Jacques 
Rupnik (ed.) International 
Perspectives on the Balkans 
(Clemensport, NS: Canadian 
Peacekeeping Press, 2003).
3.  Álvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), 
‘The Arab Democratic Wave’, 
Report no. 9, European 
Union Institute for Security 
Studies, Paris, March 2011.
4.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
lecture at CERI, Sciences 
Po, Paris, 20 January 2011.
5.  Richard Holbrooke 
and Paddy Ashdown, ‘A 
Bosnian powder keg’ , The 
Guardian, 22 October 2008; 
also Patrice McMahon 
and Jon Western, in ‘The 
Death of Dayton’, Foreign 
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2009, present Bosnia 
as being on the verge of 
disintegration and call 
for international action to 
prevent a new conflict.
Jacques Rupnik
19
town’, the EU should encourage that engagement to continue, especially 
in view of the fact that the United States enjoys greater credibility 
than the Europeans, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia, and that its 
professed primary goal, precisely, is to assist the region’s accession to 
the EU. In short: European integration strengthened by an Atlantic 
insurance policy.
Russia under Putin has tried to regain a major role in the Balkans. In 
recent years it has acquired a significant capacity to make a nuisance of 
itself and has staged something of a comeback to the region, no longer 
with a vague rhetoric about solidarity with its Slav Orthodox brothers 
under threat, but seizing rather on the Kosovo question and the issue 
of energy supply. Russia has acquired a decisive position in the Serbian 
energy sector and Putin’s visit to Belgrade on 23 March 2011 was meant 
to breathe new life into the South Stream pipeline project. The Russians 
are trying to convey to the European states the message that they should 
welcome this rival to Nabucco as part of a necessary diversification of 
energy supply, especially given the current turmoil in the Middle East. 
The second parallel vector for Russia’s return to the Balkans has been 
the support it has given to Serbia’s claims on Kosovo. The consistency of 
the EU position on Kosovo’s self-determination and the ‘frozen conflicts’ 
in the Caucasus has, predictably, been called into question by Russia. 
To claim that these are self-serving arguments does not dispense with 
the need to address the tension that exists between the legitimacy of 
Kosovo’s independence and its difficult quest for international legality 
and recognition (by 65 states so far). The International Court of Justice’s 
ruling on August 2010 has considerably altered the picture. The current 
government in Belgrade is seen as being the most favourable to the EU 
in two decades. Their jointly proposed resolution in the UN and the 
more pragmatic stance taken by President Tadić, now ready to engage 
in concrete negotiations with Pristina, also has also implications for 
Russia’s role. Initially Belgrade’s approach was to make a deal with 
Russia, giving Moscow a stake in its energy sector while relying on its 
backing in the UN Security Council over Kosovo. After the ICJ ruling 
and Belgrade’s new pragmatism, Russia can hardly be ‘more Serbian 
than the Serbs’. There is therefore likely to be only limited Russian 
obstruction in the Balkans, in the form of an occasional reminder that 
the Kosovo precedent has implications for secessionist enclaves in the 
Caucasus and elsewhere. In other words, for Moscow the Kosovo issue 
remains primarily a bargaining chip to be used for its own claims in 
its ‘near-abroad’.
Turkey’s policies are the third favourable factor for the EU’s role in 
the Balkans. There have been significant and on the whole positive 
developments in the relations between Turkey and several Balkan 
countries (Bulgaria, Greece and most recently Serbia), which suggests 
that old animosities inherited from the imperial past can be overcome. 
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Turkey opened enlargement negotiations with the EU in October 2005, 
before the Balkan countries, which given that they used to be part of 
the Ottoman Empire, was from their perspective not least among the 
paradoxes of ‘Europeanisation’. To the extent that, historically, their 
national and European identities were constructed in opposition to 
the Ottoman legacy, it is by no means self-evident for them now to 
proclaim a concerted process of EU accession with Turkey.6 On the 
road to Brussels, hitch your wagon to the Orient Express from Istanbul! 
Following enlargement to include the countries of the former Habsburg 
Empire, is the next step a ‘post-Ottoman’ enlargement embracing south-
eastern Europe?
The case for geographic proximity and for the coherence of EU policy 
with regard to its south-eastern neighbours can and has been made. 
However, independently of its merits, the public reluctance that exists 
(particularly in Germany and France) with regard to EU accession by 
Turkey and the latter’s new assertiveness as an international player (its 
vote against the EU at the UN, presenting itself together with Brazil as 
a go-between in the negotiations with Iran), would suggest that, if one 
is serious about bringing the Western Balkan states into the EU, one 
may consider decoupling their European agenda from that of Turkey. In 
either case there is nothing in current Turkish policy that could weaken 
the EU’s position in the Balkans as the ‘only game in town’.
regional dimensions of state-building 
and eU integration
It remains to be seen whether the favourable international environment 
makes it any easier for the EU to shape a coherent regional approach. 
The question goes back to the debate of the 1990s about the regional 
priorities of the Stability Pact for the Balkans versus the individual 
competition encouraged by the Stabilisation and Association Process. 
Today the EU must reconcile the diverse situations and relationships it 
has established with individual countries of the region with the need 
to deal with state-building issues such as borders and minorities, as 
well as single market issues such as trade and communications, which 
require a regional approach.
There are two ways of assessing the situation in the region. One is to 
adopt the perspective of the EU Commission in its progress reports and 
to establish, in true regatta spirit, a ranking of the Western Balkans 
countries in their onwards march towards EU membership. The other 
is to combine a broader regional picture with the view from the Balkan 
states themselves (the main aim of this volume), which shows the limits 
6.  For a recent study of the 
evolving perception of 
Turkey see Bozidar Jezernik 
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Jacques Rupnik
21
of individual, country-by-country approaches to the shared problems 
and remaining contentious issues and to EU integration. 
The annual reports on the Western Balkan countries released in November 
2010 by the European Commission reveal a familiar blend of encouraging 
signs of progress and a long to-do list: the glass is both half full and 
half empty. In normal circumstances this might pass as the prosaic 
routine of the pre-accession process. But these are not quite ‘normal 
circumstances’, either for the EU or the Balkans A brief examination of 
recent changes and of the remaining obstacles can help set the framework 
for reconsidering and accelerating the enlargement process.
The EU is dealing basically with three main categories of countries. 
Croatia is about to conclude its entry negotiations and is set to join the 
EU in 2013; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia7 (FYROM) and 
Montenegro (now to be joined by Serbia) have EU candidate status; 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo still remain for all practical purposes 
two Europeanised semi-protectorates. Albania should have been in the 
second category but now seems adamant to prove it remains a separate 
case. As for the pace of reform,8 not even Croatia, the frontrunner, can 
afford to be complacent. In terms of economic performance, in 2007 
it surely could have joined the EU with Romania and Bulgaria, with 
which it also shares the need to fight corruption and reform its judiciary, 
which until recently had a backlog of almost two million cases pending. 
It certainly lacks a track record in appointing independent judges, 
particularly for the politically sensitive cases. Under pressure from the EU 
this may be changing: former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, the man who 
helped ‘Europeanise’ the nationalist HDZ inherited from the Tudjman 
era, has been in custody in Austria since December 2010 on charges of 
money-laundering and embezzlement, while several members of the 
government are also facing corruption trials. President Ivo Josipović’s 
European vision combining regional cooperation and EU integration9 
is certainly appreciated abroad, but is now confronted with mounting 
social discontent and euroscepticism at home.
At the bottom of the list are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo where 
divided polities and a dysfunctional institutional framework account, at 
least in part, for the inability to fight corruption and organised crime. 
A senior EU representative remarked with regard to Bosnia that this 
year’s report could have been called the ‘non-progress report’. The 
middle group comprises FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia, with their 
shared concerns regarding the rule of law and good governance, but 
where some progress is being made in terms of economic reform and 
regional cooperation. The EU’s belated visa liberalisation was certainly 
the most positive signal sent to the people of the region. How could 
they believe in the future of their country within Europe as long as they 
were not allowed to travel there? Only Kosovo remains set apart in a 
7.  The Institute follows 
the EU and UN decision 
concerning the name of this 
country: FYROM/ARYM (UN 
Resolutions 817 and 845/93). 
However, in this volume, 
external authors may have 
used different wording.
8.  Neil Mac Donald, ‘Pace of 
reform sets back Croatia’s 
EU hopes’, Financial 
Times, 3 March 2011.
9.  Ivo Josipovic, ‘Regional 
cooperation and EU 
integration: two foundations 
of the same process’, speech 
given at the Kennedy 
School of Government, 
Harvard University, 
11 February 2011.
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ghetto. Candidate status has been granted to FYROM and Montenegro, 
but postponed for Albania: it is not self-evident to invite a country 
whose June 2009 election results have still not been recognised by the 
opposition. The extreme and violent political polarisation has brought 
parliamentary life to a halt and the country to the verge of its worst 
crisis since the financial pyramid scandal of 1997.10 Candidate status 
will now be given to Serbia, because it was Belgrade that initiated some 
of the most encouraging changes of importance for the whole region.
In a clear departure from the tone and substance of the Kostunica 
government’s policies, in 2010 under Tadić’s leadership Serbia has 
replaced its pro-European stock phrases with an actual pro-European 
policy. The first necessary step was the normalisation of its relations 
with its neighbours. After a decade of wars of Yugoslav dissolution 
followed by a decade of recovery and stalemate, we have now seen a 
series of concrete steps being taken towards the recognition of crimes 
committed and a U-turn on the issue of Kosovo. Following tense 
relations with Croatia after mutual charges of genocide that were taken 
to the International Court of Justice in 2009, President Tadić found in 
his newly-elected Croatian counterpart, Ivo Josipović, a partner for a 
different approach.11 Tadić’s speeches during his visits to Srebrenica 
in Bosnia and to Vukovar in Croatia were meant as part of a process 
of reconciliation, opening a new phase in Serbia’s relations with its 
neighbours. Probably the main persisting obstacle to change in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is Republika Srpska which under Dodik behaves 
as a state within a state. The difference, however, is that Belgrade no 
longer supports its implicit separatism (and the same goes for Zagreb’s 
attitude towards the Croats in Herzegovina). On 31 March 2010 the 
Serbian Parliament passed by a narrow majority (127 votes in a 250-
seat legislature) a resolution accepting responsibility for a major crime 
committed by General Mladić’s troops in Srebrenica in 1995.12 A Serbo-
Croatian commission has been created to deal with the most difficult 
bilateral problems, a welcome precedent for Serbia’s relations with 
Kosovo. Independently of government efforts, a project sponsored by 
the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation suggests ways in 
which scholars from Serbia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav successor 
states can attempt to rid historiography of nationalist mythology and 
seek a shared narrative.13
It is indeed with regard to Kosovo that significant and unexpected 
changes have occurred. Serbia’s endorsement of a joint resolution with 
the EU at the UN General Assembly in September 2010 heralded a 
fundamental change in its dealings with Kosovo. In the past Kosovo 
Albanians considered the question of status as paramount, while Serbia 
preferred to deal with the technical issues. After Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in February 2008 there was a reversal of roles: Belgrade 
considered status talks to be a precondition for solving the practical 
10.  ‘Three men killed and sixty 
wounded in opposition 
protest’, Mathew Brunwasser, 
‘Two Men Jostle for Power’, 
The New York Times, 26 
January 2011. Edi Rama, the 
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11.  Marek Kubista, ‘Reprise 
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fr, 29 March 2010.
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problems while Pristina preferred to focus on specifics. In September 
2010 Serbia agreed to unconditional direct talks with Kosovo, primarily 
concerning Kosovo Serbs’ relations with Serbia, but also a series of 
concrete bilateral issues (ranging from customs to energy supply). 
This shift in the Serbian stance follows the International Court of 
Justice ruling of 22 July 2010 to the effect that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence is not contrary to international law. This was a blow for 
Serbia, which considered that it had a strong legal argument even if the 
political realities on the ground were moving in a different direction. 
What has happened since the summer of 2010 could be described as 
giving satisfaction to the Kosovars, with the ICJ ruling and above all the 
triumph of pro-European realism in Serbian politics. It was certainly also 
a success for the EU to have been able to draft a joint resolution with 
Serbia and emerge as the facilitator in the relations between Belgrade 
and Pristina. As a result, it was possible for direct talks between Serbia 
and Kosovo to start on 8 March 2011. Nobody can tell how long they 
will take or what the outcome will be once the most sensitive issues 
(such as Mitrovica and Northern Kosovo) are on the table. But if the 
EU provides the appropriate backing and political incentives, we may 
be closer to overcoming the most difficult security issue in the Balkans 
and what is potentially the main stumbling block in the EU’s attempts 
to stabilise and integrate the region.
One of the political obstacles to the development of regional cooperation 
in the immediate aftermath of the war was the underlying suspicion, 
particularly in Croatia, that it was an externally induced attempt to 
put back together something resembling former Yugoslavia. This is no 
longer so, as Tim Judah so pertinently observed: ‘From Slovenia to the 
Macedonian border with Greece, most people in the region still have a 
lot in common, even if they do not talk about it too much. Every day 
the bonds between them, snapped in 1990, are being quietly restored. 
Yugoslavia is long gone; in its place a Yugosphere is emerging’.14 This goes 
beyond the rhetorical posturing of Presidents Josipović and Tadićand 
concerns trade and restored links between companies, professions 
and citizens. Without overestimating the potential spillover effect of 
these developments, they create a favourable context for approaching 
EU integration beyond the logic of emulation and individual accession 
strategies.
However, besides these favourable developments, the main case for a 
regional approach to EU enlargement in the Balkans stems from the 
specific nature of the region’s predicament: to reconcile the apparently 
contradictory tasks of nation-state building and European integration. 
The major difference with the countries of Central Europe is not just 
a time-lag or the degree of democratic consolidation but the question 
of statehood and state capacity. A democratic polity requires first of 
all a consensus on its territorial framework. As long as this was not 
14.  Tim Judah, ‘Entering the 
Yugosphere’, The Economist, 
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established in the aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia and as long 
as issues pertaining to borders and national minorities shaped the 
political agenda, the chances of democratic consolidation remained 
slim. With the independence of Kosovo the redrawing of the map has 
been completed, but the successor states are still in the making. In 1988 
Zoran Djindic called Yugoslavia an ‘unfinished state’. Today Veton Surroi 
calls its successors ‘unfinished states’: Kosovo in search of sovereignty 
and recognition; Bosnia and Herzegovina in search of a post-Dayton 
constitution (replacing a constitution designed to end the war with one for 
a functioning democratic polity); Serbia in search of accepted/acceptable 
borders with both abovementioned states (non-recognition of Kosovo 
and ambivalence of its relations with Republika Srpska); Macedonia 
in search of an identity and a name. For the first time the European 
Union, a project conceived in order to relativise states’ sovereignty, has 
become involved in the formation of new nation-states that also aspire 
to become members of the Union. Until now the EU’s transformative 
power has proved effective in integrating established states; now it is 
confronted with the challenge of integrating contested states.
The process of accompanying the creation of future member states has 
implications for the other closely-related aspect of state capacity. It is 
one thing for EU accession prospects to facilitate a reformist consensus 
among candidate states and sometimes to help tip the political balance 
in favour of democratic forces (as was the case in Slovakia, Romania and 
Bulgaria) at the expense of post-communist nationalists. It is another 
to facilitate institution-building and state capacity. The dual question of 
statehood and state capacity is a specific feature of South-East Europe 
and calls for a modified, adapted EU approach to enlargement. The 
argument that border and minority issues in the applicant states are 
interdependent strengthens the case for a concerted regional approach 
to enlargement. The shared European roof is meant to help defuse 
contentious territorial and institutional issues in parallel to the EU 
accession process.  
To be sure, this is not a very popular argument with the Commission or 
the most advanced candidate countries. Indeed, no country’s accession 
should be hostage to the intransigence of its neighbour. But given, 
for instance, the interaction between different aspects of the ‘Serbian 
question’ (with Kosovo or Bosnia) it seems wise to build on the recent 
positive developments in order to encourage a regional approach to the 
resolution of those issues.15 
To sum up the favourable trends: the EU has emerged as the unchallenged 
international actor in the Balkans; the region, exhausted by a decade 
of conflict, is recovering stability and the capacity to cooperate; the 
EU has no other plausible enlargement agenda in sight and could use 
15.  Cf. ‘Pour une nouvelle 
entente balkanique’, 
special issue of Anatoli 
(CEMOTI), CNRS, Paris, 
September 2010.
Jacques Rupnik
25
the direct involvement of some of its member states in the region to 
facilitate the accession process.
Member states as vectors for eU 
integration?
It seems prudent from the EU’s perspective to make sure that contested 
issues in relation to ‘unfinished statehood’ are settled during the accession 
process when the EU’s leverage is strongest. A related assumption is that 
neighbouring EU member states can act as facilitators or ‘sponsors’ for 
that process of ‘Europeanisation’. A brief examination of some of the 
remaining obstacles casts doubt on this assumption.  
There are several contentious bilateral issues that could become serious 
obstacles to the EU accession process. Croatia, to take the frontrunner, 
has pending border issues with most of its neighbours. The easiest one 
to solve, or so it seemed, was that of Slovenia’s access to international 
waters. But in recent years this has escalated into a potential stumbling 
block for Croatia’s EU accession.16 Slovenia’s 2010 referendum on the 
proposed solution was a high-risk gamble that could have caused a 
major setback for Croatia’s EU prospects, with repercussions for the 
rest of the Western Balkans.
The second bilateral conflict that is becoming a serious obstacle on the 
road to the EU concerns Macedonia’s quest for a post-FYROM name 
and identity acceptable to its Greek neighbour. In 2009 Greece vetoed 
FYROM’s accession to NATO and there is little indication that it intends to 
be more flexible as far as EU accession is concerned. FYROM’s government 
(also exploiting adversity for domestic purposes) has now taken that 
obstruction to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, accusing 
Greece of having breached the provisions of their 1995 Agreement.17 
Above and beyond the unresolved name issue between Athens and 
Skopje, the Greek case has broader relevance for the EU’s enlargement 
to the Balkans.* Given its history, socio-economic development and 
political culture, Greece gives us an idea of what Bulgaria or Serbia 
would be like if they had not experienced a communist regime after 
World War II. A country that has been in the EU for some 30 years 
and has benefited considerably from its structural funds now reveals 
that it is bankrupt and does not have a functioning state. It is not clear 
who is supposed to learn from whom. In any case, the Greek crisis is 
bad news for the Balkans, as it affects the way the region is perceived 
within the EU; unless the country’s current financial crisis and massive 
16.  For a detailed presentation 
of the negotiations see 
Vasilka Sancin, ‘Slovenia-
Croatia Border Dispute: 
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October 2010, pp. 93-111.
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aid from its EU partners brings home the message that this is not the 
time to obstruct EU policy in the Balkans.
The Macedonian question reveals the tensions between EU policies 
in the Balkans and those of some of its member states. Some of them 
(Greece, Austria, Italy) for historical and geographic reasons have been 
directly involved and have been considered in Brussels as vectors of 
EU influence in the region. Others, such as new EU members Slovenia, 
Bulgaria and Romania, have a direct stake in the region’s stability and 
accession prospects. However, the problems faced by the latter two in the 
realm of the rule of law and the fight against corruption have increased 
reservations within the EU with regard to the ‘premature accession’ of 
other post-communist Balkan states. Proximity and involvement thus 
do not automatically make an EU member state a facilitator in the 
enlargement process.
The third warning for the EU in the region comes from Cyprus. It 
was included in the 2004 eastern enlargement at the insistence of 
Greece, on the assumption that accession to the European Union would 
simultaneously overcome the partition of the island in accordance with 
the Annan Plan.18 We know what happened to that assumption and the 
way the EU proved unwilling or unable to make full use of the leverage 
it enjoys at the moment of accession of a new member. The EU must 
now bear this in mind as the ‘Cyprus lesson’ in its future dealings with 
the Western Balkans. There will be no EU enlargement without the 
pending bilateral conflicts having been resolved first.
These developments should suffice to qualify the widespread assumption 
that an EU member state automatically acts as a stabiliser and as an 
‘advocate’ of a neighbouring country’s accession. Croatia’s inclusion 
in the EU would certainly contribute to stabilising its democracy and 
the rule of law. However, the impact on neighbouring Bosnia and 
Herzegovina remains debatable, as Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
holders en masse of Croatian passports, are losing interest in the future 
of their state. Croatia is the only European state with more voters 
than citizens! The passports delivered by Romania to an estimated 
800,000 citizens in Moldova, or by Bulgaria (on a much smaller scale) to 
citizens of FYROM pose a similar problem. What then is the European 
norm in the matter? In his essay Igor Štiks seeks in vain a coherent 
answer to this question. It surely cannot be that of Viktor Orban’s 
Hungary, holding the EU Presidency in 2011 while offering citizenship 
to Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states.19 But it confirms the 
importance of questions concerning the nature of citizenship and 
certain potentially destabilising effects of EU enlargement on some of 
its new neighbours. Any EU enlargement policy in the Balkans should 
entail careful consideration of its impact on fragile states that are not 
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included, and hence of its relationship with the EU’s neighbourhood 
policy and ‘Eastern partnership’.
Conclusions
These are some of the main challenges and dilemmas confronting the 
EU in its approaches to the Western Balkans. The common wisdom – 
which surely must be questioned – is that the ‘regatta’ approach works 
fine for the EU, as it makes the enlargement process ‘discreet’ enough to 
make it acceptable to Western public opinion and stimulating enough 
for the political elites’ reformist agenda in the countries concerned. No 
wonder ‘Europeanisation’ looks different depending on whether it is 
seen from Brussels or from the countries at the receiving end. 
This is also where ‘enlargement fatigue’ within the EU meets ‘accession 
fatigue’ in the Balkans. The latter has two faces: the region’s political 
elites sometimes use verbal commitments to EU membership as a 
smokescreen for politics as a business model. No less important is the 
erosion of popular support for EU accession (strongest where it is least 
advanced, in Albania; weakest where it is most advanced, in Croatia).20 
According to the Gallup Balkan Monitor, the majority of citizens in all the 
countries concerned (except Croatia) would vote for EU accession even 
though a majority in each of the EU candidate countries believes their 
country to be ‘heading in the wrong direction’.21 Hence the importance 
of checking such premature doubts about a process which has a long 
way to go and cannot succeed without the support of the societies 
concerned. This points to the limited effects of initiatives such as a 
‘summit to commemorate a summit’ (Sarajevo 2010 celebrates Zagreb 
2000) and to the need for tangible measures that citizens can directly 
identify with Europe. There is no doubt that visa liberalisation has been 
the most important such measure, both symbolically and politically, 
although provisionally leaving out Kosovo.
The agenda for the countries of the Western Balkans and for the EU seems 
clear enough. For the former it entails addressing the doubts raised about 
the rule of law after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria by tackling 
corruption, nepotism and the preference for by-passing legal norms. 
That implies dealing with the main sources of those phenomena, legacies 
of socialism (‘social capital’ means corrupt networks to get around the 
law), of the war economy (getting around embargoes by cooperating 
with organised crime) and of the market transition (with an opaque 
and largely corrupt privatisation process). Last but not least: the use of 
public sector employment for political patronage and state capture. 
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the political spectrum who 
consider that the EU did 
little for Croatia during the 
1990s war and that General 
Gotovina is a national hero 
whose handing over to the 
ICTY in The Hague was 
made a condition for opening 
accession talks with Croatia. 
The second comes from the 
young generation on the 
left: during their March 
2011 demonstrations in 
Zagreb they called for new 
elections, but also demanded 
the renationalisation of 
some parts of the economy, 
with slogans such as ‘No 
to capitalism’, ‘No to the 
EU’. This dual challenge 
to EU accession makes the 
outcome of the forthcoming 
referendum on EU entry 
a very uncertain one.
21.  Gallup Balkan Monitor, 
Brussels; see also the 
chapter by Robert 
Manchin in this volume.
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The dividing line in Balkan politics is not (or only very rarely) between 
liberal democrats who connect Europe with their civil societies, on 
the one hand, and authoritarian radical nationalists, on the other. 
In most cases one is dealing with a continuum of nationalisms and 
today the task of EU accession is mostly in the hands of governments 
composed of moderate nationalists. The case of Croatia suggests that 
pragmatic nationalists can be made ‘eurocompatible’: the evolution of 
the governments of the post-22Tudjman HDZ under Ivo Sanader and 
now Jadranka Kosor (under pressure from the EU and two successive 
presidents, Mesić and Josipović) paved the way. The process is now at 
work in Serbia, which has moved in a decade from radical to moderate 
nationalism: from Milosević to Kostunica and now Tadić.23 This shift in the 
centre of gravity of domestic politics, with the emergence of ‘eurorealism’ 
and pragmatism, will be essential for overcoming the abovementioned 
contentious issues and establishing a consensus on the reforms needed 
in order to complete the region’s EU accession process.
After the obstacles in the Balkans there are those that exist in the EU. 
The crisis of the euro and the challenges it poses to the EU’s cohesion 
and leadership raise concerns about the EU’s ability at the same time to 
keep an eye on the enlargement ball. It is not easy to promote openness 
and generosity (without which EU expansion to the Balkans is a non-
starter or merely a matter for technocrats) when the economy is in crisis 
and the politics of accountancy prevail. The result is mutual distrust or 
pretence: ‘We pretend we want you and you pretend you’re getting ready’. 
All this is only reviving suspicion in the Balkans about the plausibility 
of the enlargement agenda. The EU is seen as fussy about the process 
but uncertain about the outcome. For such doubts to be dispelled, 
two complementary things are needed. Firstly, a strong positive signal 
from Brussels, in the form of an accelerated and coherent EU regional 
expansion policy in the Balkans. Secondly, and no less importantly: the 
capacity of local actors to tackle the European reform agenda not just 
as something that is imposed from outside, but as domestic homework 
for any democratic European society in the twenty-first century.
The misunderstandings are not helped by the different and often confusing 
definitions of what ‘Europe’ or the ‘European project’ stands for. It can be 
summed up by three paradoxes. The European project since World War 
II stands for peace through institutionalised interdependence: ‘pooled 
sovereignties’ is just another term for the relativisation of nation-states 
and European integration becoming a vector for post-1989 globalisation. 
However, in the Balkans, since the early nineteenth century, the path 
to European modernity has been identified precisely with the building 
of nation-states. The EU is advocating the transposition of its model of 
peace through institutionalised interdependence to the Balkans, while at 
the same time, and most reluctantly, being drawn into a belated process 
of nation-state building or future member state-building.
22.  This argument was first 
developed by Jacques Rupnik 
in ‘The demise of Baklan 
nationalisms? A sceptical 
view’, in Judy Batt (ed.), 
‘The Western Balkans: 
Moving On’, Chaillot Paper 
no. 70, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris, October 2004.
23.  Milosević’s heirs in the 
Socialist Party (SPS) are 
now in the government 
coalition, applying for 
membership in the Socialist 
International and working 
for EU accession. Even the 
Radical Party (with V. Seselj, 
its founding-father, at the 
ICTY in The Hague) has 
toned down its europhobic 
nationalism in order to focus 
more on social discontent 
in its search for voters.
Jacques Rupnik
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A second paradox concerns multiculturalism: the EU, rightly, resists 
ethnic partition in Kosovo, Bosnia or FYROM in the name of a civic 
concept of the new nation-state in the making and of a multicultural 
society. This argument was voiced loud and clear in the 1990s by Western 
intellectuals, politicians and the media, creating legitimacy and public 
support for a European engagement, and even for military intervention 
against ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. Today the argument is 
becoming blurred as, in all corners of old and new Europe, we see a 
return of identity politics and the rise of national-populist forces on issues 
related to immigration and integration. If Chancellor Merkel declares 
that there has been a ‘complete failure of multiculturalism’ in Germany, 
how then do you promote it in Bosnia? We opposed ethno-nationalist 
logic in the Balkans only to discover it in our own midst.
The third paradox concerns public opinion in the applicant countries. 
According to various Gallup Balkan Monitor surveys,24 citizens become 
more sceptical the closer their country gets to EU accession. We knew 
about public opinion in Western Europe which, in the midst of a major 
economic crisis, might prefer to close the door in order to preserve 
an acquis (albeit one that is not always very communautaire). But now 
in the Balkans we are discovering what could be called ‘premature 
euroscepticism’ in proportion to the advancement of the accession 
process: Albanians seem to love the EU from a safe distance, the Croats 
resent it on their doorstep. The Serbs are somewhere inbetween. If 
confirmed, this trend would be extremely worrying, as there is no 
chance that enlargement could succeed without the support of public 
opinion and the involvement of civil society actors.
None of the above mentioned paradoxes would be sufficient on their own 
to undermine confidence in the process of the Balkans’ EU integration, 
but they happen to coincide with a crisis of confidence and leadership at 
the core of the EU. It is not easy to expand the Union to the periphery 
when its very core seems in doubt or otherwise engaged.
This situation may lead some to call for a combination of Gramscian 
‘pessimism of reason’ and ‘optimism of the will’. Indeed, some NGOs, 
think-tanks and indignant advocacy groups are calling for the process to 
be speeded up and one can only sympathise with their efforts. It seems 
to us, on the contrary, that there may well be grounds for pessimism 
about political will in the EU, while remaining optimistic about the 
imperatives of reason. Unlike in the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions 
in eastern and central Europe, the case for the EU’s expansion to the 
Balkans cannot be based on the emotional appeal of the ‘return to 
Europe’. Nor can the élan come from the sympathy and humanitarian 
response inspired by the tragedies of the 1990s. The European promise 
to the Balkans must remain based on reasoned arguments about what 
is at stake for the region and the EU.
24.  Gallup Balkan Monitor, 
Brussels (see also the 
chapter by Robert Manchin 
in this volume).
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Here are three (among a number of other) arguments to support a realist’s 
case: political success, self-interest and credibility. EU enlargement to 
the Balkans represents the pursuit of its most successful policy since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is not called into question within the 
EU and remains, for the foreseeable future, the only plausible prospect 
for EU enlargement. The inclusion of the countries of the Western 
Balkans will represent an addition of some 20 million to the EU’s a 
half a billion citizens. When considering the costs of enlargement in a 
context of budgetary restrictions one must not forget the costs of non-
enlargement. The cost of the wars and subsequent recovery programmes 
has been estimated at $100 billion for the 1990s alone.25 Without credible 
prospects of accession to the EU the latter’s influence will recede among 
the political elites and more radical forms of nationalism are likely to 
resurface around the unresolved contentious issues pertaining to the 
‘unfinished states’ of the Balkans. Without a tangible and assertive 
European commitment to the Balkans, the progress made over the last 
decade could unravel, at enormous political and financial cost to an 
EU which would then be forced to return to a logic of protectorates. 
What such a failure of Europe’s transformative power would do to its 
attractiveness as an inspiring model of institutionalised interdependence 
is open to debate. What is absolutely sure, however, is that this would 
shatter the EU’s credibility as an international actor. What credibility 
would it have in dealing with crises in the Middle East, Africa or Asia 
if it were unable to fix problems in its own backyard? Ivan Krastev 
argued a few years ago that the choice facing the EU in the Balkans is 
between enlargement and Empire. It would seem rather to be one of 
European enlargement as a ‘substitute for an empire’,26 a common roof 
for the completion of the unfinished states, with nation-state building, 
a regional approach and European integration as three dimensions of 
that process.
For these reasons the Balkans requires a rethink of the EU approach to 
enlargement, which cannot simply replicate the pattern so successfully 
applied in Central Europe. The EU should strengthen the regional 
approach by giving all the countries of the region candidate status and 
a date for the opening of negotiations. The pace and completion of the 
process will then depend on the capacity to deliver of each country’s 
political elite, thus making their respective responsibilities clear and 
the political costs of failure more palatable. But that, in turn, requires 
the EU to overcome its hesitation between containment and integration 
and to renew its commitment to the Balkans’ European future in order 
to restore its credibility in the region and at international level.
25.  A. Ross Johnston, ‘An 
assessment of the decade 
of Western peacekeeping 
and nation-building in the 
Bakans’, East European 
Studies Special Report, 
Woodrow Wilson Center, 
May 2003, p. 3.
26.  Jacques Rupnik, ‘L’Europe 
centrale et les Balkans à la 
recherche d’un substitut 
d’empire’, in Anne-Marie 
Le Gloannec et Aleksander 
Smolar (eds.), Entre Kant 
et Kosovo (Paris: Presses 
de Sciences Po, 2003).
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Chapter 1 
Turning nationalists into eU 
supporters: the case of Croatia
Dejan Jović
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent 
the official views of any institution.
Introduction
Providing that nothing unexpected happens in the last phase of the 
accession talks between Croatia and the European Union, it is likely 
that they will be completed in the autumn of this year. Once the Treaty 
of Accession is signed, it will be followed by a referendum in Croatia 
on joining the European Union, which – providing there is sufficient 
support for EU membership among Croatian voters – will in turn be 
followed by a longer process of national ratification in the EU Member 
States. Although no date has been officially set, even for the completion 
of the accession talks, Croatian political leaders hope for EU entry on 
1 January 2013,1 while EU officials indicate that this might not happen 
before the end of 2013 or even in 20142 provided there are no further 
complications in the ratification process. 
Croatia has always insisted on an ‘individual approach’ to membership 
for each candidate country and has persistently rejected any grouping 
with other Western Balkan states, arguing that other candidates in the 
region are too far behind in post-war reconstruction and in establishing 
stable democratic institutions and practices. Furthermore, they have 
unresolved internal issues, open disputes with their neighbours and 
internal border disputes (Serbia and Kosovo). Croatia’s journey towards 
EU membership would only be slowed down if it was grouped with 
other states. This does not mean that the Croatian authorities do not 
support their neighbours’ EU membership bids. On several occasions in 
2010 and 2011 Croatian officials explicitly encouraged other countries 
in the Western Balkans to speed up reforms in order to become credible 
candidates for EU membership as soon as possible. President Josipović 
promised that once it joins the EU and becomes a full participant in 
debates on further enlargement Croatia would do nothing to slow down 
or block Serbia’s or Bosnia and Herzegovina’s entry.3 Moreover, recent 
1.  See President Ivo Josipović’s 
statement at: http://www.hrt.
hr/index.php?id=48&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=93587&tx_tt
news%5BbackPid%5D=4
8&cHash=e46b727876.
2. See statement by Hannes 
Swoboda at: http://www.
jutarnji.hr/hannes-swoboda-
-hrvatska-ce-u-eu-uci-tek-
krajem-2013-/920502/.
3.  See Dejan Jović, ‘Palubna 
diplomacija i funkcionalna 
suradnja: hrvatsko-srpski 
bilateralni odnosi na početku 
mandata Ive Josipovića’, 
Izazovi evropskih integracija, 
vol. 11, pp. 27-42. 
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opinion polls conducted by Eurobarometer in autumn 20104 show that 
the majority of Croats – unlike the majority in the EU 27 – support the 
EU membership bids of all the Western Balkan countries. For example, 
while 66 percent of Croats would support Montenegro’s membership, only 
36 percent in the EU 27 are in favour of it. Support for other countries 
is also high: for Bosnia and Herzegovina 74 percent (as against only 35 
percent in the EU 27), for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(72 percent (as against 35 percent in the EU 27), for Kosovo 66 percent 
(29 percent), for Albania 65 percent (29 percent), and even for Serbia 
61 percent (and only 34 percent in the EU 27). 
Paradoxically, by relying only on public opinion polls, one could indeed 
conclude that more Croats support Serbia’s EU membership than that 
of Croatia. Although the polls show that support for membership 
has increased in the last year of negotiations, Croats remain largely 
unconvinced of the benefits of EU membership. The last Eurobarometer 
survey shows that only 27 percent of Croats believe that EU membership 
would be good for their country, while 29 percent think it would be 
bad for Croatia (41 percent says it would be neither good nor bad). Only 
37 percent expect Croatia to benefit from EU membership, while 54 
percent think there would be no benefits at all. There is a widespread 
sense of unease that EU membership would bring new opportunities for 
foreigners (i.e. Europeans) to buy Croatian real estate, in particular on 
the Adriatic coast. In addition, jobs that are now available exclusively 
to Croatian nationals (and de facto this means all jobs, since very few 
are advertised without a request for domovnica, a certificate of Croatian 
nationality) would also be available to other EU citizens, irrespective 
of their nationality. Due to factors that will be explained below, the 
general image of the EU is less positive in Croatia than in most other 
EU countries. Only 28 percent of Croats have a ‘predominantly positive 
image of the EU’, while 25 percent have a ‘predominantly negative’ 
one.5 Nevertheless, a poll conducted by Croatian pollster Ipsos Puls in 
November 2010 shows that Croats are unlikely to reject EU membership 
in an eventual referendum. Of the total population, 52 percent are in 
favour of joining the EU and 35 percent are opposed to it. There was an 
alleged increase of 10 percent in the number of people supporting EU 
membership between June and November 2010, which goes to show 
how volatile public opinion is with regard to this issue.6 
Based on these data one might conclude that there is not much enthusiasm 
for EU membership in Croatia. Yet it is as if there is a sense of inevitability 
about it. Media reports on the EU accession talks have been rather 
technical, often using new jargon that means little to the general public. 
Most have simply stated which ‘chapter’ in the EU negotiations has 
been opened and closed, without describing the actual substance of 
the process and what it really means. This has left the impression that 
the entire EU accession process is something technical and better left 
4.  See: http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/
eb74/eb74_hr_hr_nat.pdf.
5.  See: http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/
eb74/eb74_hr_hr_nat.pdf.
6.  See: http://www.poslovni.
hr/vijesti/istrazivanje-
rast-podrske-pristupanju-
eu-165356.aspx.
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to politicians, experts and the state administration. There again, the 
negotiators themselves have preferred to be left to their own devices, 
rather than having to face sometimes difficult questions and protests 
by various segments of the general public. No politician anywhere is 
likely to gain popularity by talking about the EU – and the same was 
(and still is) the case in Croatia. 
The public opinion data correspond to what can be seen in Croatia 
itself. Most Croats believe that it is decisions made somewhere else 
and by somebody else that will (or will not) lead to EU membership. 
They do not feel that they can influence the decision in any particular 
way. This is not really surprising. People (not only in Croatia) rarely 
feel that they can influence political decisions, be it on a local, national 
or supranational level. The less influence they have, the more distant 
these issues are from their own personal lives. Croats are no exception 
to this general trend in Europe. Thus they believe that even if they voted 
‘No’ in the referendum on EU membership, the pro-EU political elite 
would manage to find a way to overturn the result; if in the end Croatia 
did not achieve membership, then it would be due to decisions taken 
by external forces (the EU itself or some of its Member States) and not 
because Croatia had done or failed to do something. This sense of the 
outcome being all but inevitable, regardless of what happens on the 
ground, is at the root of the relative indifference in Croatia towards EU 
accession. It also means that Croats’ expectations of the EU are fairly 
low, and consequently Croats are actually unlikely to be disappointed 
once they enter the EU. Those who are likely to be disappointed are 
those who expected much more than can be delivered, which is not 
the case here.
Nevertheless, at this stage it does indeed look as if Croatia has advanced 
towards achieving the paramount (and some would even say the only) 
foreign policy objective: membership of the EU; and it is indeed very 
likely to become the 28th Member State. The fact that there is not much 
enthusiasm for membership still needs to be addressed during the 
referendum campaign on membership. The real challenge will be how 
to convince moderate (and as yet unconvinced) Croatian nationalists – 
especially those who participated in the war of independence (known 
in Croatia as the Homeland War) – that joining the EU does not mean 
losing sovereignty. To do this, the pro-EU political elite will need to 
get across the message that EU membership is the final stage on the 
long road of transition from ‘the Balkans’ (personified in the concept 
of Yugoslavia) to ‘Europe’ (i.e. the European Union, which for all intents 
and purposes is referred to as Europe, and which in this paper we will 
also call Europe). The aim is to show that, by joining the EU, Croatia 
would be more protected, more influential and more respected in the 
community of nation states; that it will have achieved not only symbolic 
recognition (such as in 1992) but real recognition of its statehood. If this 
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strategy is successful, the pro-EU forces are likely to win the day and 
secure sufficient support for a ‘Yes’ vote. In this author’s view, due to 
circumstances that are specific to Croatia, this argument has perhaps 
more chance of convincing nationalists in Croatia than in other EU 
countries. However, as in all EU Member States, the battle between 
nationalists and anti-nationalists will never be over. The forces of 
nationalism will keep challenging the European Union as a concept and 
will agree to compromise only when and if it is instrumental to their 
national interests. In the case of Croatia this is likely to be manifested 
in a policy of opposing any further EU enlargement towards Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and imposing more bilateral conditions for 
supporting further enlargement into the remaining Western Balkan 
states. 
Croatia’s fivefold transition: from war to 
peace
Croatia’s accession to the European Union is a more complex process 
than any previous one due to the fact that the country was at the centre 
of the post-Yugoslav conflicts and wars. While Slovenia also experienced 
some resistance to its independence in 1991, the violence was limited 
to ten days of conflict with only a dozen casualties. Soviet intervention 
was also rather limited in scope in the Baltic states once they had 
indicated their intention to break away from the Soviet Union. But in 
Croatia’s case, the entire first decade of independence was marked by 
internal and external conflicts over its borders and internal disputes 
over its constitutional structure. It was not until January 1998 that the 
last part of the territory of what used to be the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia (1945-1991) was reintegrated into the post-Yugoslav Republic 
of Croatia. The intensive military conflict lasted from August 1991 
until January 1992 but peace did not arrive until August 1995, when 
the largest part of the self self-proclaimed secessionist Krajina region 
was defeated militarily and incorporated into the newly independent 
Croatia. The war claimed some 20,000 lives all told (including both 
military and civilian deaths). Even now, 20 years after the beginning 
of the conflicts, there are still about 2,000 people missing as a direct 
result of the atrocities. The bodies of some victims might never be found, 
as they were most likely transported to other territories of the former 
Yugoslavia, or even abroad. Some of those who died were reportedly 
buried beneath or beyond the minefields which have still not been 
completely cleared.7 Some were buried in unknown locations, while 
other bodies were hidden in already existing graves, under other people’s 
names. The problem of missing people is still high on the agenda of 
bilateral relations between Serbia and Croatia, as demonstrated at three 
7.  Croatia plans to clear 
the remaining minefields 
by 2019. Currently, 994 
square kilometres are 
still laid with mines. See: 
http://www.24sata.hr/
politika/razminiranje-
hrvatske-bi-trebalo-
zavrsiti-do-2019-50486.
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meetings between Serbian President Boris Tadić and Croatian President 
Ivo Josipović in 2010.8 
In addition, the Serbo-Croatian war of the early 1990s created about 
half a million refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). In the first 
phase of the war, there were about 250,000 registered IDPs and refugees, 
mostly ethnic Croats who had to leave Krajina and neighbouring Bosnia 
and Herzegovina which had been at war in 1992-1995. But after 1995, 
most ethnic Serbs from Croatia had become refugees in neighbouring 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result of the war, the ethnic 
Serb community in Croatia was reduced to approximately one third of 
its pre-war size. While in 1991 there were 581,663 Serbs (12.2 percent 
of the total population of Croatia), in the 2001 census there were only 
201,631 (4.5 percent). Moreover, those who in previous censuses had 
declared themselves as ‘Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense’ also disappeared 
after the collapse of Yugoslavia. In 1981 there were 379,057 ethnic 
Yugoslavs (8.2 percent of the Croatian population), while even in 1991 
(at the moment when the conflicts in Yugoslavia had already started and 
the process of disintegration was at an advanced stage) 106,041 Croatians 
(2.2 percent of the population) declared themselves Yugoslavs in the 
ethnic sense. Most of them changed their ethnic self-definition (which 
in Yugoslavia and in all post-Yugoslav states was one of the fundamental 
markers of political and social identity) under heavy pressure and as 
part of the policy of voluntary or (in most cases) involuntary assimilation. 
Consequently, after the war, Croatia became a de facto mono-ethnic 
country. While in 1991 ethnic Croats made up 78.1 percent of its 
population, in 2001 they accounted for 89.6 percent. 
The war thus dramatically changed the nature of Croatian society which 
historically had been fairly open to the influences of other cultures. 
Croatia’s transition was therefore unique and much more complex than 
in any other EU candidate country. It was a case not of triple9 or even 
quadruple10 transition, but fivefold, having an additional – fifth – element: 
the transition from war to peace. In Croatia’s case, not only have the 
political and economic system changed, the very identity of the state 
and the nation went through a radical and thorough transformation 
after 1989. The fact that it experienced major conflict has made its 
democratisation and Europeanisation much more difficult. Although 
unique compared to any other previous EU accession state, Croatia is 
only the first in a series of similar cases that might follow if the EU opts 
to expand further into the Western Balkans. All the potential candidate 
countries in Southeast Europe had similar experiences in the 1990s, 
although not to the same extent. 
In Croatia, just as in other countries of the post-Yugoslav area, the 
political culture of the 1990s – and to a degree of the 2000s as well – 
was marked by nationalism, not by multiculturalism. The principles of 
8.  ‘This is the primary, 
central issue in our bilateral 
relations. This issue has to 
be resolved so that we show 
to everyone that we care 
about the victims of the war 
and those who were left 
behind them’, said President 
Tadić on 24 November 2010. 
http://www.komentar.hr/
portal/vijesti/svijet/5369.
9.  Claus Offe, Varieties of 
Transition: the East European 
and East German Experience 
(London: Polity Press, 1996). 
10.  Taras Kuzio, ‘Transition 
in Post-Communist States: 
Triple or Quadruple?’, 
Politics, vol. 21, no. 3, 
2001, pp. 168-77. 
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internationalism and multi-ethnicity that dominated Yugoslav politics 
(and the European international system during the Cold War in response 
to the radical nationalism of the Second World War) were quickly 
abandoned and replaced by a ‘return to nationalism’, following similar 
trends in Eastern Europe after the 1989 ‘revolutions’. The main objective 
was to create, defend and strengthen the newly achieved statehood, not to 
preserve diversity and increase interaction. Politics of ‘ethnic engineering’ 
comprised a range of political and legal measures which favoured ethnic 
Croats – including members of the Croat ethnic community who lived 
in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina – and discriminated against 
all minorities, especially ethnic Serbs from Croatia. Even if the laws 
were subsequently changed to avoid discriminatory practices, they 
were often implemented according to ethno-nationalist objectives and 
principles. In the early 1990s this was most evident in the policy of 
citizenship,11 while throughout the post-1995 period there was a high 
degree of bias against ethnic Serbs from Croatia in the Croatian judicial 
system, especially in cases related to war crimes.
On the whole, it can be said that Croatian nationalism more or less 
succeeded in achieving its main objectives in the 1990s, and was perhaps 
more successful than any other brand of post-Yugoslav nationalism. The 
three main objectives it achieved were: (a) international recognition 
of Croatia, despite initial hesitation and resistance on the part of the 
main European and global powers; (b) successful reintegration of all the 
territories that used to belong to the Socialist Republic of Croatia; and 
(c) an ethnically more homogenous Croatia than at any time in the past, 
with the size of its ethnic minorities much reduced. Ethnic homogeneity 
was one of the main objectives of all ethnic nationalisms in the Western 
Balkans, but nowhere else has it been so successful than in Croatia 
during the 1990s. Furthermore, by granting de facto citizenship to all 
the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia enhanced its political 
influence over this neighbouring and complex country, without any 
territorial expansion. It used politics of dual citizenship not only to 
protect ethnic Croats (who found themselves torn between loyalties to 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) but also to advance its political 
objectives in the Western Balkans.12 At the same time Croatia skilfully 
avoided international sanctions and isolation, although its initial policy 
towards Bosnia and Herzegovina took it dangerously near. If there was any 
clear winner of the wars of the 1990s, it was Croatia, or rather Croatian 
nationalism. Indeed, this is how Croatian nationalists describe their own 
successes in the 1990s: as a victory for the Croatian cause, sometimes 
against all odds and mostly without significant EU support.13
The consequences were and still are significant: such victory not only 
strengthened Croatian nationalism domestically but also determined 
Croatia’s stance towards Europe. If you (unexpectedly) win a war, you 
do not heed any ‘conditionality policy’ or any such similar advice from 
11.  Igor Štiks, ‘The Citizenship 
Conundrum in post-
Communist Europe: The 
Instructive Case of Croatia’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, 
no. 10, 2010, pp. 1621-38. 
12.  That being said, the author 
does not argue against the 
policy of dual citizenship 
when it comes to Croats 
(or anyone else in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina). If 
introduced now, a ban on 
dual citizenship would force 
ethnic Croats to opt for one 
of two citizenships. If faced 
with such choice, a very 
large majority would chose 
Croatian citizenship and 
renounce Bosnian, if not 
for any other reason than 
because Croatian citizenship 
is soon to become also EU 
citizenship, with all the 
benefits that status brings. 
As a consequence, they 
would become foreigners in 
their own country of birth 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
which could lead to a wave 
of migration from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to Croatia. This 
would in fact make Bosnia 
and Herzegovina less likely 
to remain multi-ethnic, and 
would in fact be another 
victory for ethnic nationalists 
in their attempt to construct 
mono-ethnic societies.
13.  Croatian nationalists 
acknowledge the fact that 
they had support from the 
United States, especially in 
the final military and police 
operations in the Homeland 
War, such as Operations 
Flash and Storm in 1995.
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the European Union. If you are convinced you were able to win a war 
on your own merits, it is difficult to accept external pressure to reform. 
Those who won the war are unlikely to agree to their policies and actions 
being thoroughly scrutinised. The increased confidence that came with 
winning the war was a major stumbling block to initial cooperation 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Pressure from the ICTY on Croatia, as well as EU pressure for reforms, 
was not at all welcome in Croatia which was the only post-Yugoslav 
state that could claim victory in the wars of the 1990s.14
The other fundamental element of Croatia’s post-war identity was 
based on the notion of victimhood. In Croatian political circles – 
and in Croatian society in general – Croatia was viewed not only as 
the winner of the war, but also as a victim of that war.15 The official 
narrative – which was soon to focus on glorifying the Homeland War 
(domovinski rat) – presented Croatia as the victim of foreign (Serbian/
Montenegrin) aggression. This narrative insists on the inter-state and 
inter-ethnic nature of the war, and rejects any attempt to describe the 
conflict as a ‘civil war’. Ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region (and often 
Serbs in general) are described as ‘foreign invaders’ who committed an 
act of international aggression (invasion), although they did not come 
to Croatia from anywhere else (at least not in the last few centuries) but 
were in fact born and lived in Croatia. But because the secession was 
organised and supported by Belgrade, the areas that declared secession 
from Croatia were treated as ‘occupied’. This narrative then served to 
justify the expulsion of the ‘occupiers’ and restrictive measures when it 
comes to their returning home. In the nationalist narrative that emerged 
in the first years of independence, ethnic Serbs were collectively treated 
as ‘guests’ in what is essentially an (ethnically) Croat homeland. They 
were not seen as an integral part of Croatian society but rather as 
temporary and undesirable inhabitants.
In addition, Croatia declared itself a victim of the passivity and 
indifference with which the European Community approached the 
post-Yugoslav crisis from 1991 to 1995. Croatian nationalists are largely 
critical of Europe’s role during the breakup of Yugoslavia, blaming it 
for being too passive in preventing the worst consequences of the war, 
for being morally deficient and completely insensitive to the suffering 
of other Europeans or for wanting to maintain the status quo, namely 
Yugoslavia, for too long. On more than one occasion, former President 
Tudjman criticised Europe for not helping Croatia. Without decisive 
US intervention in 1994 and 1995 (via Washington and the Dayton 
Agreement), the war in the former Yugoslavia would have caused even 
more casualties. Thus, while the United States understood the plight of 
the victims, Europe failed to do so. Subsequently, Croatian nationalists 
and supporters of sovereignty became even more dismissive of Europe. 
It had not helped the victim and got involved only to apply pressure on 
14.  For the ICTY and Croatia 
see: Christopher K Lamont, 
International Criminal Justice 
and the Politics of Compliance 
(London: Ashgate, 2010). 
15.  Victor Peskin and 
Mieczysław Boduszyński: 
‘International Justice 
and Domestic Politics: 
Post-Tudjman Croatia 
and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia’, Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 55, no. 
7, 2003, pp. 1117-42. 
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the winner. This came on top of the ideological scepticism with which all 
nationalists in principle view the European ‘experiment’. The European 
Union is – after all – an alternative to the old Westphalian state system 
in which only nation states matter. It combines national sovereignty 
with functional institutionalised cooperation, something about which 
nationalists would by definition be sceptical. In the case of the post-
Yugoslav states, the ambition to create new states out of multiethnic 
Yugoslavia led to the victory of nationalism over any alternatives. In 
order to create new states, a degree of nationalism was inevitable, and 
the political elite used all means available to promote it.16 In this context 
it was only logical that the membership of the European Union was not 
seen as a priority over the objective of consolidating the new statehood. 
If membership of any international organisation was desirable, then it 
would be the United Nations and NATO. While membership of the 
United Nations meant confirmation of newly achieved statehood and 
thus had high symbolic value, membership of NATO (which Croatia 
achieved in 2009) offered an additional guarantee of safety and protection 
and thus increased the level of de facto sovereignty. The 1991-95 war 
thus provided the context within which Euroscepticism flourished in 
newly independent Croatia. 
Constructing a new narrative: making 
nationalism compatible with eU 
membership
In response, pro-EU forces in Croatia need to show that in order to 
have a functioning and independent state, Croatia needs to be a member 
of not only NATO but also the European Union, as it is the only way 
for Croatian national interests to be fully protected. It is not enough 
to declare sovereignty as such: a declaration can still be challenged 
and is purely symbolic unless there are sufficient guarantees from 
powerful, international actors. By joining the EU, Croatia will be offered 
a seat among the powerful nations of Europe, and will thus gain real 
power. EU membership is in direct continuity with the declaration of 
independence, and is its culmination. 
The Croatian position towards EU membership changed in 2000, 
not because of a complete rejection of the nationalist narrative but 
rather because it has been reinterpreted in such a way as to present 
EU membership as the final stage in the process of making Croatia an 
independent and sovereign state. EU membership is now seen as the 
final step in the long process of transition which started with the formal 
declaration of independence from Yugoslavia but will only end once 
16.  For transformation of 
elite nationalism into 
popular nationalism, see 
Catherine Baker: Sounds 
of the Borderland: Popular 
Music, War and Nationalism 
in Croatia since 1991 
(London: Ashgate, 2010). 
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Croatia no longer feels that its survival as an independent state is being 
challenged. In the years of war and post-war reconstruction, Croatia 
was a sovereign state in name only. In reality, for a long time it was not 
in full control of its territory due to the presence of secessionist forces 
(supported, financed and politically controlled by Serbia during most of 
the war) as well as UN peacekeepers and other international observers 
in the United Nations protected areas of Krajina and Eastern Slavonia. It 
was also exposed to de facto interventionism as a result of the activities 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
whose jurisdiction and authority significantly reduced the independence 
of Croatia’s political and judicial systems. Although Croatia began to 
reflect on the crimes committed by its own side in the post-Yugoslav 
wars (especially since 2001), had it not been for permanent pressure 
from the ICTY, its own prosecutors would have been rather reluctant 
and much more hesitant to prosecute. Finally, the EU conditionality 
policy further reduced the de facto sovereignty of the new Croatian 
state as regards domestic public policies. Over the last six years, since 
the accession talks began, the Croatian authorities have been obliged 
to implement reforms that otherwise they would rather have avoided. 
But it is primarily because of the prospect of EU membership that they 
decided to change. 
This cooperation would not have been possible if the mainstream 
nationalist narrative developed by the Croatian political elite, including 
the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) which led the country for 17 out 
of 20 years since independence,17 had not incorporated the objective of 
EU membership. The HDZ now argues that without EU membership, 
Croatia would remain a semi-sovereign country, still under heavy 
pressure from external forces. It would be much more vulnerable to 
potential tensions in the region of Southeast Europe, particularly in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina which shares a 932-kilometre border with 
Croatia and where some 450,000 Croatian nationals live. Furthermore, 
by becoming a member of the EU, Croatia would disassociate itself from 
the complexity of the ‘Western Balkans’, a concept invented to describe 
a specific group of countries which emerged out of Yugoslavia but were 
not yet fully consolidated, plus Albania. By becoming part of Europe, 
Croatia would finally – and once and for all – ‘leave the Balkans behind’. 
One of the key claims of the Croatian nationalist discourse – that Croatia 
is a Central European, not a Balkan country – would finally materialise. 
Ever since the Yugoslav state was created in 1918, Croatian nationalist 
discourse argued against it on the grounds that Yugoslavia pushed 
Croats into the Balkans, a place where they did not belong. Even after 
the collapse of Yugoslavia, Croatia was still seen as part of the Western 
Balkans and not really as part of Europe. This view was compounded 
by the fact that in Europe there was a tendency to treat the Balkans as 
a ‘European backyard’ rather than as a room in its house. Europe also 
referred to ‘the Balkans’ as being the ‘other Europe’. In the collective mind 
17.  For the transformation of 
HDZ in the early 2000s, 
see: Dejan Jović, ‘Croatia 
after Tudjman: the ICTY 
and issues of transitional 
justice’, in Judy Batt and 
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik 
(eds.), ‘War Crimes, 
conditionality and EU 
integration in the Western 
Balkans’, Chaillot Paper no 
116, June 2009, pp. 13-27. 
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the Balkans is closely associated with violence and conflict, despite the 
fact that there have been longer periods of cooperation than of conflict 
in this part of the world. For many Europeans, the Balkans is lawless, 
violent and pre-modern; a rather simplified picture which does not 
reflect the other – multiethnic and tolerant – side of the region. The 
process of transformation is about turning the ‘Balkans into Southeast 
Europe’, and then – into ‘Europe’, as John Lampe has indicated in the 
title of his book.18 The process of EU enlargement to the Balkans is also 
the process of ‘de-Balkanising the Balkans’.19 It would be the end of the 
Balkans, at least as a political concept.
The cultural and political dichotomy between ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ 
had direct consequences on how Croatian nationalism perceives EU 
accession. It appropriates it as the final step in the long struggle against 
Yugoslavia and anything associated with Yugoslavia, and thus with 
the Balkans.20 In other words, EU membership is seen as ‘missing 
evidence’ that the Croatian nationalist discourse was in fact right in 
starting the process of secession from Yugoslavia in the first place. 
It is an opportunity to present the whole nationalist programme as 
progressive and modernising, rather than as regressive and out of step 
with contemporary trends of multiculturalism in the EU. In addition, 
by joining the EU, Croatia would leave the Balkans and would therefore 
contribute to its disappearance in the political sense. 
Moreover, EU membership of Croatia would spell the end of 20 years of 
international supervision of the state’s policies. The Croatian nationalist 
discourse has always been critical of the ever-expanding international 
presence in Croatia in the war and in the post-war period. It viewed the 
various UN, ICTY, OSCE, EU and IMF missions to Croatia as hampering 
the country’s sovereignty. This was especially the case with the ICTY, 
against which Croatian nationalists are quick to mobilise. They hope 
that once the country becomes a member of the EU, such interference 
in internal Croatian politics will cease. Thus, EU membership is seen 
also as a bulwark against (in their view undesirable) foreign influences.21 
From the point of view of most nationalists in other EU Member States, 
it must seem a paradox that EU membership is seen as an instrument 
of gaining, not losing, de facto sovereignty. However, this is what has 
motivated and successfully transformed many ardent Croatian nationalists 
into (at least temporary) supporters of the European Union. On the one 
hand, they never liked the idea of Croatia becoming part of another 
multiethnic and supranational structure which some see as a kind of 
‘New Yugoslavia’. On the other, however, they hope that once Croatia 
has become a fully-fledged member, it will be more powerful and thus 
have more freedom to implement its own policies without being told 
what to do (or not to do). 
18.  John R. Lampe, Balkans into 
Southeast Europe: A Century of 
War and Transition (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
19.  This concept occurs in 
both academic and semi-
academic discourse. For 
the former, see: Andrew 
J Pierre: ‘De-Balkanizing 
the Balkans: Security and 
Stability in Southeast 
Europe’, USIP Special Report 
no. 54; available at: http://
www.usip.org/publications/
de-balkanizing-balkans-
security-and-stability-
southeastern-europe. In 
political discourse, see 
the official website of the 
President of Serbia, Boris 
Tadić, where it is said 
that the President ‘has 
actively promoted the ‘de-
Balkanization of the Balkans’ 
by taking the initiative in 
reconciliation efforts as 
well as by encouraging an 
increase in regional trade’. 
See: http://www.predsednik.
rs/mwc/default.asp?c=10
0000&g=20061005141
211&lng=eng&hs1=0. 
20.  Arguments of this nature 
are expressed, for example, 
in newspaper articles by 
three leading nationalist 
columnists in the Croatian 
daily press. See: Zvonimir 
Despot, ‘Ipak bolje EU nego 
Balkan’, Večernji list, 7 March 
2011; Davor Butković, ‘Treća 
Jugoslavija je besmislica 
kao i politička jugosfera’, 
Jutarnji list, 13 November 
2010; and Tihomir 
Dujmović: ‘Hrvatskom 
ulasku u Europsku 
uniju najviše se protivi 
Srbija’,  , 5 March 2011.
21.  One could here reverse 
the old slogan of Croatian 
nationalists according to 
which Croatia was a bulwark 
of Christianity (antemurale 
Christianitatis) into Europe 
becoming the bulwark of 
Croatian sovereignty. 
Dejan Jović
43
Conclusion
With the accession negotiations almost complete, the Croatian political 
elite now needs to secure sufficient support for EU membership among 
Croatian voters. Most of them are undecided, and a not insignificant 
proportion of the public opposes membership. However, the decision will 
be made by the large body of moderate nationalists who have prevailed 
in all the parliamentary elections since the country’s independence with 
the exception of those in 2000. 
The key to their acceptance of the EU lies in convincing them that 
EU membership is not incompatible with the long-term objectives of 
Croatian nationalism. Although at first sight this may appear paradoxical, 
the nature of Croatian politics since 1990 shows that it is not entirely 
impossible, largely due to the mental and conceptual dichotomy that 
opposes ‘Europe’ to ‘the Balkans’. 
The more nationalistic the government’s rhetoric regarding the EU 
agenda, the more likely it is that these voters will be in favour of EU 
membership. They will support EU membership only if they see that 
the achievements of their nationalist struggle during the Homeland 
War (1991-5) are better protected if the country is in the EU rather 
than if it remains outside. However, there would be consequences for 
their expectations of EU membership. Once the country joins the EU, 
these very same people, elite and voters alike, will try to exploit the 
EU in an effort to disassociate Croatia from the ‘remaining Balkans’, 
namely from Serbia, first and foremost, but also from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. There is thus a very real danger that, unless they are 
marginalised within Croatia, the same nationalists who voted for the 
EU would become the most vocal opponents of further enlargement 
to other Western Balkan countries. Indeed, they will almost certainly 
oppose any further softening of the EU border, because it is the border 
that divides ‘Europeans’ from the ‘Others’, in particular from Bosnians 
and Serbs, who should – according to Croatian nationalists – be kept 
permanently out of Europe. It is the fact that ‘we’ belong to Europe 
and ‘they’ do not which keeps us different and determines ‘our’ new 
identity. From that perspective, it is only logical that they want to 
keep that division (which they argue has deep historical, cultural and 
political roots) distinct. One of the leading Croatian opinion makers, 
Davor Butković, expressed this in clear terms in one of his columns in 
Jutarnji list, on 13 November 2010:
If Croatia joins the European Union at the beginning of 2013, it will be 
separated from Serbia – in fact: separated from Serbia more than at any 
period of its modern history – for a solid period of time. This separation 
will be manifested both in economic terms and physically – through the 
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Schengen system. For that reason it is indeed unbelievable that some 
still argue that Croatia is now being threatened by some Third Yugoslavia. 
Croatia, I repeat, has never been farther away from Yugoslavia and Serbia 
in its whole history... When at the end of 2012 or the beginning of 2013 
we finally join the EU, any talk of any sort of association with a Yugoslav 
prefix will become long-forgotten history. Fortunately.22
One may of course wonder whether the narrative of Croatian nationalism 
will survive the deep political and cultural changes that EU membership 
brings. As we saw in public opinion polls conducted recently, most 
Croats today are in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia 
joining the EU. The same is true of the political leadership of Croatia. 
So, what chance do Croatian nationalists and supporters of Croatian 
sovereignty have within an increasingly globalised and Europeanised 
framework? Regardless of why and how they entered the EU, no Member 
State remained quite the same after joining. In all of them the EU was 
instrumental in defeating excessive nationalism and in promoting (in 
many cases rather successfully) liberal politics. Would Croatia not also 
become much more liberal and cosmopolitan once it joins the Union?
It might indeed. In fact, in the last decade Croatian politics have 
become increasingly liberal, largely as a result of the EU accession 
process. However, the founding discourse of the Homeland War, which 
in essence celebrates the war and conflict of the 1990s, has survived. 
Indeed, in this final phase of the EU negotiations and with the twentieth 
anniversary of Croatia’s new statehood this discourse has been revived 
and revitalised. In these last 20 years, the myth of the Homeland War has 
become the keystone of official discourse and enshrined in the official 
declaration enacted by Parliament back in 2000.23 This narrative has 
now become one of the main obstacles to creating a more liberal, open-
minded and tolerant Croatia which is open to its neighbours. However, 
the European Union is primarily a community of peace, which actively 
promotes a culture of peace and tolerance. It should thus be expected 
that those who are unwilling to actively promote peace might come 
under some pressure. 
The experience of previous enlargements shows that EU membership 
offers a new chance not only to liberal and anti-nationalist globalising 
forces but also to nationalist anti-globalists. While the former use the 
new institutional set-up to advance their liberal agenda and defeat local 
nationalism, the nationalists also use EU membership to consolidate 
their own discourse and respond to the challenges of globalisation. They 
use the EU as the new ‘hostile other’ in order to mobilise the nation 
against it. Both of them – nationalists and globalists – are constantly 
restructuring. They both survive, and even strengthen their own 
positions in the new circumstances. Similar trends may of course be 
expected in Croatia too. 
22.  Davor Butković, ‘Treća 
Jugoslavija je besmislica kao 
i politička jugosfera’, Jutarnji 
list, 13 November 2010. 
23.  See: http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/
sluzbeni/274008.html.
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By accepting Croatia in the Union, the EU will be faced with the new 
experience of including a country that has recently been at war and 
where that war is still much remembered and celebrated. It will accept 
a member that bases much of its contemporary political identity on 
the notion of being both a winner and a victim of a war that Europe 
considered unfortunate and unnecessary. It will be a challenging 
experience and one that is likely to have a major impact on the EU 
integration of other Western Balkan states in the future. 
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Chapter 2
Bih after the elections – a tale 
of disillusioned optimism
Denisa Sarajlić-Maglić
Introduction – post-election change?
The success of the October 2010 general elections in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) should not be judged according to the victory of a 
particular party or coalition, but rather by whether or not they brought 
change in terms of strengthening the country’s democratic processes. 
After four years of reform stalemate, with the political elite having 
reverted to extreme nationalist discourse and policies, the October 2010 
general elections represented an opportunity for the citizens of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to seek change. Their awareness of the need for change 
was evident first and foremost from the 56.28 percent turnout rate,1 
the highest since the national authorities had been running general 
elections independently.2 Moreover, 370,000 more ballots were cast 
in 2010 than in 2002, an increase of 22 percent.3 The high turnout in 
itself gave some cause for optimism.
Civil society also played a major role, encouraging voter turnout, 
particularly among the younger generations, by means of a very creative 
activist campaign. This was important, given the fact that since the 
2008 municipal elections, 80,000 young people had become eligible to 
vote, including a whole generation born the year when the war started. 
Gathered around an informal platform, civil society organisations moved 
from pure advocacy to serious activism in a very short period of time. 
They organised actions calling for accountability on the part of political 
parties, awareness-raising on the issues of party funding and candidates’ 
property, voter profiling on the basis of party programmes, measurement 
of the extent to which parties had kept the promises they had made in 
the 2006 campaign and many other activities. Thus, for the first time, 
the political parties found themselves not only in competition with each 
other, but also under very visible pressure from civil society, which to 
some extent succeeded in shifting the political campaign away from 
1.  The highest turnout 
recorded so far was in 
2002, at 55.5 percent. 
Source: http://www.izbori.
ba/documents/2010/
ID750-prilog.pdf.
2.  The first elections 
administered by the BiH 
Central Election Commission 
were held in 2002, while 
the 2004 General Elections 
were conducted and funded 
independently by the BiH 
authorities. See:  http://
www.izbori.ba/documents/
ODZIV2008/Odzivi_po_
izbornim_jedinicama.pdf.
3.  The turnout in 2002 was 
1,298,827, and in 2010 it 
was 1,671,977, according to 
information from the Central 
Election Commission. This 
increase can be attributed 
to a system of passive voter 
registration (i.e. the voter 
register uses data from 
the Central Identification 
Protection System).
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the highly emotive ethnic issues that had dominated previous elections 
towards issues affecting the  daily lives of voters.
Contrary to all expectations, the rhetoric during the election campaign 
was somewhat milder than had been the case in the four years preceding 
the elections. The 2006 elections had marked a turning-point, with the 
government agenda veering sharply towards nationalism and away from 
Euro-Atlantic integration. This trend was already clear during the 2006 
election campaign and continued afterwards. This period was marked 
by the lowest government activity since the country’s European agenda 
had been set and by the most divergent nationalist positions since the 
signing of the peace agreements in 1995. Although BiH managed to 
sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2008, 
its progress in implementing it has been slow and arbitrary. It was 
therefore somewhat encouraging to see a milder tone adopted during the 
2010 election campaign than in the period preceding it. The nationalist 
rhetoric escalated only after the elections.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU integration process was dealt a severe blow, 
falling victim to a political power struggle dominated by nationalist 
issues. Reform was slowly pushed off the political agenda; between 
2006 and 2010 the reform process slowed, grinding to a full halt in the 
six months following the October 2010 elections. 
Thus the EU agenda suddenly found itself engaged in a war of rhetoric 
against the nationalist agenda. While the international community was 
taking a ‘hands off ’ approach, the nationalist political leaders tried to 
construct a new political reality composed not of individual parties, but 
of ethnic political blocs, sidelining the EU agenda for several months.
relations with neighbours
The election of Ivo Josipović as the new Croatian President in January 
2010 created new dynamics in the relations between the Western Balkan 
neighbours. Mr. Josipović laid emphasis on restoring good-neighbourly 
relations and sending reconciliatory messages to regional political 
leaders. On several occasions he paid his respects to the war victims 
on all sides. On 14 April 2010, during a visit to BiH where he addressed 
the BiH Parliament, President Josipović expressed deep regret about 
Croatia’s involvement in the division of Bosnian society and the suffering 
of innocent victims. After the BiH elections, Mr. Josipović met with the 
newly-elected Bosniak member of the Presidency, Bakir Izetbegović. Mr. 
Izetbegović himself contributed to the new positive climate of relations, 
apologising on Serbian B92 television for ‘all innocent persons killed by 
the Army of BiH’, albeit in a personal rather than official capacity.
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The intensified cooperation between BiH and Croatia is also reflected in 
a number of bilateral agreements, among other things on cooperation 
in the field of the information society and electronic communications 
and the restoration and modernisation of the Sava River waterway. A 
major development was the signing of an agreement on the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of court rulings in criminal matters. The 
two countries also signed an agreement on police cooperation in the 
fight against cross-border crime that had been initialled at a joint session 
of the two governments in Split in June 2010. Cooperation among all 
countries of the region has progressed in the fields of the fight against 
crime and corruption, police and the exchange of data, resulting in a 
series of arrests and prosecutions throughout the region. 
However, as time goes by, it appears that the changed dynamics of 
bilateral relations is in danger of remaining limited to form rather than 
substance. Without substance the novelty of the new dynamics will soon 
wear off and President Josipović might lose the momentum generated 
by the initial boost to good-neighbourly relations. Even though he has 
now positioned himself as a respectable regional partner, real relations 
between Croatia and BiH are still marked by a series of open issues, 
such as the status of Port Ploče, access to the open sea and the Peljesac 
bridge, transit through Neum, dual citizenship, unresolved borders and 
property issues, to mention but a few.
There are also unresolved border issues between BiH and Serbia, as 
well as a lack of formalised dialogue through the Interstate Council for 
Cooperation. At the beginning of 2010, Serbia agreed to the appointment 
of a new BiH Ambassador to Belgrade, a position that had stood vacant 
for three years. Also, in March 2010, the Serbian Parliament adopted a 
resolution condemning the crimes committed in Srebrenica. 
However, the Serbian leadership appears to be playing a double game. 
On one hand, Tadić is trying hard to project the image of a progressive 
and moderate politician to the international community. On the other 
hand, however, he continued to show public support for the rhetoric of 
the then Prime Minister and the current President of Republika Srpska 
(RS), Milorad Dodik. Tadić played a very destructive role by showing 
symbolic support for Dodik, riding roughshod over what little had been 
restored by way of inter-ethnic relations in BiH. Tadić joined Dodik 
in a series of pre-election events, such as the opening of a primary 
school named ‘Serbia’ in Pale and the inauguration of a bridge over the 
Drina River in Zvornik. On the eve of elections both Tadić and Serbian 
Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić showed up at Alliance of Independent 
Social Democrats (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata – SNSD) party rallies 
hosted by Svetlana Ceca Ražnjativić, wife of Željko Ražnjatović Arkan, 
a war criminal who was killed in 2000. Ms. Ražnjativić has since been 
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indicted by Serbian prosecutors for corruption and the illegal possession 
of weapons.
Thanks to the efforts of the Turkish authorities, regional cooperation 
was further stepped up in April 2010, when the Presidents of Turkey, 
BiH and Serbia signed the Istanbul Declaration following a series of 
trilateral meetings at the level of the Foreign Affairs Ministers. It was 
agreed at the summit that members of the BiH Presidency would soon 
visit Belgrade, although this did not happen prior to the October 
elections in BiH. President Tadić and Prime Minister Erdogan visited 
Srebrenica on the 15th anniversary of the genocide. Serbian President 
Boris Tadić stated in Istanbul that EU membership was in the common 
interest of all three states and hailed the Istanbul Summit as a ‘new 
beginning’ in their relations. Tadić, Gül and Silajdžić agreed that they 
would continue to work on building peace, prosperity and stability 
in the Balkans. The former Chairman of the BiH Presidency, Haris 
Silajdžić, welcomed President Tadić’s assurances in Istanbul that Serbia 
would never do anything to harm the integrity and sovereignty of BiH, 
which he said brought ‘peace and serenity into our hearts’. However, the 
Serb member of the BiH Presidency, Nebojša Radmanović, proclaimed 
Silajdžić’s signature on the Istanbul Declaration to be unconstitutional, 
while Milorad Dodik dismissed the entire Declaration as ‘non-existent’. 
For this reason, a meeting between President Tadić and the Republika 
Srpska authorities was organised at the end of May in Laktaši, at which 
the RS officials conveyed their honest opinion about the Declaration to 
the Serbian President. 
a shadow over democracy in Bih
The newly-elected President of Republika Srpska (RS), Milorad Dodik, 
continued throughout the entire election campaign to canvass for greater 
autonomy for the RS, only slightly softening his tone as compared with 
the previous four years. He made frequent reference to the possibility 
of the RS seceding through a referendum, expressed the intention that 
certain state competences would be devolved to the entity level, and 
encouraged the Croat political community to seek a third ethnic-territorial 
entity within BiH. He consistently denied genocide in Srebrenica and 
criticised the State of BiH, its symbols and authority, calling into question 
its very existence. His party representatives in the State Parliament 
blocked major legislative projects from the European agenda, including 
the Laws on State Aid and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
as well as veterinary and environmental legislation.
Another significant point concerning the elections is that the nationalist 
rhetoric escalated only afterwards, at least on the part of the Croat 
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nationalist parties. Frustrated by the failure of its candidate to be elected 
to the Presidency of BiH, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska 
demokratska zajednica – HDZ) tried to undermine Social Democratic 
Party candidate Željko Komšić’s re-election to the Croat seat. HDZ 
challenges Mr. Komšić’s legitimacy as the Croat member of the Presidency 
on the grounds that his election was also supported by Bosniak voters, 
which is perfectly admissible under the BiH Election Law. However, 
rather than manifesting itself through proposals for changes to the way 
Presidency members are elected, their reaction has prompted stronger 
claims for territorial autonomy for the Croats through the creation of 
a third entity.4 This has raised doubts about the HDZ’s motives for 
claiming more rights for Croats, whose constitutional representation 
deserves due consideration, but cannot be achieved through territorial 
reorganisation at the expense of the country as a whole. This ambition 
has extended to claims that the HDZ and HDZ 1990 are the only 
‘legitimate’ representatives of the Croat people.
This position is inaccurate on several counts. First of all, to claim 
that only nationalist parties with a nationalist prefix in their title can 
be the legitimate representatives of an ethnic group is tantamount to 
introducing entirely new political categories that do not even exist in 
the Constitution. The constitutional power-sharing system includes a 
series of mechanisms designed to prevent the domination of any single 
ethnic group over the others, while the voting and decision-making 
procedures demand the participation of representatives of all ethnic 
groups, regardless of which political party they belong to. Denying 
elected representatives the right to represent their constituencies, allowing 
them only the right to represent their ethnic group, surpasses even the 
existing complex protection mechanisms enshrined in the Constitution. 
The claim that only elected representatives from nationalist parties can 
represent an ethnic group denies non-nationalist parties the right to have 
a cross-ethnic appeal, and individual parties the right to be composed 
of representatives from different ethnic groups. In essence, this concept 
undermines the need for multi-ethnic parties, and ultimately, the need 
for elections, if political representation in government is solely the 
reflection of the population’s ethnic composition. It would mean that 
the outcome of elections would depend not on the share of votes won, 
but on the proportional representation of ethnic groups. And finally, 
this concept infringes the basic human right to elect or to be elected 
as an individual. It is particularly worrying that this concept received 
either tacit or open support from Republic of Croatia officials, including 
President Josipović.
As a result of the increasing post-election nationalist activism, Republika 
Srpska’s two main parties, the Serbian Democratic Party and the Alliance 
of Independent Social Democrats, signed a platform on ‘ joint action 
in the institutions of BiH’, announcing their intention to protect the 
4.  BiH is divided into two 
territorial entities, Republika 
Srpska and the Federation 
of BiH, the population of the 
former being majority Serb, 
while Croats and Bosniaks 
form majorities in some 
areas of FBiH. Some Croat 
parties have been demanding 
the right to form a third 
territorial entity with a 
majority Croat population. A 
previous attempt to challenge 
the BiH Constitution and the 
country’s territorial integrity 
in 2001 ended in the arrest 
and indictment of its initiator 
and former member of 
theBiH Presidency Ante 
Jelavić and his associates.
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‘integrity and institutions of Republika Srpska’.5 The two largest Bosnian 
Croat parties, HDZ and HDZ 1990, soon followed suit, thus forming 
two ethnic political blocs that took firm positions during the coalition 
negotiations, limiting the room for manoeuvre on any non-ethnic issues 
and making the coalition negotiation process much more cumbersome 
and time-consuming.
At state level change was evident in the election of the Bosniak member 
of the BiH Presidency, with Haris Silajdžić losing his seat to Bakir 
Izetbegović. In broad terms, Dr. Silajdžić’s four-year mandate had been 
marked by the categorical rejection of any rapprochement of ethnic 
communities and by ambitious and idealistic political goals. Bakir 
Izetbegović, on the other hand, consistently advocates reconciliation 
among neighbours and takes a significantly less rigid stance on internal 
political relations. 
The Social Democratic Party almost doubled its result compared to 2006, 
winning eight seats in the BiH House of Representatives (HoR)6 as well as 
a significant majority in the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH) and in five out of ten cantons. The Party of Democratic 
Action (SDA) lost a significant number of seats, but still secured a position 
as one of the key negotiators in the process of forming a post-election 
coalition, due mainly to its success in maintaining equidistance with all 
the major parties before and during the election campaign. The Alliance 
of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) again won a significant majority 
in the RS National Assembly, even though nominally it lost a large number 
of votes. It stands on an equal footing with the Social Democratic Party 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Socijaldemokratska partija – SDP) in terms of 
the number of seats in the BiH HoR. Conversely, none of the so-called 
‘Croat’ parties individually has won a large number of seats in the HoR, 
the largest being HDZ with three seats.
However, the continuing political fragmentation, with such a limited 
number of representatives in the lower House of Parliament, still 
creates difficulties for the formation of post-election coalitions. One 
encouraging development following those elections is that a number of 
parties forming the core of a potential new coalition have managed to 
impose a dialogue on the new coalition’s programme goals, counteracting 
the concept of two or three ethnically-based political blocs. This is in 
itself an important milestone towards strengthening democracy in BiH, 
although it will not be sufficient unless it is thoroughly implemented 
during the government’s four-year mandate.
However, concern about the questionable democratic nature of the 
electoral process continues to cast a dark shadow, given that the elections 
were held in compliance with the discriminatory provisions of the BiH 
Constitution, thus preventing members of ethnic groups other than 
5.  See: http://www.mojevijesti.
ba/novost/60813/tekst-
platforme-o-zajednickom-
djelovanju-snsd-i-sds-
scenarij-raspada. 
6.  The BiH House of 
Representatives has 42 seats.
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the Constituent Peoples from running for the BiH Presidency and the 
House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH (HoP). Under 
Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Accords, only members of one of the 
three Constituent Peoples7 of Bosnia and Herzegovina are permitted 
to stand for those elections, thus excluding members of the country’s 
14 other national minorities. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) found that this amounted to discrimination and ruled in favour 
of Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci, members of the Roma and Jewish 
communities, both citizens of BiH, whose ethnic origin barred them 
under the Constitution from standing for election to the Presidency and 
the HoP. Following this, the Head of the EC Delegation warned that 
the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement with BiH could be 
suspended if the Constitution was not brought into line with the ruling. 
Lady Ashton repeated the same message during her visit to the country 
in February 2010. However, the BiH authorities were still unable to reach 
an agreement on the implementation of the ECHR ruling before 2010 
general elections were announced, and they were thus conducted on 
the basis of the discriminatory rules. By the same token BiH was also 
in breach of Article 2 of the Interim Agreement with the EU.
eU integration – a declarative goal only
The 2010 EU Progress Report for the first time is quite blunt in its 
description of the obstacles standing in the way of EU integration: ‘No 
steps have been taken to address the problem of legislation relevant 
for EU integration being blocked’.8 The blockages are attributed to 
a number of causes, including the lack of a joint vision, deliberate 
political obstruction through the misuse of rules on quorums,9 a lack 
of coordination between the different levels of government, the failure 
to harmonise legislation, the lack of enforcement mechanisms for the 
implementation of EU priorities, etc. These and other factors have 
‘delayed reforms and reduced the country’s capacity to make progress 
towards the EU’.10
One exception to this in the rule-of-law area concerns BiH’s compliance 
with the conditions for granting visa-free travel to Bosnian citizens. 
Although it lagged behind the other countries of the region (except 
Albania) in fulfilling the criteria of the roadmap on visa liberalisation, 
all conditions were met by mid-2010, enabling visa-free travel to 
commence on 15 December 2010. The very technical criteria entailed 
legislative amendments and the adoption of laws, the formation of new 
institutions, the appointment of officials and the recruitment of new 
staff, as well as training in numerous areas such as immigration, asylum, 
border control, the fight against crime, terrorism and corruption, and 
the protection of identity, and the installation of a very sophisticated 
7.  The Constituent Peoples 
are the Serbs, Bosniaks 
and Croats, and the rest 
fall into the category 
‘others’ and do not enjoy 
equal political rights.
8.  European Commission, 
‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2010 Progress Report’, 
SEC(2010) 1331, Brussels, 
22 November 2010, p. 8. 
Available at: http://www.
delbih.ec.europa.eu/files/
docs/2010progress2.pdf.
9.  Ibid.
10.  Ibid.
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system of biometric passports. The decision to grant free travel to BiH 
citizens throughout the Schengen area will have long-lasting positive 
effects. Not only does it give Bosnian citizens a sense of belonging to 
Europe, but it finally also gives them a sense of freedom now that they 
are able to travel beyond the very narrow confines of their immediate 
neighbourhood. Hopefully, in the long run, this decision will influence 
mindsets too, encouraging young people especially to think beyond 
narrow-minded ethnic divisions and internal segregation.
It would appear that citizens have grasped the technical nature of the 
EU integration process better than the political elite. In the focus group 
research conducted by the Foreign Policy Initiative BH in late 2010, 
it was apparent that BiH citizens valued the merit-based system of 
progress towards the EU and did not expect any undeserved political 
rewards. They also objectively valued the progress made by the other 
countries of the region. 
In spite of the slow progress of EU reforms, the Gallup Balkan Monitor11 
still records increased public support for EU integration. Although there 
is still some discrepancy between the levels of support registered in FBiH 
and RS, there has been some increase in the case of the latter. Support in 
FBiH remains high at 75 percent, and while it stands at only 59 percent 
in RS, it is still higher than the 48 percent recorded last year. Quicker 
EU integration also ranks quite highly as an issue for all three ethnic 
groups, with Croats ranking it as the first area in which changes would 
be expected after elections, Serbs ranking it as second, and Bosniaks as 
third. Interestingly enough, all three groups have more faith in changes 
in the area of EU integration, than they do, for example, in job creation, 
which was placed in fourth position by all of them.
However, the statistics concerning the different visions of the country’s 
future paint a more depressing picture. According to Gallup’s research, 
87 percent of BiH Serbs would agree with the secession of Republika 
Srpska to form an independent state, if the people were to vote for such 
a change. 43 percent of Bosnian Croats would be in favour of splitting 
FBiH into a Croat and Bosniak entity, as would 61 percent of Bosnian 
Serbs. Finally, in international sports events 88 percent of Bosnian Serbs 
support the Serbian national team, 72 percent of Bosnian Croats the 
Croatian national team, and 94 percent of Bosniaks the BiH national 
team, which is yet another indicator of the depth of the country’s social 
divisions and its lack of a common vision for the future. 
Given the number of commitments the country entered into when 
signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), it is clear 
that some constitutional change will be necessary in order to unblock 
the reform process and speed up EU integration. Constitutional reform 
is a prerequisite for addressing the country's dysfunctionality and 
11.  Gallup Balkan Monitor, 
‘EU support on the rise – 
the right moment to speed 
up reforms?’, Insights and 
Perceptions: Voices of the 
Balkans, December 2010.
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democratic deficit. It will thus remain one of the major challenges 
facing any coalition government, yet without it, SAA obligations will 
be hard to implement. 
There is also a need for clarification as to what functional constitutional 
reform actually means in practice. What it does not mean is another 
attempt at territorial reorganisation, because there is no ideal solution 
that would satisfy all territorial appetites, even within the same ethnic 
communities (as was the case with the different positions adopted by 
the HDZ and HDZ 1990, with the latter calling for the third entity to 
extend across the entity border, while the former wished to limit it to 
the territory of FBiH). Even if such an ideal ethnic-territorial divide 
existed, it would still not make the country more functional or better 
equipped to deal with the challenges of EU integration. Functional 
constitutional reform must therefore include measures to create a 
decision-making system more conducive to change, with less blockages, 
and mechanisms enabling the state to enforce harmonisation with EU 
legislation across the entire country. However, according to the Gallup 
Balkan Monitor, only 10 percent of Serbs would like to see constitutional 
change strengthening the state government in accordance with EU 
regulations, as opposed to 44 percent of Bosniaks and Croats. According 
to the same research, all three groups show a very low level of trust 
in both national institutions and the EU. The national government is 
among the least trusted institutions, while the EU is trusted only slightly 
more. The most trusted institutions for all three groups are the military 
and the religious communities.
The BiH authorities have thus failed to make progress on key EU 
reforms, including finding a solution regarding the ECHR ruling in the 
Sejdić-Finci case, or with regard to issues of state property, state aid, 
the census and defence property. Also according to the EU Progress 
Report ‘very little progress was made towards meeting the requirements 
set by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board for the closure 
of the Office of the High Representative (OHR)’.12
agenda for the international community
The main task of the Office of the High Representative of the International 
Community in BiH since the Dayton Agreement has been to implement 
the Peace Agreement and interpret its provisions. No one ever put an 
end date on the mandate of the High Representative (HR), nor was it 
made clear what would determine the closure of OHR. The general 
understanding was that it would be closed down once the country was 
on an ‘irreversible’ road to the EU and NATO. But with the chances of 
12.  Ibid. p. 10.
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‘irreversibility’ getting slimmer after 2006, the international community 
started to run out of arguments for closing it down.
Paddy Ashdown was the first HR to announce that he would be the 
last, right at the start of his mandate in 2002. His successor Christian 
Schwarz-Schilling conveyed the same message throughout his one-year 
mandate, while the next two High Representatives, Miroslav Lajcak 
and Valentin Inzko, were tasked with planning the transition from the 
OHR to the EU Special Representative (EUSR). Formally, the Peace 
Implementation Council Steering Board (PIC SB) set the ‘5+2’ conditions 
for OHR transition, which included the resolution of state property and 
defence property allocation issues, the completion of the Brcko Final 
Award, fiscal sustainability and the entrenchment of the rule of law. 
In addition to those five objectives the PIC SB agreed that two further 
conditions must be met prior to transition: ‘signing of the SAA and a 
positive assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB based on full 
compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement’.13 The first condition 
was met in 2008, while BiH seems to have moved further away from 
the second as time has gone by. For several years the EU Progress 
Reports stated that ‘The European Union would not be able to consider 
an application for EU membership until the OHR has been closed.’14 
However, this sentence was not included in the 2010 Progress Report, 
indicating recognition of the fact that the political situation in BiH had 
deteriorated and that the OHR presence continued to be necessary.
In December 2010, the PIC SB communiqué reflected the EU’s scepticism 
about stability and progress in BiH. The PIC SB ‘expressed concern at 
the findings of the European Commission’s annual Progress Report, 
adopted on 9 November, regarding the limited progress on the country’s 
European integration agenda and on key EU-related reforms, as well as 
the lack of a shared vision among Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political 
leaders’.15 It took note of the Progress Report assessment that there had 
been little progress with improving governance and the functionality 
of the state, including aligning the Constitution with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It reiterated that the transition from 
the High Representative to a reinforced EU presence remained the goal 
based on the 5+2 agenda, but recalled that it was ‘the responsibility of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to build consensus and reach 
agreements necessary to fulfil these criteria’.16 
In the same spirit, Operation EUFOR Althea’s executive mandate was 
renewed by UN Security Council Resolution 1948/2010 on 18 November, 
enabling it to continue its role of ensuring compliance with the military 
annexes of the Dayton Agreement. This could also be interpreted as 
recognition of the continued need for an international presence to 
maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13.  Declaration by the 
Steering Board of the 
Peace Implementation 
Council, PIC SB political 
directors, 27 February 
2008. Available at: http://
www.ohr.int/pic/default.
asp?content_id=41352. 
14.  Extract from the 
Communication from 
the Commission to 
the Council and the 
European Parliament, 
'Enlargement Strategy and 
Main Challenges 2009-
2010', COM(2009)533 
final, Brussels, 14 
October 2009, p. 1.
15.  PIC SB Communiqué, 
1 December 2010. 
Available at http://www.
ohr.int/pic/default.
asp?content_id=45573. 
16.  Ibid.
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Against this backdrop, the discussion on the closure of the OHR has 
gradually turned into a debate on the ways and means of maintaining 
its mandate while strengthening the mission of an EUSR. In parallel 
there is very heated discussion among BiH’s political parties, with those 
of RS consistently demanding an immediate closure of the OHR on the 
one hand, and those of FBiH arguing that the OHR should not be closed 
down before its responsibilities can be transferred to the legitimate 
institutions of BiH, on the other. The latter have a particularly strong 
case when one considers all the unresolved issues stemming from 
the Peace Agreement requiring clarification, interpretation or even 
arbitration. Through Annex X to the peace agreement and thanks to its 
action these past 15 years, the OHR has become an integral part of the 
legal and political system in BiH. Its abrupt ‘extraction’ from the BiH 
legal system would create a political and legal vacuum that would lead 
the country into further crisis. Some civil society organisations have 
supported the idea of OHR gradually devolving its responsibilities to the 
BiH institutions until there comes a time when the country is capable 
of sustaining its stability and functionality on its own.
The PIC Steering Board urged the authorities to ‘establish as a matter 
of priority a transparent and effective mechanism for developing 
concrete constitutional reform proposals’, which would address the 
discriminatory provisions based on the ruling in the Sejdić-Finci case. It 
stated furthermore that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina also needs to increase 
efforts to improve its decision-making in order to be in a position to 
be able to adopt, implement and enforce steps required to promote 
the country’s integration into the EU’.17 All of the above is based on 
the Progress Report assessment that ‘there has been little progress on 
improving governance and the functionality of the state’.
As stated earlier, constitutional reform was also a core issue during 
the coalition discussions, but opinions diverged on its meaning and 
substance. However, the international community’s role in that regard 
remains undefined. After several failed attempts to initiate and facilitate 
negotiations on constitutional reform among political leaders,18 the 
Swedish EU Presidency represented by Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, 
aided by European Commission and US representatives, made another 
attempt during the election year to gather political leaders together in 
EUFOR’s camp Butmir in order to reach an agreement on constitutional 
change. But that effort only further exposed the divergences among the 
different parties and fed existing suspicions about the international 
community’s motives, perceived by the public to be self-serving and 
directed at a single aim – to speed up the closure of OHR.
17.  Ibid.
18.  The largest-scale effort to 
reform the BiH Constitution 
took place in 2006 in 
the form of the so-called 
‘April package’, and it 
failed in BiH Parliament 
by one vote less than it 
needed to be passed. The 
international community was 
subsequently involved in a 
series of smaller-scale efforts 
to negotiate constitutional 
reform, including the 
Mostar Declaration, 
Prud Agreement, etc. 
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Conclusion: the eU is losing a war of 
rhetoric
Even though the EU has repeatedly pointed to the need for constitutional 
reform in order to speed up the integration process, it has never given 
any clear indications as to the precise way in which the problematic 
constitutional provisions need to be changed. However, in view of this 
latest attempt and all previous efforts by the international community 
to facilitate constitutional reform, there is growing scepticism as to 
the degree to which it is willing to be involved in similar efforts in the 
future. Caution is therefore recommended. International efforts to offer 
constitutional packages or specific proposals have not delivered the 
desired results so far. However, given the need for constitutional reform, 
the international community, and the EU in particular, could play a 
constructive role by designing a framework that sets the parameters 
for changes that are essential in order to remove the obstacles to EU 
integration. 
Unfortunately, this is an area in which the EU seems to be losing the 
abovementioned war of rhetoric. While the international community is 
taking a ‘hands off ’ approach, however concerned it may appear about 
the rhetoric of secession and division, the nationalist political leaders 
are using that vacuum to impose the concept of nationalist blocs. In 
this way they are sidelining the EU agenda. As stated earlier, the EU 
agenda is thus becoming a victim of the nationalist agenda. Once the 
government coalition is up and running, the EU will have to face the 
challenge of bringing public political discourse back into its own court. 
This will be difficult given, on the one hand, the very emotionally charged 
nationalist rhetoric, and the very technical nature of the EU agenda, 
on the other. Nonetheless, this is the job that the EU will need to do 
itself. It is not something that can be done by the US, or that will be 
done independently by local political leaders. They will need the EU as 
a strong partner in deferring the nationalist agenda and sustaining the 
EU agenda for the years to come, at least until such time as the state of 
BiH is capable of guaranteeing stability and a functioning government. 
Until then, the issue of the OHR’s closure should not even appear on 
the agenda of the international community, however strong the new 
EU presence becomes.
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Chapter 3 
Ten years of post-Milosevic 
transition in serbia: problems 
and prospects
Jovan Teokarevic
Introduction
One decade after the beginning of democratic transition, Serbia is going 
through a number of serious crises, from economic slowdown and a 
significant drop in the living standards of the majority of the population, 
to EU ‘accession fatigue’ and disappointment with the post-Milosevic 
democratic rulers. As a result there is widespread pessimism and 
disillusionment which can be seen in every aspect of public life. 
Such feelings stand in sharp contrast to the optimism of ten years ago 
when the fall of the previous regime was welcomed by most citizens 
as a sign of radical change and hope for the future. A decade ago it was 
only too natural to expect a whole new era to begin once Milosevic was 
gone, with stable peace instead of the wars and conflicts of the 1990s, 
with sustainable development instead of decay and suffering, and with 
consolidated democracy instead of dictatorship. 
Ten years later, despite obvious though uneven progress, many 
expectations have not been met. Although the past decade has not seen 
military conflict, the process of disintegration unleashed 20 years ago 
with the break-up of Yugoslavia has continued. In 2006 Montenegro 
opted in a referendum for independence (to leave the federation with 
Serbia) and Kosovo, as a former autonomous region of Serbia, unilaterally 
declared independence in 2008. Furthermore, EU membership, a goal 
now shared by a convincing majority in contrast to the 1990s, is still 
an objective which, in the best of scenarios, could only be achieved 
in the long run. Economic recovery has been replaced by decline, and 
the newly-won democracy suffers from many problems, both old and 
new. 
The social atmosphere today is far worse than it has been even in the 
past several years. From today’s perspective, 2008, while far from perfect, 
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was a year of great optimism throughout the country because Kosovo’s 
secession in February – a traumatic event for Serbia – was not followed 
by a new cycle of violence, as many had feared. That same year there 
came further encouragement in the form of two election victories by 
pro-European political forces, namely the Democratic Party (DS) under 
its president Boris Tadic: they won both the presidential (January) and 
the parliamentary (May) elections in very difficult circumstances. A few 
months later, the biggest opposition and nationalist party, the Serbian 
Radical Party, split into two: the larger part – the Serbian Progressive 
Party led by Tomislav Nikolic – took a pro-European stance, which 
for the first time resulted in an almost universal consensus about the 
country’s priorities. 
Things changed for the worse soon afterwards, with the global economic 
crisis getting in the way of many ambitious plans for the future. Faced 
with today’s harsh reality, Serbian citizens now have a different perception 
of the past, which no longer looks as bad as it did just a few years ago: in 
particular, life in communist Yugoslavia tends to be seen in a rosy light 
when compared with today. There is a popular joke which captures this 
nicely and which goes: ‘Sweden is lagging thirty years behind Serbia. 
Why? Because the Swedes still live well!’ 
It is not surprising that pessimism holds sway. According to some 
opinion polls, Serbia is the fourth most pessimistic nation in the world. 
While it is difficult to predict the effects of each crisis or all of them 
together, it is nevertheless worth explaining here the main issues and 
prospects. 
The economy
The prevailing gloom in Serbia can first of all be ascribed to numerous 
economic problems. Serbia was certainly hit extremely hard by the 
global economic crisis. At the same time the government has been 
unable to find the appropriate cure and has clearly performed much 
worse than many other governments in the region and in Europe in 
response to the crisis. Previously high rates of growth (5-6 percent on 
average during the second part of the last decade) were below zero in 
2009 and 2010. 
While some growth is expected during 2011, it is difficult to be optimistic 
about future economic prospects with data still showing poor performance 
in certain crucial areas. For instance, exports are rising again, but hardly 
enough and only after a major drop at the beginning of the crisis. De-
industrialisation, which almost became a symbol of the Serbian transition 
during the previous decade, has not been replaced by an opposite trend, 
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and the level of Serbia’s production is still far below what it was in the 
former Yugoslavia. A drastic fall in foreign investments, together with 
high foreign trade, current account and budget deficits, have forced 
the government to keep borrowing with the result that the country is 
deeply in debt (each citizen owes around €1,900). The inflation rate is 
among the highest in Europe, and the stability of the national currency, 
the dinar, is still very much under threat after a dramatic loss of almost 
a quarter of its value against the euro in the last couple of years. 
The employment figures are the most striking and indeed the most 
frightening signs of decline. In only two years, 2009-2010, in a nation 
of 7.5 million people, more than 200,000 lost their jobs, with the 
total number of jobless verging on 800,000 officially and one million 
unofficially. An already very high level of unemployment of 13 percent 
before this period went up to 20 percent at the end of it.
High inflation, coupled with the constant devaluation of the dinar, 
has hit families very hard. Around 700,000 people are estimated to be 
currently living under the so-called poverty level. More than 300,000 
retirees receive less than €100 in pension payments. On the other hand, 
most of those who are employed are not necessarily to be envied. The 
average monthly income of €320 is the lowest among all the ex-Yugoslav 
states, and comparable only to that in Kosovo – the least developed part 
of the whole Balkan region. The standard of living, which was higher a 
few years ago, is now for many people not very different from what they 
were used to during the notorious years of deprivation under sanctions 
and hyper-inflation in the 1990s. A good part of the average family’s 
budget (46 percent) is spent only on food, and very little remains for 
other needs. 
The deteriorating social situation in Serbia has given rise to waves of 
protests which tend to radicalise as times goes by. The government 
is hardly capable of finding the appropriate solution and responds 
hastily and without a clear strategy. The pressure on the government 
is growing not only from below, but also from above: that is, from 
international financial institutions which made their loans conditional 
on tight monetary policy and frozen wages in the public sector. Little 
by little, as the government’s former programmes in every sector are 
being cut back and delayed, and pressure from both sides is growing, 
key decision-makers resemble firemen running from one fire to the 
next, trying to put them out with a leaky watering can. 
It is clear that for many problems there is no strategy and no will or 
capacity to implement any strategies that do exist. Despite numerous 
papers produced and adopted by the government, Serbia does not seem 
to have any effective plan to deal with the economic crisis. The same 
is true for the most pressing issues, such as reducing the overgrown 
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public sector, or the ‘guillotine’ of excessive regulations that prevent 
rather than support the development of private business, or the fight 
against corruption. Achievements in these areas are few and far between, 
and the indecision of those in power does nothing to provide solutions. 
Among the main reasons why effective, systematic and long-term 
solutions to such pressing issues have not been found, the following 
can be cited: the survival of vested interests of wealthy and influential 
‘tycoons’ (reflecting the ‘captured state’ phenomenon), incompetence, 
poor coordination within the government, etc. 
It would certainly be an exaggeration and wrong to conclude that the 
government elected in July 2008 is to blame for all the economic and 
social problems and failures in today’s Serbia. It undoubtedly inherited 
a considerable number of problems from previous post-Milosevic 
governments as well as others dating back to the 1990s and beyond in 
Serbia’s communist past. In addition, and even more importantly, the 
present government was elected on the very eve of a global economic 
crisis that nobody had seen coming. One might therefore speculate 
that the economic performance of any government would have been 
at least equally unsatisfactory. 
politics
During the last few years, and particularly since the last parliamentary 
and presidential elections held in 2008, Serbian political life has acquired 
three new features, which have also become its main characteristics. 
The first of these has already been mentioned: a consensus on European 
integration among the majority of parties represented in the Serbian 
Assembly. The second one is the beginnings of a two-party system, and 
the third is the informal transformation of the former semi-presidential 
system into a presidential one. 
Before 2008 all the parties in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) 
coalition (18 in all!), which took power when Slobodan Milosevic’s regime 
came to an end after it lost the elections in October 2000, accepted 
that EU membership was not only a goal but also a priority for Serbia. The 
main promoter of this position was the Democratic Party (DS), led first 
by the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic who was assassinated in 
2003 by representatives of the country’s Special Forces. The incumbent 
President of Serbia (now in his second mandate), Boris Tadic, took 
command of the Democratic Party afterwards and has remained in the 
driver’s seat ever since. 
Some important members of the original DOS coalition, such as 
the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) led by Vojislav Kostunica, did 
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not initially deny the worth of this goal, but later began to express 
reservations. This was reflected in the attitude towards the EU membership 
conditions during two governments led by Mr. Kostunica (2004-2008; 
its main coalition partner in the second government, 2007-2008, was 
the Democratic Party). While the more technical EU demands were 
being met during this period, there was little enthusiasm for the more 
political demands relating to Serbian citizens indicted for war crimes 
which were not being fulfilled completely. On the eve of Kosovo’s 
secession from Serbia, the DSS finally gave up its pro-European stance 
completely, since it blamed the EU Member States for allowing Kosovo 
to gain independence. 
Before the split within the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in autumn 2008, 
this highly nationalist party stood firmly against EU membership being 
a priority for Serbia. After the split, the larger group – the Serbian 
Progressive Party (SNS) led by Mr. Tomislav Nikolic – made a complete 
U-turn and became pro-EU. The smaller SRS group has changed neither 
its leader, Vojislav Seselj (indicted by the Hague International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in custody since 2003), 
nor its anti-EU ideology. 
This newly-found unity around the common goal of EU integration was 
further strengthened by a similar transformation within the Socialist 
Party of Serbia (SPS) which, having once been the main instrument of 
the nationalist regime in the 1990s, turned into a pro-European party. 
The first signs of this change could be seen in the support it gave in 
parliament to the minority government of Vojislav Kostunica, elected 
in 2004. The SPS’ newly-forged pro-EU identity was given particular 
emphasis after 2008, when it became the main ally of the DS in the 
incumbent government. 
The Serbian Progressives’ and Socialists’ transformation from being 
symbols of the non-democratic and nationalist regime in the 1990s to 
being supporters of the pro-EU policy in the last few years certainly 
remains a controversial issue, with many possible outcomes. However, 
its significance for the consolidation of Serbian democracy is undisputed. 
For the first time in the country’s recent political history, the main 
political actors are no longer sharply divided on an issue that has been 
a unifying force in all other Balkan and Central European countries, 
i.e. until recently everywhere else except in Serbia. 
The second defining characteristic of Serbian political life in the last 
few years has been the gradual shift from a multi-party into a genuinely 
two-party system. 
Although Serbia became a multi-party democracy in 1990, more or less 
at the same time as other post-communist countries, throughout the 
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1990s the political scene was dominated by limited pluralism with one 
hegemonic political party – the Socialist Party of Serbia. It was run by 
Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia and of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), whose undisputed power rested upon the following 
factors: unlimited extra-institutional powers (among which complete 
control over the security services, the economy and main media outlets 
in the period of wars and isolation), a majoritarian electoral system 
initially, a semi-presidential system of government, lack of democratic 
experience and lack of democratic political culture. 
Also of special significance was the very large number of parties, 
particularly within the chronically disunited opposition, in stark 
contrast to first one (SPS) and then – at the end of the decade – two and 
finally three ‘parties of power’ (the Yugoslav Left – JUL, and the Serbian 
Radical Party – SRS). Milosevic’s party had to share power in coalition 
governments with them (and others) as early as the second multi-party 
parliamentary elections in 1992, when the majoritarian electoral system 
was replaced with the proportional one. Failure to change the regime 
during the 1990s can largely be attributed to extremely unfavourable 
external circumstances, as well as to irregularities in the conduct of 
elections. 
Regime change in October 2000 came as a result of a temporary unification 
of a very diversified opposition in the DOS coalition (Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia), which first won the presidential elections in FRY 
(Vojislav Kostunica beat Milosevic) and then in December of the same 
year scored a landslide victory in the Serbian parliamentary elections 
with a two-thirds majority. The unmanageable DOS coalition of almost 
20 parties broke apart just six months later, but managed to hold on 
to power for three years and eventually collapsed soon after Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjic was assassinated in 2003. The predominantly 
Democratic Party (DS) government was then replaced by the minority 
coalition government of Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic 
Party of Serbia (DSS), with the support of a now small Socialist Party 
of Serbia (SPS) in parliament. 
At this point two major new elements were introduced into Serbia’s 
party system. First, the majority of parties in the former governing 
DOS coalition failed to meet the threshold for a parliamentary seat, 
thus radically decreasing the number of parties that really did count. 
Secondly, the opposition consisted of two completely opposed sides: 
the nationalist and populist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) that took one 
third of the votes and became by far the most numerous party; and the 
pro-European, pro-modernisation Democratic Party (DS) whose new 
leader took office as President of the Republic in 2004, thus launching 
the first cohabitation.  
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In the third post-2000 parliamentary elections, held in January 2007, 
SRS repeated its success and with one third of the seats remained the 
strongest individual party in parliament; however, pro-European parties 
(DS included) took the other two thirds of the votes and managed to 
form a new government in an uneasy coalition, with the same Prime 
Minister Kostunica. Because of the newly introduced rule according 
to which national minority parties did not have to pass the 5 percent 
threshold, the number of parliamentary parties did not drop. Nevertheless, 
the parties continued to become increasingly polarised, with DS and 
SRS at the two extreme ends of the spectrum (pro- and anti-European, 
respectively). Various other dividing lines cut across this dominant 
division, too. At that time Kostunica’s DSS pursued a policy of providing 
a link between the two poles, and, by manoeuvring between the two, 
was able to secure the biggest coalition potential, and a much more 
influential position than its election result would have suggested. 
The Serbian party system continued to change – to ‘institutionalise’ 
– along different lines to other post-communist countries. According 
to traditional thinking, Serbia still did not fulfil the conditions for 
the ‘institutionalised party system’ because: (i) there was no stability 
in the sense of more or less equal electoral results for the parties in 
subsequent elections; (ii) parties were not really embedded in society; 
(iii) parties had no legitimacy among the elite and citizenry; and (iv) 
party organisations failed to become more important than the leaders 
and their coteries. 
Before the abovementioned split within the Serbian Radical Party 
which took place in autumn 2008, political parties in Serbia could be 
divided according to several criteria, two of which are more important 
than the others. First, they could be divided into three camps, with the 
DS (representing the ‘civic’ option) on one side, the SRS (‘nationalist’ 
or ‘chauvinistic’) on the other, and the DSS in between as a kind of a 
‘national democratic’ option. The two opposing poles in this triad also 
comprised the traditional divide between the ‘modernisers’ (equal to 
‘pro-Europe’) and ‘traditionalists’ (equal to ‘nationalists’). The other 
divide existed only in Serbia at that time: between the ‘systemic’ and 
‘anti-systemic’ parties; the former had a two-thirds majority in parliament 
(DS, DSS and some smaller parties) and the latter consisted of the SRS 
and to some degree the SPS – parties of the ‘ancien regime’. 
When in autumn 2008 the newly-created Serbian Progressive Party 
(SNS) of Tomislav Nikolic decided to change sides and distance itself 
from the radicals and draw closer to the DS, the most important phase 
in the transformation of the party system was finally complete. The 
pro-European camp was strengthened at the expense of the nationalists, 
and the ‘anti-systemic’ category lost its previous significance as it was 
narrowed down to the Radical Party alone. This finally made Serbia 
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comparable to other post-communist countries in the Balkans and 
Central Europe. 
During the last three years, on the basis of these changes, two key 
political actors – DS and SNS – have managed to grow, marginalising 
along the way their smaller allies in power and in the opposition, and 
becoming the undeniable centres of gravity at the two ends of the 
Serbian political spectrum. Serbian has thus acquired a genuine two-
party system. Equally important is the ideological rapprochement of the 
SNS to the pro-European mainstream, i.e. to its main contender DS. The 
two parties now occupy the centre of the Serbian political spectrum, 
without any serious competition from other parties, and with the DS 
formally positioned slightly to the left and the SNS slightly to the right 
of centre. In fact, such an old-fashioned description has lost almost 
all meaning in Serbia, because SNS followers are mostly ‘transition 
losers’ who appreciate the leftist-populist ideology that the SNS has in 
big supply. 
One can only speculate about all the possible consequences this may 
still have on the political life of the country. One already noticeable 
effect is the effort of the ‘big two’ to tailor the main rules of the political 
system to suit their needs, which is likely to involve a change from the 
proportional electoral system to a mixed majoritarian-proportional one, 
according to the German model. This and other similar changes will 
further reinforce the domination of the two parties. They will be able 
not only to compete for power at different levels between themselves, 
but also to make all kinds of political agreements, including major 
ones such as forming the ‘grand coalition’ government, or changing the 
Constitution. The ideological differences between them are not so big 
as to prevent cooperation, and, more importantly, they do not matter 
much anymore. Last but not least, the fact that these previously fierce 
opponents have come together might also mean that a potential change 
of government at the next parliamentary elections or later should be 
considered as a normal part of the political game, without entailing any 
significant change in the main political priorities, or even for that matter 
an actual regime change. In other words, if the SNS were to come to 
power, it would not spell the end of the EU accession process but would 
be a continuation with certain modifications, as in other countries. 
The third new feature of Serbian political life is the informal change 
from the semi-presidential to the presidential system, with the informal, 
extra-Constitutional and extra-institutional powers of the President 
of the Republic having grown significantly since 2008. Boris Tadic, as 
head of state in his second consecutive term in office, has secured for 
himself much more political influence than is offered by the letter of 
the Constitution, or than the usual range of powers that a president can 
enjoy in a semi-presidential system of the Serbian type. This type of 
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hybrid regime that Serbia shares with most post-communist countries 
of Europe does not include the possibility of the president leading the 
government, but this is exactly what the incumbent Serbian President is 
capable of today. This practice has been borrowed from France or Russia 
(under the presidency of Vladimir Putin) where, although the two parts 
of the executive branch of power are formally separated, the presidents 
effectively direct the governments’ work. The Serbian Constitution does 
not allow for this. On the contrary, the position of the prime minister 
has been made more independent and even strengthened vis-à-vis the 
president in the last Serbian Constitution passed in October 2006. 
Nevertheless, Tadic can enjoy extra-Constitutional informal powers 
because instead of the cohabitation that existed in the previous two 
governments of Vojislav Kostunica, Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party has a 
majority in the Serbian Assembly. It is a constellation of forces which – 
as political theorists have already described in other examples – creates 
the conditions for the semi-presidential system to function in practice 
as a purely presidential one. 
Tadic has engineered one more advantage for himself and his party. 
He keeps the function of president, leaving the post of prime minister 
to someone else, which, in turn, allows him greater flexibility since 
he can choose when and how he wants to associate himself with the 
government’s policies, or to dissociate himself from them and play the 
role of an independent power broker. In many instances, particularly 
in certain critical moments, he has been clearly identified by citizens 
and even more so by international interlocutors as the one in charge 
of all the main political issues and choices in Serbia. Such presidential 
power does sometimes allow for quick fixes and bold decisions. However, 
this ‘Putinism Serbian style’ has often been criticised as being the main 
factor contributing to the lack of much-needed accountability in the 
present Serbian coalition government. 
This third feature of Serbian political life also accounts for the current 
domination of the Democratic Party which goes far beyond the central 
legislative and executive branches of power. In addition to the majority 
it has in parliament and in the government (within a coalition, of 
course), DS has a majority with partners in the Assembly of Vojvodina 
as well, and similarly also holds sway in most major Serbian cities. 
This is the single most important reason why the public associate the 
current government’s poor performance, particularly in the economy, 
directly and first and foremost with the Democratic Party. It dominates 
the political life of Serbia to an extent not seen before during the entire 
decade of the post-Milosevic era. 
Of course, the DS has used its power in numerous institutions led by 
its coalition for many good purposes, particularly for the advancement 
of EU-driven political reforms. Without the leading role played by the 
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DS in implementing those reforms, Serbia would not have made such 
significant progress in the consolidation of democracy or towards EU 
integration. It is currently estimated that democracy in the country has 
reached the level of ‘semi-consolidation’, which puts Serbia, together 
with Croatia and Montenegro, just below Bulgaria and Romania in this 
respect. In the same group of countries which lies between the better 
performers from Central Europe, on the one side, and the much poorer 
performers from the former Soviet Union, on the other, are the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. Bosnia and Kosovo are 
lagging behind Serbia and others from the region and are in the next group 
of countries that are still in transition and have hybrid regimes. 
Serbia’s distinctive ‘DS epoch’ will also be remembered for the problems 
it created. First among which is, without any doubt, an insufficiently 
high level of rule of law, which blocks and makes pointless all economic 
and political initiatives. Failure to uproot widespread corruption is 
another case in point which goes hand-in-hand with the lack of rule of 
law. Despite tangible results in the fight against organised crime, much 
more has to be done in this area too. 
Two remaining remarks about the absence of necessary progress in 
democratisation are of a more general nature. The first has to do with 
the obvious tendency of the ruling coalition and its key party to try to 
influence as much as possible all spheres of life and branches of power, 
which of course runs counter to the basics of democracy. Recent efforts by 
the executive to tighten controls over the media and the judiciary, using 
new laws and reforms as a pretext, were met with deserved criticism 
from the public. These laws were withdrawn or changed only after the 
intervention of the European Commission, which speaks volumes about 
the ruling coalition in Serbia. After several cases of ex-post complete 
change of policies that were previously commended and pushed by the 
executive, only in response to demands from abroad, the legitimacy of 
this pro-European government has been seriously shaken. 
There is also a growing public consensus about the potential harm to 
democracy that may result from a specific political phenomenon known 
as ‘partocracy’. It was certainly not invented by the incumbent rulers in 
Serbia but has been developed to previously unthinkable proportions 
in the past few years. 
Because of the dimensions of the problem, some political scientists even 
label the Serbian political system an open and unrestricted ‘partocracy’, 
using the term in the most pejorative sense. Firstly, while there has 
been undisputed improvement (namely the partial consolidation of 
democracy in the post-2000 period), Serbian political parties (the way 
they are organised internally, the way they function and their relations 
with the public) have been untouched by this positive trend. They have 
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preserved, and even reinforced, a genuinely undemocratic hierarchical 
structure and undemocratic decision-making, and party leaders have 
absolute control of each and every move. To make things worse, this is 
equally true of parties in the ‘new’ regime as in the ‘ancien’ regime. 
They all consistently oppose stricter legal regulation, including in 
particular financial scrutiny, and have even recently increased the level 
of control over their parliamentarians through the introduction of two 
mechanisms rarely seen in other countries. The first is the so-called 
indirect proportional electoral system, which means that under existing 
laws the parties are not obliged to respect the order of names on the 
party list for which citizens vote. On the contrary, the parties are free to 
pick and choose from the list as they like, thus overriding voter choice 
and ensuring that potential members of parliament toe the party line. 
Elected candidates have no independence from their party and there 
is a complete lack of accountability towards their constituents: voting 
is thus anything but an instrument of democracy.
To make things worse, a second mechanism has been introduced: the 
elected officials of all parties are obliged to sign a blank resignation letter 
before they take office. Thus their party leaders can decide whether and 
when to activate the resignation, replacing one party representative with 
another (who must also sign a blank resignation letter in advance). 
If these and other serious shortcomings (including, for instance, excessive 
centralisation) are not rectified soon, Serbia risks forfeiting the promised 
fast track to EU membership. Even more importantly, in the absence of 
necessary change, the Serbian political elite may further alienate citizens 
and create even higher levels of absenteeism than already exists and 
which is already very worrying. 
european integration
Serbia’s path to EU integration has been uneven and generally very rocky. 
In the past few years, the various post-Milosevic governments have 
made more progress and have been more enthusiastic about meeting 
technical demands than political ones. Apart from periods of extreme 
dedication to EU business, on several occasions Brussels temporarily 
suspended negotiations with Belgrade because of lack of progress in 
certain critical reforms, mostly relating to Serbia’s reluctance to prosecute 
indicted war criminals. Many foreign and domestic observers have had 
the impression that, unlike some of its neighbours, Serbia could have 
done much more during all these years and speeded up its accession. 
But somehow there was always something missing and Serbia has been 
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unable to pass this threshold and move rapidly and with determination 
towards EU membership. 
The current Democratic Party government is trying to prove that it is 
capable and willing to turn the page and get the country to the point 
of no return in the accession process. It is true that some elements of 
the puzzle, which were missing until recently, are now finally in place: 
a political consensus on EU membership being a national priority has 
been achieved (as described above) and in recent years efforts to meet EU 
conditions have become much more effective. For example, the alignment 
of legislation with the EU acquis is on the ‘fast track’; parliament has 
amended its rules of procedure to restrict the possibilities of the opposition 
blocking the legislative process; there is greater accountability in the 
EU integration process which is more transparent than before: results 
can be measured more precisely through action plans and coordination 
of the whole process has been improved. 
The crucial test for the incumbent DS Government will be if Serbia 
acquires candidate status by the end of 2011. The winning combination 
for Serbia would, of course, be to begin accession negotiations soon 
afterwards and to aim for EU membership by the end of the decade. 
Like other candidate and potential candidate countries, it will have to go 
through this process at a time when there is little enthusiasm for further 
enlargement among the Union’s Member States. This ‘enlargement fatigue’ 
is a product of the current economic crisis and the EU institutional 
crisis and has led to an informal tightening of the accession criteria for 
the Western Balkan countries. 
If all goes well, Serbia could at last move from the group of slower 
Balkan travellers on the European train to the fast one. Ten years after 
the end of the previous regime, Serbia still does not have EU candidate 
status, although EU membership has always been a priority and all 
post-Milosevic governments claimed they were dedicated to and busy 
with Europeanisation. While no other Western Balkan country has yet 
become a fully-fledged EU member, Croatia is closest to that goal (most 
probably in 2013) since it acquired candidate status in 2004 and began 
accession negotiations a year later. FYROM and Montenegro are also 
candidates (since 2005 and 2010, respectively), while Serbia is still in 
the waiting room for this level of integration, together with Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
However, the fact that Serbia’s integration process has speeded up in 
the last few years is an encouraging sign that things really are changing 
in this respect. After the signing of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement in 2008, Serbia officially applied for EU membership at the 
end of 2009, which coincided with another major success: acquiring 
a visa-free regime for Serbian citizens travelling to the Schengen area. 
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Currently, in spring 2011, having replied rapidly to the European 
Commission’s Questionnaire, Serbia is waiting for a decision on its 
candidacy which is due in December. 
Perhaps the best (and largely unexpected) results were those accomplished 
in regional cooperation. Serbia even took a lead in many initiatives, first of 
all in strengthening good relations with Croatia. In order to advance the 
process of reconciliation in the region, in spring 2010 Serbia’s Assembly 
passed a resolution on the Bosnian genocide committed by Bosnian 
Serbs in Srebrenica, stressing its condemnation of this crime. In general 
there has been a significant increase in the number of initiatives and 
practical steps aimed at reconciliation, and cooperation in all spheres 
of life has greatly improved. Of special significance is the cooperation 
between the judiciaries and police departments of the Western Balkan 
states in their joint fight against crime and corruption. Greater regional 
cooperation is, of course, particularly important in a post-conflict region 
such as the Balkans. Moreover, it is one of the formal obligations each 
state in the region has undertaken in its Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the EU. This new and positive wave of cooperation 
comes after the crisis triggered by the unilateral secession of Kosovo. 
While Serbia has not changed its policy of not recognising Kosovo, it 
has clearly changed its regional policy. 
Nevertheless, the latest improvements in regional cooperation and 
other areas do not alter the fact that Serbia’s EU integration has been 
very slow, particularly if judged from the perspective of the promises 
made by all post-Milosevic governments and expectations of Serbian 
citizens. There are three main reasons for this. 
First of all, for most of the post-Milosevic period the pressing issues 
of nation and state building have taken up all the attention, time and 
energy of the nation and especially of the government. Fortunately, the 
means for dealing with those issues were different to those resorted 
to in the 1990s. However, even without war, it was anything but easy 
to do everything that was necessary at the same time: rebuild a post-
conflict state and society, introduce far-reaching political and economic 
reforms, remain on course for European integration, and deal with 
perhaps the biggest challenge of all – the decision of Montenegro and 
Kosovo to break away from Serbia. Whatever one makes of Belgrade’s 
policy vis-à-vis their independence, it was certainly very demanding 
to juggle these events and other tasks, and to keep doing so within the 
democratic process. The first part of the past decade was taken up with 
tough negotiations with Montenegro and most of the second part with 
Kosovo (and they continue, as will be explained below). Although the 
levels of engagement were certainly changing, and the same could be 
said about the intensity of the consequences of these processes on all 
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other issues, it was often difficult to prioritise and EU integration might 
have slipped down the political agenda. 
Furthermore, without clear borders and as a kind of unfinished state, 
Serbia was in many significant ways incapacitated to fulfil EU-related 
demands. EU integration is a serious business that presupposes that 
the candidate is a ‘finished’ state with full sovereignty in the classical 
sense of the term. 
The second reason that explains why Serbia has fallen behind in the 
integration process is the prevailing attitude in the country, under all 
the post-Milosevic governments, towards war crimes. Two different but 
complementary attitudes developed with regard to this key political 
criterion set by the EU for former Yugoslav nations which took part 
in the wars of the 1990s. Periods of half-hearted efforts to arrest and 
send all indicted war criminals either to domestic courts or to the ICTY 
alternated with periods in which such efforts were more or less stopped 
largely because of the alleged lack of impartiality of the ICTY and of the 
EU towards Serbia (the same arguments were also put forward in Croatia). 
It was argued that although Serbia of all the former Yugoslav states had 
delivered the largest number of indicted individuals to The Hague, it 
nevertheless remained the main target of pressure and blackmail from 
the EU and other influential international organisations and states. 
Such arguments were put forward not only by opposition circles, but 
also by key parties and figures in a number of Serbian governments, 
which of course made things much worse. The EU relied on periodic 
reports from the main ICTY prosecutor when it came to judging 
whether and to what extent Serbia and other neighbouring countries 
were complying with demands relating to war crimes. Some of the 
demands, if not met fully, were moved to the next step in Serbia’s EU 
path, so as not to stop the accession process and at the same time to 
allow political conditionality to work. In this way, Brussels kept both 
the ‘carrot’ (further EU accession) and the ‘stick’ (suspension) as key 
instruments in the process. This kind of ‘conditionality plus’ for hard 
and very specific cases such as Serbia has without any doubt been 
necessary, and also quite successful so far; but it obviously requires a 
lot of time and effort on both sides. 
The third reason that might explain why Serbia’s EU integration is 
taking such a long time is that there is no clear strategic vision, and 
accompanying consensus, which puts Brussels at the very top of the 
country’s list of priorities. 
As already pointed out, much has been achieved in this respect. There 
is now a broad pro-Europe consensus amongst all the parliamentary 
parties, and while there are understandable nuances between the 
Jovan Teokarevic
73
different parties, the situation is also clearly different from before. A 
good illustration of how things have changed is the Resolution on EU 
accession voted in 2004: although only a political document without 
legal force, it was passed after a very rough ride in parliament and with 
a tiny majority of just four votes; today, now that the Serbian Progressive 
Party (SNS) joined the pro-EU camp in autumn 2008, it would be 
adopted with a very clear majority. 
The same party – to give one more example of how things have changed 
for the better – dubbed the signing of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) ‘an act of national betrayal’ in spring 2008, only 
six months before it changed sides. Today, the SNS promises that it 
would continue to implement the SAA if it came to power after the next 
parliamentary elections. 
Improvements notwithstanding, there are still question marks hanging 
over the key question: does Serbia have any alternative to the EU? Different 
Belgrade governments have given different answers to this question. 
At the beginning of the past decade, the answer was so unequivocally 
‘no’ that the very question seemed pointless. Later on, as more and 
more people began to realise that Europeanisation was far from easy 
and that it demanded sacrifices including those which could – rightly 
or wrongly – touch national pride, more and more people began to 
voice doubts. Since EU membership in the meantime had become a 
kind of a moving target (always ten years away), the grounds for EU 
scepticism were prepared. In addition, the nationalists conveniently 
recalled the 1999 bombing of Serbia by NATO which, they pointed 
out lest anyone should forget, included some of the same countries as 
are in the EU. It was therefore mooted that maybe the EU was not the 
best direction to head in. 
The final and decisive step that confirmed that the EU was not necessarily 
Serbia’s indisputable goal was made when the country turned towards 
Russia on the eve of Kosovo’s secession. The leading party of the ruling 
coalition at that time, Prime Minister Kostunica’s Democratic Party of 
Serbia, tried to convince its partners (including Tadic’s Democratic Party) 
that Serbia should turn its back not only on NATO but also on the EU 
as they had contributed to and made possible Kosovo’s secession. The 
signs that Serbia had found a new destination were all too clear to see. In 
December 2007 parliament suddenly and without public debate passed 
a resolution which proclaimed Serbia a neutral country. Neutrality 
at that time meant (and now still means) little more than ‘no NATO 
membership’, but that was the best gift Russia could have received, 
since the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance was thus stopped in the 
Balkans. In exchange for Russia’s support (in the UN Security Council 
and elsewhere) for Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence, 
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important economic concessions were made to Russia, such as giving 
Gazprom a controlling share in Serbia’s oil and gas monopoly, NIS.
In the months that followed the end of Prime Minister Kostunica’s 
government, efforts to marginalise the EU as Serbia’s goal were 
discontinued. Tadic and his party won both the presidential and 
parliamentary elections in the first part of 2008 mainly on the ‘EU ticket’. 
In other words, he got support for the continuation and intensification 
of the EU integration process. However, judging by the election results 
that support was limited, which is why a new version of the ‘not only 
the EU’ policy was invented and promoted by the Democratic Party 
and its coalition government. 
This time around, the ideological formula that was intended to satisfy as 
many domestic supporters and as many foreign partners as possible was 
that there were four pillars to Serbia’s foreign policy: Brussels, Moscow, 
Washington and Beijing. The order of the capitals in the formula would 
sometimes change, but Brussels always kept the leading position. 
This formula contained many messages, and the message to the EU 
was that Serbia had alternatives it might use if Brussels continued 
to keep Serbia on a tightrope, constantly raising the accession bar 
and asking the impossible, such as the arrest of the remaining two 
indicted war criminals (Mladic and Hadzic) who the Serbian authorities 
maintained could not be found. It did not take long for Belgrade to 
discover that a country of Serbia’s size and geographic position, and 
also a potential candidate for EU membership, was not really capable of 
conducting such an independent foreign policy. Therefore the formula 
was forgotten for a while, only to resurface later when favours from the 
other capitals were needed. Such inconsistency resulted in manoeuvrings 
and misunderstandings with Serbia’s allies. At home it demonstrated a 
chronic lack of consensus among the current elite and began alienating 
supporters. In essence, no one knows exactly what the country’s foreign 
policy is, and no one believes the leaders because they have made so 
many contradictory statements. 
The latest version of the Serbian government’s effort ‘not to put all their 
eggs in the EU basket’ involves ‘strategic partnerships’ that Serbia began 
to conclude with individual countries. For the time being, such bilateral 
agreements have been signed with Italy, France and China, and one 
with Russia will be signed by summer 2011. In practice, they might not 
be very significant after all. The idea behind them is probably to garner 
political support and economic aid from these influential countries, 
and generally to seek and preserve as much preferential treatment as 
possible for Serbia in these difficult times of crisis. Internally, as before, 
seeking strategic partners beyond the EU serves to attract Eurosceptics 
to Tadic’s pro-European camp. The problem is, of course, that this is 
Jovan Teokarevic
75
exactly what takes pro-European voters away from the Democratic Party 
and its coalition government. 
This brings us to some final considerations about Serbia’s EU integration. 
The whole international and domestic context of the last few years, as 
described below, led to another new phenomenon in Serbia that might 
be called ‘accession fatigue’. It is specific to the people of Serbia and 
elsewhere in the ‘EU waiting room’ who are dissatisfied and disappointed 
with the results of the EU accession process so far. They feel that they 
have sacrificed too much, believing in more or less empty promises that 
the EU is just around the corner and that it will turn the present hell 
on earth into a paradise. And they blame both the Union and domestic 
EU proponents for this disappointment. Their expectations have been 
betrayed, which is why they have either become extremely sceptical 
about EU membership or turned completely against it. 
This reaction is reflected in public opinion polls. The latest poll from 
early spring 2011 shows a considerable drop in support for future EU 
membership in Serbia. Only 57 percent of respondents were in favour 
of EU membership – the lowest number in the last ten years. Another 
18 percent said they would vote against joining the Union, while 20 
percent said they would not bother voting at all. 
The fall in support for the EU is hardly specific to Serbia. The same 
downward trend can be seen in most other EU aspirants, particularly 
in those countries at the same level of integration as Serbia at present. 
The closer a country gets to attaining EU membership, the higher the 
demands become and this, of course, sets a price that many parts of 
society are not willing or able to pay. At the same time, the rewards 
that might come from membership will be seen only in the long run 
and rarely before the actual accession date. 
kosovo 
Kosovo’s secession from Serbia in 2008 has been an issue of the utmost 
importance for Serbia’s internal and external policies. Belgrade’s resolute 
rejection of this unilateral move was shared by both the government and 
the opposition. It also led to misunderstandings and conflicts with the 
states that recognised Kosovo’s independence, including neighbouring 
states. What was a very complex situation in the second half of 2010 
nearly turned into a stalemate which threatened to acquire the ‘frozen 
conflict’ label. 
The issue gained a new dynamic at the end of July 2010 when the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s 
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unilateral declaration of independence of February 2008 and stated that 
it was not in violation of international law. A busy diplomatic August 
followed, during which time the authorities in Pristina gloated in the 
expectation of receiving new recognitions of its statehood, while Belgrade 
was desperately trying to persuade other countries that regardless of 
the ICJ verdict, Kosovo’s secession was unjust, illegal and that it set a 
dangerous precedent which could be repeated in many other countries. 
Then, at the beginning of September the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
– which had requested the opinion from the ICJ two years earlier – 
passed a joint Serbian-EU resolution on the same topic. 
Rather than spelling the end of the matter (in the form of a political ruling 
which followed the legal one), the resolution marked the beginning of 
yet another cycle of difficult negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina 
which have now begun with the aim of putting an end to this long, 
complicated and controversial issue. Although not legally binding, like 
the ICJ ruling itself, the resolution carries considerable political weight. 
The first reason for this is the change in Serbia’s position on the eve 
of the UN meeting. Contrary to the situation in 2008, when Serbia 
managed to persuade the majority of UN members to ask the ICJ for its 
opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s secession, thus challenging influential 
Western and other states which had backed Kosovo’s independence, 
this time around those same states were not against the new resolution. 
The September resolution was thus adopted in UNGA by consensus, 
i.e. without a vote, because it had been previously negotiated between 
Serbia’s President Boris Tadic and the EU foreign policy chief Catherine 
Ashton. 
Belgrade agreed to change the substance of its own original resolution 
sent to UNGA at the end of July, immediately after the ICJ ruling. 
Previously, it had stressed that ‘secession cannot be an acceptable way of 
solving territorial issues’, and had demanded that the parties should ‘find 
mutually acceptable solutions to all open questions’. This clearly meant 
reopening talks on the very status of Kosovo. A day before the UNGA 
session, the Serbian government backed down under heavy pressure 
from the EU, deleted the key parts of its text quoted above and agreed 
instead to the ‘readiness of the EU to facilitate the process of dialogue 
between the parties’. The resolution further states that dialogue should 
‘promote cooperation, make progress on the path towards the EU and 
improve people’s lives’.1
The change is considerable and it is a reflection of the radical shift 
in Belgrade’s strategy of resistance vis-à-vis Kosovo’s independence. 
Although Tadic and other officials in Belgrade insist that Serbia will 
never recognise its former autonomous region as a separate state, it 
has become clear that the Kosovo policy they have been pushing since 
February 2008 has not been successful. By the beginning of September, 
1.  United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/64/298, 9 
September 2010.
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70 states had recognised Kosovo, including 22 of the EU 27, 24 of the 
28 NATO members, and all but one Balkan state (Bosnia, because of the 
Bosnian Serb veto). The pace of recognition was indeed slowed down 
by hyperactive Serbian diplomacy coupled with Russia’s support in the 
Security Council and by the fact that many countries fear secession in 
their own territories. 
In contrast to its predecessors in the 1990s, the incumbent Serbian 
government should be given credit for using only peaceful, diplomatic 
and legal means in this ambitious struggle. But its stubborn insistence 
and lack of any productive idea on how to resolve the conflict eventually 
began to alienate its Western partners. With the convenient ICJ ruling in 
their pocket, they simply did not want to see another ‘frozen conflict’ in 
the EU’s backyard. In order to press Serbia harder, the German and British 
foreign ministers paid visits to Belgrade at the end of July, stressing in 
private talks and also publicly two things that were obvious everywhere 
except in Serbia: firstly, Kosovo’s status has already been decided and 
cannot be changed, and the same is true for any other border in the 
Balkans, and secondly, Belgrade has to comply with the EU approach 
if it wants to progress further towards the membership it requested last 
December and if it wants the EU to help in other areas. 
In return it seems that Serbia has been offered the prospect of faster 
EU integration, but the joint EU-Serbian resolution finally came about 
only when the five EU Members States that have not recognised Kosovo 
(Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) found a common 
position with the 22 other Member States. The inclusion of the EU-5 
legitimised Tadic’s risky change of policy at home, only weeks after 
he had sent special envoys around the world to lobby for the original 
Serbian resolution of July. 
Although it is still impossible to predict all the consequences of the 
breakthrough in the Kosovo issue in the summer of 2010, some things 
seem clear already. Serbia has made a step in the right direction which 
offers a chance for the problem to be resolved. Whether this step will 
be followed by others will depend on the internal political situation, 
on the readiness of Kosovo leaders to make concessions, and on the 
strategy of the EU which has taken the reins as the single facilitator of 
future negotiations. 
Tadic’s pro-European government will have a hard time persuading the 
public in Serbia that the current change of its Kosovo policy does not 
mean a complete abandoning of its slogan ‘both Kosovo and Europe’ 
which helped it win the last elections in May 2008. To remain in power, 
Tadic will have to demonstrate that the concessions he made will, 
in return, generate some relatively fast results. There are still hopes 
among the Serbian public that they will regain the northern part of 
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Kosovo under Serbian sovereignty as a kind of symbolic trade-off, but 
in time they might eventually be satisfied with the Serbian minority 
in northern Kosovo gaining special status, together with guaranteed 
international protection for Serbian monasteries in its former province. 
If there is a change of government, it will find that it also has limited 
room for manoeuvre. 
Kosovar Albanians are unlikely to be ready for big compromises, since 
they finally have the edge in this contest. But if Russia continues to 
block their UN membership in the Security Council, and certain EU 
countries refuse to recognise them, they will eventually have to come 
up with significant offers which will ultimately see neither winners nor 
losers in the ‘battle for Kosovo’. 
Conclusion
By taking the wheel on a bumpy road, the EU showed for a moment 
that it had reached unity on one important foreign policy issue. It 
remains to be seen whether it is up to the challenge. Less will depend 
on its diplomatic capacity, and more will depend on the ‘carrots’ it 
could promise to both Pristina and Belgrade in return for their mutual 
concessions. Faster EU integration is certainly a viable incentive, but 
it would have to be juggled with the prospects of other Balkan EU 
aspirants for whom membership is a distant goal, and with the Union’s 
enlargement fatigue and a serious economic crisis. 
Kosovo is just one of the major problems Serbia will have to face in the 
years ahead. It will have to deal with other problems that are no less 
difficult relating to the economy, politics and EU integration. A decade 
after the demise of Milosevic, the number and intensity of Serbia’s 
difficulties still run high, and the country continues to walk a thin 
line between key alternatives and allegiances. Serbia has nevertheless 
made significant progress in all areas and has left many major problems 
behind. Given that its problems today are less specific and are similar 
to those of any other European state, it might be hoped that in the 
future it will be more successful than at present in coping with the 
challenges ahead.
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Chapter 4 
Montenegro’s journey towards 
eU accession
Momčilo Radulović 
The 2006 referendum and its aftermath
The repercussions of the referendum on independence are still very 
visible within Montenegro, as well as at the wider Western Balkans 
regional level and internationally.  
Montenegro officially proclaimed its independence on 3 June 2006, after 
the referendum held on 21 May 2006, when 55.5 percent of citizens 
voted for independence and thereby confirmed the creation of a new 
independent state in the Balkans. 
This time, unlike the previous crises during the 1990s, the EU’s reaction 
was timely and effective. EU institutions were involved in the process 
of preparing for the referendum from the very beginning, mediating 
between the Montenegrin government and the opposition and prescribing 
the 55 percent voter threshold for achieving independent status. 
Even though the fixing of this percentage may have been contentious 
from the point of view of basic democratic principles, the outcome of 
the referendum was widely accepted. Since May 2006 this has served 
as the basis for the goodwill shown towards Montenegro in many 
diplomatic circles in Brussels and in the region, as well as representing 
a significant success for the EU ‘in its own backyard’. The role of the EU 
in the process was essential: through soft-power intervention in internal 
Montenegrin circumstances it contributed to a democratic solution and 
stabilisation in the country, as well as to the democratic and peaceful 
dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, thus giving 
a new qualitative impetus to the European Union’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Although in the case of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and 
of the referendum in Montenegro, the EU was obliged to exercise a 
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certain degree of flexibility in its interpretation of democratic standards, 
and had to resort to improvised and rather risky legal and political 
compromises (like the 55 percent voting threshold for achieving a 
majority in the referendum), in the end this game paid off for all actors. 
For the first time in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, a new state 
was created without war. In this particular case where the EU ‘gambled’ 
with the law and traditional democratic practices, Montenegro got its 
independence and the EU chalked up an important success as a  foreign 
policy actor.
The stabilisation of Montenegro was also a clear sign of the stabilisation 
of the whole Western Balkans region, both with regard to relations 
between countries and state entities and with regard to relations between 
ethnic and religious communities.
Even during the long run-up to the referendum, Montenegrin political 
and social elites were engaging in the process of European and Euro-
Atlantic integration and advocating EU membership as one of the 
country’s most important objectives. 
Immediately after the referendum on independence, both the government 
and the parliament of the Republic of Montenegro emphasised the 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes as a priority for 
Montenegro. Full diplomatic relations between the EU and Montenegro 
were established on 12 June 2006, as well as diplomatic relations with 
all the Member States. Regarding relations with other international 
structures, even though it had been agreed that Serbia would remain as 
a legal successor of the State Union, Montenegro openly declared that it 
would respect all international obligations and agreements undertaken 
while it was still part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
Montenegro strengthened its position on the international scene, and 
thus already in June 2006 it became the 192nd member of the United 
Nations. In addition, within the first year of independence, Montenegro 
became a member of the OSCE, the World Bank, the IMF, the Council 
of Europe, Partnership for Peace and many other international political, 
economic, sports and cultural institutions and organisations.
On 24 July 2006, the EU Council of Ministers made the decision to 
proceed with ‘the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with Montenegro1 while on 8 November 2006 Montenegro received 
its first Annual Progress Report. The Decision of the Council on the 
principles, priorities and conditions of the European Partnership was 
issued on 22 January 2007.2 
Meanwhile, on 15 October 2007 the SAA was signed in Luxembourg. In 
addition, the Interim Agreement allowed Montenegro to qualify for EU 
1.  Council of the European 
Union, Press Release, doc. 
11556/06, Presse 216, 2746th 
Council Meeting, Justice 
and Home Affairs, Brussels, 
24 July 2006. See: http://
www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressdata/en/jha/90655.pdf.
2.  Council Decision 2007/49/
EC of 22 January 2007 on 
the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with 
Montenegro, Official Journal 
L 20, 27 January.2007.
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preferential trade status just after 1 January 2008 and the Delegation of 
the EU Commission was established in Podgorica in November 2007.
Despite difficult political circumstances within the European Union and 
increasingly obvious enlargement fatigue during this period, Montenegrin 
officials persevered and the application was submitted in December 2008, 
during the French EU Presidency. For the French EU Presidency, who 
did little for Western Balkans enlargement, this involved no significant 
efforts while on the Montenegrin side, in contrast, significant efforts 
were expended. It represented a success for Montenegrin diplomacy, 
especially given a certain amount of hostility, both within the EU and 
among certain regional players. 
This put Montenegro ahead of other potential candidate countries and 
new confirmation of the commitment of European institutions came with 
the famous questionnaire that the European Commission sent to the 
government of Montenegro in July 2009. The process of answering more 
than 3,000 questions (with almost 700 additional questions) lasted until 
the second quarter of 2010. Even though the outcome of this process was 
ultimately successful, it was weakened by excluding the participation 
of Montenegrin civil society actors. Meanwhile, an additional boost to 
Montenegro’s European integration prospects happened in December 
2009 when visa liberalisation was granted as of January 2010.
The European Commission issued a positive evaluation of Montenegro’s 
preparedness in November 2010 and on the basis of that recommendation 
Montenegro officially became an EU candidate country in December 
2010. 
Even though this represented a significant achievement for Milo 
Djukanović’s government, the date for the opening of negotiations with 
Montenegro has been conditioned on Montenegro fulfilling requirements 
relating to reforms to be undertaken in seven distinct areas. The necessity 
to commit to reforms in these fields had already been raised by the 
EU in previous Annual Progress Reports, Parliamentary Declarations 
and other analytical and expert documents about Montenegro and its 
progress in European integration processes from 2002 until today (these 
seven areas will be discussed later in the chapter). 
Having in mind that these did not constitute new or additional demands 
being made of Montenegro, many EU officials warned about the difficult 
tasks which Montenegro needed to fulfil on its path to EU accession. 
Thus, already in 2007, Olli Rehn in an article for the daily Vijesti 
stated: ‘growth depends on investments, and investors need legal and 
political security, transparency and predictability. Key for this would be 
strengthening of the rule of law and an efficient fight against corruption 
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and organised crime … EU assistance will hasten the development of 
better institutions and administrative capacities.’3
Messages such as these constituted a clear warning to the authorities 
while at the same time serving to incentivise internal democratisation 
forces, especially those spearheaded by civil society, to continue to fight 
against many aspects of the political and economic system in Montenegro 
that lag far behind EU standards and constitute a heavy burden on this 
country in the European integration process. 
According to reports and analysis of all relevant international stakeholders 
(the EU, UN, OSCE, CoE), there are still many problems that require 
serious efforts and improvements. Namely, rent-seeking political elites, 
monopolies in the economy, ‘clientelism’ in government, corruption in 
all areas of social, political and economic life, an inefficient approach to 
tackling organised crime, a politicised judiciary, a partisan approach in 
employment policies, strong political control of public media, nepotism 
and a non-transparent privatisation process. For citizens of Montenegro, 
these are part of everyday life. 
This highlights a phenomenon that seems quite specific to Montenegro 
– being burdened with complex transitional problems while at the 
same time being quite successfully advanced on the path to European 
integration. How can this paradoxical situation be explained?
Many people in Montenegro would attribute much of the credit for 
the plus side of this specific paradox to a key political figure – Milo 
Djukanović, who resigned as Prime Minister in December 2010. Even 
though such an interpretation is open to dispute, it is clear that a brief 
overview of Milo Djukanović’s political trajectory tells us a lot about the 
entire political, economic and social transition of Montenegro.
The role of djukanović
From 1989 until late 1996 Djukanović was an associate and political 
partner of Slobodan Milosević, but in 1997 he started to gradually distance 
himself from Milosević and take the path toward democratisation and 
integration in the international community, focusing primarily on EU 
countries and the US.
Since the option of democratisation and EU integration was supported by 
the minority opposition movement that was advocating the independence 
of Montenegro, in spring 1997 Djukanović began to adopt this pro-
independence political agenda, directing the majority of his political 
followers towards the same goals and thus taking his distance from 
Milošević’s politics. By the same token he distanced himself from the 
common state with Serbia. 
3.  Olli Rehn, ‘The Gate 
to the EU’, Vijesti, 16 
October 2007, p.3.
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This political volte face led Djukanović towards strengthening cooperation 
with the EU, although in the period from 1997 to October 2000 such 
cooperation remained on the level of bilateral and multilateral meetings, 
political support in the West’s conflicts with Milošević and financial 
help for the resolution of refugee problems during the Kosovo crisis 
and immediately after that. There were no specific formal moves 
regarding Montenegro’s status in relation to the EU but Djukanović and 
his ministers enjoyed a certain amount of goodwill from the EU and 
countries in the region and on this basis a certain amount of informal 
and formal cooperation was launched. 
This situation was used by Djukanović to develop parallel institutions, 
independent from Belgrade, and in this way to pave the way towards 
Montenegrin independence. At the time, he was additionally encouraged 
by many EU officials, either officially or informally. At this particular 
juncture, exerting internal pressure on Milošević in this way suited the 
EU, while Djukanović managed to save Montenegro from more intense 
bombardment in 1999,4 since in talks with EU officials he rightly 
explained that further bombing of Montenegro (as a part of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia) would only play into the hands of Milošević 
and his followers in Montenegro.  
This situation in which Djukanović courted the West, and his government 
was focused on swiftly achieving Montenegrin independence, lasted 
until October 2000 and the fall of Milošević’s regime. 
With the arrival of (relatively) democratic forces to power in Serbia after 
October 2000 the EU’s attitude towards Montenegrin independence 
cooled somewhat, since its main focus now shifted to the stabilisation 
of Serbia, and thus Djukanović and Montenegro were relegated to the 
background to some extent. 
As an additional burden for Djukanovic, he was cited in a series of 
internal and international allegations about cigarette smuggling and 
corruption. There are still some unresolved questions surrounding his 
activities and those of his close associates and friends, and they have 
been the subject of investigations by the Italian and other European 
authorities. All this has raised uncomfortable questions about crime 
and corruption in official circles in Montenegro.
In spite of this, Djukanović was slowly but steadily moving towards 
achieving independence for Montenegro, engaging in significant 
compromises with international actors and the Serbian leadership along 
the way, as demonstrated by the so-called ‘Belgrade agreement’ forming 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on 14 March 2002. 
4.  During the NATO 
intervention in 1999, 
Montenegro was deeply 
divided and dangerously 
poised in a stand-off 
between the advocates of an 
independent Montenegro 
(led by Djukanović) and 
Milošević’s followers, who 
had the support of the Army 
of FRY, whose regular and 
special units were placed 
throughout Montenegro 
until the fall of the Belgrade 
regime in October 2000.
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This compromise also took place before the referendum on independence 
in May 2006, which Djukanović successfully organised, in spite of 
significant opposition from important actors in the international 
community. One of the most important characteristics of Djukanović’s 
approach was that he never openly said ‘no’ to any of the requests of the 
international community, even to some which were domestically very 
difficult for him, as was the case with the 55 percent voter threshold 
for a majority in the referendum on independence or the recognition 
of Kosovo.
But at the same time that he was accepting new conditions and demands 
for reforms from outside, he continued in many ways with the same 
old practices inside the country – implementing a minimum amount 
of concessions and seeking to maximise time for adaptation to new 
political circumstances. In that way he was postponing internal 
implementation of certain reform initiatives in a manner that was not 
producing consequences that were significantly visible outside the 
country and at the same time buying time to accommodate to new 
situations and in an attempt not to lose control over any of these newly-
reformed sectors. 
All of this created a dual perception: one from outside, where the tempo, 
quality and results of reforms were regarded as relatively adequate and 
another internal impression, from the perspective of citizens and civil 
society actors, where the speed, quality and results of reforms were far 
from satisfactory.
However, it would be wrong to say that this situation went unnoticed 
by the European Union, the US and other international actors. The 
evidence shows that the international community continually requested 
reforms in virtually the same areas for years (as testified by all the 
EC Annual Progress Reports 2002-2009). Nevertheless, it seems that 
political pragmatism in regional and international relations sometimes 
eclipsed strong support for the internal democratisation of Montenegro 
– Djukanovic always maintained strong and stable government which 
fulfilled all the regional and international priorities while at the same 
time not causing extremely significant problems at home. That was 
the reason why the EU, US and other international actors lent constant 
support to Djukanovic (or at least support with ‘one eye closed’) for 
such a long period of time.
This conclusion seems inescapable if we take two additional factors into 
consideration – the regional context and the development of serious 
problems within other countries of the Western Balkans; and the specific 
local situation with regard to the opposition parties in Montenegro.
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The opposition in Montenegro
In this context it is necessary to present a brief overview of the present 
situation regarding the Montenegrin opposition, where even after the 
referendum of 2006, the majority of opposition parties are still ‘swimming 
in the waters’ of Serbian nationalism and challenging the independent 
state status of Montenegro.
Such a position was one of the main reasons for the opposition’s 
constant failure to unify and create a more substantive political bloc 
that might challenge Djukanović’s rule on the basis of the values of 
democratisation, promotion of civic rights, religious tolerance and 
equality between nations. 
Instead of that, major opposition parties like the Socialist People’s Party 
(SNP) or New Serbian Democracy (NOVA) still support radical Serbian 
nationalist elements in Montenegrin society. However, there are some 
differences between those two parties, with the SNP having already 
moved towards focusing on social and economic issues and the fight 
against corruption, to the detriment to some extent of this pro-Serbian 
agenda. Nevertheless, it is hard to find much evidence of a shift towards 
strengthening of civic and democratic potential inside these parties.
While the SNP and NOVA had not been expected to easily overcome the 
nationalistic mindset inherited from previous periods and to become 
pillars of democratic change in Montenegro, the most radical impetus 
towards democratic change was supposed to come from the Movement 
for Changes (PZP), the party which had strong roots and origins within 
the civil society and democratic actors in Montenegro. This party was 
formed in 2006 on the basis of a wave of strong social support for 
democratic changes, which resulted in the PZP obtaining 11 seats in 
the Parliament of Montenegro and its emergence as the strongest single 
opposition party. 
Unfortunately, since then, along with the significant pressures with 
which it has had to contend from the ruling structures, the leadership 
of the PZP has failed to perform effectively as a political party. The 
behaviour of the PZP leadership led to numerous political mistakes 
both locally and internationally as well as a number of internal partisan 
clashes that resulted in a party split and the loss of a large number of 
leading party figures and an even more significant number of voters. 
All of this created a strong feeling of disappointment among civic and 
democratic activists in Montenegro which resulted in failure at the 2009 
elections (the PZP only gained 5 seats).
Now, after the latest failure of the opposition parties to present a united 
front, it seems that a change of power in Montenegro could only come 
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about if there were splits among the ranks of Djukanović’s Democratic 
Party of Socialists (DPS). Bearing this in mind, it is worth considering 
what is the likelihood of internal splits occurring within this, the 
strongest party in Montenegro.
future prospects
The post-referendum period in Montenegro further strengthened the 
political authority of Milo Djukanović, who survived the collapse of 
the socialist system and has ‘outlived’ all other political actors in the 
Western Balkans. 
Both strongly supported and strongly opposed, after 21 years in executive 
power as the president of Montenegro and the president of the government, 
Djukanović resigned from the post of Prime Minister in December 2010. 
Even though this was not the first time he stepped down (he resigned 
in November 2006 for one and a half years only to return to office in 
February 2008), it seems that this new decision may prove to be more 
binding, at least until new presidential elections in 2013.
Djukanović’s decision to step down was influenced by different 
considerations on both occasions. The first time, in 2006, he said 
that he was leaving politics to start his own private business, while he 
explained his resignation in December 2010 as his ‘contribution to the 
further democratisation of Montenegro’. Even though his resignation 
was predominantly a matter of his own political calculation, many 
believe that in addition he was both directly and indirectly encouraged 
by different international actors to make a move in that direction.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that Djukanović is no 
longer interested in power. Since the ruling DPS is still in control of all 
social, political and economic processes in Montenegro together with 
their junior partner, the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), it is obvious 
that real power and influence over the main decision-making processes 
are still in the hands of Djukanovic, given that he is still in charge as 
a president of the DPS. 
During the period after his first resignation (2006-2008), things swiftly 
began to escape his control. In particular his position and that of 
his interest group (composed of family and friends and influential 
businessmen) both within and outside the DPS began to be jeopardised 
by the ambitions of Svetozar Marovic (deputy president of the DPS) and 
President of Montenegro Filip Vujanovic (second deputy president of 
the DPS). This moved Djukanovic to return to office as Prime Minister 
in February 2008. This time Djukanović used his term until December 
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2010 to carefully prepare his exit and shore up his position and the 
position of certain business and political circles close to him. He provided 
political and party support for Igor Luksic as new Prime Minister and 
he successfully curbed the power of both his actual and potential 
opponents within the ruling DPS. In this respect, unless Luksic makes 
some sudden radical changes, a strong element of continuity is likely to 
prevail in Montenegro’s domestic and European policies.
Having said that, even though some analysts predicted stronger clashes 
within the ruling DPS, so far internal political conflicts have remained 
at a low level. This is predominantly a consequence of the specific 
political situation after the arrest of the mayor of the city of Budva 
and the brother of the ex-vice president of the government, Svetozar 
Marovic, in the so-called ‘Zavala’ case. This arrest was a clear sign 
of the existence of internal partisan conflict within the ranks of the 
highest officials of the DPS and at the same time signalled the start of 
the partial fulfillment of EU conditions for fighting against organised 
crime and high-level corruption.
This situation could evolve in either of two directions: it could remain 
an internal party clash between Djukanović and Marovic (in that case 
there will be no proper trial in the ‘Zavala’ case) or alternatively it could 
lead to more serious reforms and an extensive fight against corruption 
and organised crime. In that sense, both Djukanović and his heir, the 
new Prime Minister Igor Luksic, are in a strong position and have a 
chance to start a new chapter.
Nevertheless, even though commitment to a more dedicated fight 
against organised crime and corruption may materialise in the middle 
and longer run, it will be very hard to predict more substantial steps in 
that direction before the forthcoming congress of the DPS (to be held 
on 21 May 2011) This congress should also confirm and strengthen the 
political position of the young new Prime Minister Igor Luksic, who owes 
his appointment to his long association with Milo Djukanović. Even 
though Luksic is not generally regarded as someone who will challenge 
Djukanović’s authority, it seems that he has already demonstrated a 
significantly different style in communication with civil society and 
media, including a certain increased transparency with regard to the 
work of the government. 
Prime Minister Luksic is widely seen, internally and externally, as a 
figure who is untainted by high-level corruption or abuse of power. 
Nevertheless, it may be difficult for him to make much progress in the 
fight against certain power structures and interest groups that have 
traditionally shaped the political and economic scene in Montenegro 
and that are either directly or indirectly connected to ex-Prime Minister 
Djukanović, Svetozar Marovic and other high-ranking DPS officials. 
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Curtailing the influence of these groups and making them play by the 
rules will be the most significant test for Luksic’s government in the 
immediate future.
However, Luksic will have the significant support of the EU and the 
international community in attempting to implement reforms and fight 
against criminality, corruption and other problems in Montenegrin 
society. His governmental programme and goals are dedicated to fulfilling 
the European integration agenda but it is not yet clear how strong he 
will be in challenging different local players, especially those within 
the ranks of his own DPS party and his government. 
on track towards european integration
Regardless of the future prospects of his success in governing Montenegro, 
PM Luksic has inherited a certain advantage in comparison to most of 
his counterparts in the region and that is the fact that at the beginning of 
2011, Montenegro is on track to join both the EU and NATO, confirming 
the success of its European and Euro-Atlantic integration trajectory. 
However, if we take into consideration Milada Anna Vachudova’s 
definition of ‘asymmetric interdependence’, where East and Central 
European candidate countries depended significantly on the perspective 
of EU membership, while ‘the EU depended on them but little,5 it is 
clear that Montenegro has greatly benefited from its engagement with 
the EU and that the development, reform and transition of Montenegrin 
society, politics and economics are inseparable from the European 
integration processes.
With regard to Euro-Atlantic cooperation and eventual NATO membership, 
Montenegro received a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in December 
2009 and since then the Montenegrin government has received positive 
feedback regarding fulfilment of its MAP obligations. 
Even though internal public support for NATO membership is not 
high, it is expected that NATO membership will come prior to full 
EU membership and this will also serve as an additional impetus for 
fostering the overall European integration of Montenegro. This is the case 
since Euro-Atlantic and especially European integration have provided 
a framework for important assistance to internal reform processes in 
Montenegro. Both politically and economically, the support of the EU, 
along with the assistance of the US (which was one of the highest in the 
world per capita), have played a key role in shaping the reform processes 
of social and institutional transition in Montenegro. 
5.  See Milada Anna 
Vachudova, Europe Undivided 
(Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p. 63.
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The economic context
From an economic perspective, according to EU data,6 the overall 
financial assistance of the EU to Montenegro between 1998 and 2010 
was over €408.5 million. Within the CARDS programme (1998-2006), 
€277.2 million was distributed, while €131.3 million was distributed 
between 2007 and 2010 under the Instrument of Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA). The support was offered within the reform process 
in the country ‘in the context of European integration with a focus on 
institution building, introduction of the EU acquis and improvement 
of socio-economic conditions as well as environmental protection and 
sustainable development. Financial support is also being provided to 
civil society.7 
The EU countries continue to be the most important trading partners for 
Montenegro. According to statistics more than 40 percent of Montenegro’s 
imports come from the EU Member States while more than 48 percent 
of exports go towards the EU.8
Since the beginning of the European integration process, Montenegro 
has shown a significant improvement in the macroeconomic sphere. 
From 2001-2003 average annual GDP grew between only 1 percent to 2 
percent, then accelerating to 4.5 percent in 2004 and 2005, showing a 
significant increase of 8.6 percent in 2006 and soaring to 10.7 percent 
in 2007. The following year, 2008, saw it fall to 6.9 percent while 2009 
witnessed the full impact of the global economic crisis with a contraction 
to – 5.7 percent of GDP.
Nevertheless, in 2010 the Montenegrin economy stabilised and GDP 
posted 0.5 percent positive growth. Today, according to international 
estimations, it seems that the worst is behind Montenegro and that a 
2 percent increase of GDP in 2011 and even more in 2012 will follow. 
Nevertheless the budget deficit will force the Montenegrin government 
to issue new state bonds and seek credit arrangements with the IMF. 
This has already been announced by Prime Minister Luksic.
GDP per capita, which increased from €1,679 in 2000 to €2,800 in 
2006 and €4,900 in 2010, reflected developments within the process 
of European integration. A low inflation rate, a high level of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and a significant drop in unemployment are 
also encouraging for future prospects.
political progress
In addition to these economic data, a comparative review of political 
transition and democratisation processes in Montenegro in the period 
6.  European Commission, 
Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, 
‘Commission Opinion on 
Montenegro’s application for 
membership of the European 
Union’, COM(2010) 670, 
Brussels, 9 November 2010.
7.  Ibid.
8.  Ibid.
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from 1999 and the European integration process up until today, shows 
considerable improvements in many fields. 
Thus, the annual Annual Progress Reports (2002-2009) and all 
relevant documents (from 1999 until today) show that there have 
been significant improvements which have contributed to a higher 
degree of democratisation of Montenegrin society and of the relevant 
institutions. These range from economic reforms designed to ensure 
monetary and fiscal stability to political reforms targeting for example 
the public administration and the judiciary.
However, these account for only a part of all those reforms that need 
to be defined, developed and implemented. In that sense, so far, both 
state institutions and the public in Montenegro (and the majority of 
representatives of civil society and NGOs) have learned that the adoption 
of a legislative framework and legal regulations is one thing, and their 
successful implementation and making them an integral part of the 
institutional framework and social context, completely another. 
There are still many serious problematic issues that need to be addressed 
urgently in order to speed up the process of EU integration and the 
overall democratisation and transition of Montenegro. These are well 
recognised both internally, by the citizens of Montenegro,9 and by the 
international community and especially European Union structures. 
Among many different tasks confronting Montenegro, the most 
important and the most urgent were defined by the EU and listed in 
the Commission’s Opinion on Montenegro’s Application for membership 
of the European Union, which was produced in November 2010. The 
Commission’s Opinion included a chapter on political criteria which 
drew attention to the persistence of ‘deficiencies in the functioning of 
democratic institutions and shortcomings in implementation of the 
legislation’. It concluded that ‘the parliament’s overall capacity to ensure 
appropriate oversight of the government remains limited.’ In addition, it 
indicated that ‘the election law has not been fully harmonised with the 
Constitution’ and that ‘the separation of powers is not fully respected 
in the case of the judiciary’. The public administration was judged as 
still ‘weak and highly politicised’.10
Therefore, in spite of the fact that Montenegro has achieved EU candidate 
status, it has not been given a date for the opening of negotiations 
with the EU. This is a clear sign that there are still serious obstacles 
that have to be removed within a short timeframe in order to prove 
to EU institutions that Montenegro has achieved sufficient political 
and economic maturity to negotiate full EU membership. This is the 
reason that the EU has set out seven conditions relating to areas for 
immediate intervention: compliance with these will be assessed in the 
9.  See various public opinion 
surveys, e.g. Balkan Monitor, 
‘Insights and Perceptions: 
Voices of the Balkans’, 
Gallup 2010. The survey 
results showed that 85 
percent of Montenegrins 
consider corruption as a 
serious, very serious or 
fairly serious problem.
10.  European Commission, 
Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, 
‘Opinion on Montenegro’s 
application for membership 
of the European Union’, 
COM(2010) 670, Brussels, 
9.November 2010.
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next Annual Progress Report that should be presented during October 
or November 2011.
If Montenegro shows significant progress in these seven key areas, the 
date for the opening of negotiations might be agreed at the end of 2011. 
Some of these requirements are clear and measurable, while others might 
be problematic for both sides, especially in terms of evaluation.
Seven Priority Areas outlined in the Commission’s Opinion 
(November 2010)
1. Improve the legislative framework for elections in line with the 
recommendations of the OSCE-ODIHR and the Venice Commission; 
strengthen the Parliament’s legislative and oversight role.
2. Complete essential steps in public administration reform including 
amendments to the law on general administrative procedure and 
the law on civil servants and state employees and the strengthening 
of the Human Resources Management Authority and the State 
Audit Institution, with a view to enhancing professionalism and 
de-politicisation of public administration and to strengthening 
a transparent, merit-based approach to appointments and 
promotions.
3. Strengthen rule of law, in particular through de-politicised and 
merit-based appointments of members of the judicial and 
prosecutorial councils and of state prosecutors as well as through 
reinforcement of the independence, autonomy, efficiency and 
accountability of judges and prosecutors.
4. Improve the anti-corruption legal framework and implement the 
government’s anti-corruption strategy and action plan; establish a 
solid track record of proactive investigations, prosecutions and 
convictions in corruption cases at all levels.
5. Strengthen the fight against organised crime based on threat 
assessment and proactive investigations, increased cooperation with 
regional and EU partners, efficient processing of criminal intelligence 
and enhanced law enforcement capacities and coordination. Develop 
a solid track-record in this area.
6. Enhance media freedom notably by aligning with the case-law of 
the European Court for Human Rights on defamation and strengthen 
cooperation with civil society.
7. Implement the legal and policy framework on anti-discrimination 
in line with European and international standards; guarantee the 
legal status of displaced persons, in particular Roma, Ashkali and 
Egyptians, and ensure respect for their rights. This will include 
the adoption and implementation of a sustainable strategy for the 
closure of the Konik camp.
92
4       Montenegro’s journey towards eU accession
Nevertheless, it seems that, so far, the new government has taken these 
demands seriously. 
A new Action Plan for fulfilment of obligations set out in the Opinion of the 
EU Commission was adopted after wide and serious public consultation 
with civil society. In this document11 the government, parliament and 
other state institutions set out the various steps and activities that should 
serve to meet the Commission’s seven recommendations.  
Meanwhile state officials have pledged full commitment to achieving 
these tasks before the new EU evaluation in October 2011. However, 
the relatively weak position of the new government with regard to 
introduction of reforms in the judiciary and the fight against organised 
crime and high-level corruption means that some uncertainty hangs 
over the prospect of the majority of these tasks being successfully 
implemented.
Ultimately the real answer to these doubts depends on the determination 
of the new Prime Minister and his team to clamp down on serious cases 
of wrongdoing by many high- and middle-ranking officials in the state 
bureaucracy and local authorities.
On the plus side, apart from these critical observations by the Commission 
regarding some internal aspects, EU officials praised Montenegro’s 
regional positioning and positive role in various aspects of international 
relations. Montenegro does not have any significant conflicts or serious 
unresolved issues with its neighbours and Montenegrin official (and 
unofficial) policy within the past decade has been one of the cornerstones 
of every successful regional initiative for cooperation. Such positive 
contribution to regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations 
has confirmed Montenegro’s position as a leading example for all other 
countries of the region in this regard. 
To support these positive evaluations of Montenegro’s good regional 
relations, Milan Rocen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, 
emphasised the example of Montenegrin recognition of Kosovo, while 
at the same time endeavouring to maintain relatively solid relations with 
Serbia. He emphasised that Montenegro has no contentious issues with 
any of its neighbouring countries and that the only issue with Croatia, 
regarding the border on the Prevlaka peninsula, will be resolved by a 
decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). He also announced 
that he expects that in the context of Croatia’s application for membership 
of the EU, the work of negotiation experts on this border issue will be 
intensified on both sides during this year.12
As well as seeking to strengthen regional political ties, Montenegro 
also maintains very strong economic connections with countries of 
11.  Government of Montenegro, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and European Integration, 
‘Action Plan for Monitoring  
Implementation of 
Recommendations Given in 
the European Commission’s 
Opinion’, 17 February 2011.
12.  Author’s interview with 
the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Milan Rocen, 
19 December 2010.
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the region, with a significant proportion of Montenegrin exports and 
imports going to and coming from Serbia (28 percent of exports and 36 
percent of imports13) and Bosnia, but also Croatia, the Former Republic 
of Macedonia and Kosovo.
Such constructive behaviour towards regional partners as well as towards 
EU institutions and EU Member States would seem to augur well for 
Montenegro’s aspirations to EU membership. 
If this is also followed by resolute and visible action taken against 
widespread corruption and organised crime and a commitment to 
other internal social, political and economic reforms, it seems that, as 
was recently intimated by senior EU officials, the EU’s doors might be 
wide open for Montenegro.
Conclusion
Five years after its proclamation of independence Montenegro is steadily 
addressing issues of democratisation rather than being predominantly 
preoccupied with the ‘pre-political’ questions of identity, statehood and 
nationalistic rhetoric. 
Despite the fact that Montenegro is still burdened with numerous 
problems of different scale and intensity in areas related to general 
democratisation and social and economic transition, the main debates 
are now less focused on state status issues than on economic, social 
and other existential and development problems.  
EU candidate status was granted to Montenegro in December 2010 and 
at the beginning of 2011, its European and Euro-Atlantic integration 
prospects look promising, offering many opportunities to Montenegro 
and its government. However, there are still many serious problematic 
issues that need to be addressed urgently in order to speed up the EU 
integration process and the overall democratisation of Montenegro. 
These problems are well-recognised both internally and externally and 
most of them are addressed in the seven requirements set out by the 
EU as a condition for offering a date for the opening of membership 
negotiations with the EU. 
Today, the Euro-integration ball is in Montenegro’s court and it is now up 
to the government and other state institutions to show that Montenegro 
can meet its European destiny. 
13.  The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Country Report 
Montenegro, January 2011.
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Chapter 5 
The story of Macedonian 
populism: ‘all we want is 
everything!’
Sašo Ordanoski
The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s own views and do not 
represent those of any organisation or institution. An early version of this 
paper was originally presented as a paper at the colloquium ‘The Western 
Balkans and the EU’ held in Paris by the EUISS at the end of January 2011. 
The author would like to point out that this chapter does not take account of 
any political developments in Macedonia since mid-March 2011.
Nikola Gruevski, Macedonia’s Prime Minister and undisputed leader 
of the governing Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity party (VMRO-DPMNE), 
firmly believes that he has invented a magic formula for staying in 
(absolute) power forever. It is a simple formula consisting of two main 
pillars and one additive. 
The first pillar is the number of public administration employees.1 When 
Gruevski came to power in mid-2006 after VMRO-DPMNE won the 
elections largely thanks to promises of economic revival, there were some 
95,000 public sector employees. At the time, this was considered to be 
an excessive number of state bureaucrats. While previous governments 
provided no clear strategy, the overstaffed public sector was supposed 
to be reduced in the years ahead as part of the general endeavour to 
boost economic growth and cut fiscal deficits. 
However, Gruevski soon realised that public administration staff cuts 
in a country with low social welfare standards and an unemployment 
rate of around 32-35 percent were widely unpopular among voters.2 
The table overleaf3 illustrates the magnitude of the problem.
1.  It is difficult to provide 
a clear definition of what 
public administration 
is in Macedonia, even 
when relying on official 
documents on public 
administration reforms. 
A brief study published in 
2009 entitled ‘Rightsizing of 
the Public Administration 
in Macedonia’ by the 
Skopje-based Analytica think 
tank (www.analyticamk.
org) claims that there 
is a difference between 
public administration 
and the civil service (state 
administration): ‘All those 
who perform duties related 
to the executive, legislative 
and judiciary branches 
of government belong to 
the civil service, while 
those working in other 
public sectors, such as 
culture, health, education 
etc. are members of the 
public administration’.
2.  It should be said at this 
point that some experts 
in Macedonia warn that 
official government statistics 
on social, economic and 
financial issues should be 
treated with caution, as they 
are ‘unreliable or politically 
manipulated’ (S. Vaknin), 
or because ‘there are some 
indicators that are really 
strange, inexplicable and 
contradicted by reality’ (D. 
Doncev). Both the latter 
authors are quoted from 
the article ‘Macedonian 
Statistics’ published on 24 
April 2010, in WAZ’s online 
edition of EUobserver.
3.  Source: Macedonian 
State Statistical Office and 
the State Health Fund 
as published in Vreme, 
2 February 2011.
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Category/Year 1992 2000 2005 2010
Employed 650,070 545,222 417,465 478,962
Unemployed 190,000 261,452 324,766 300,540
Pensioners 166,224 241,221 297,324 278,863
Children  
(under 15)
260,659 256,280 223,876 215,078
So, the Gruevski government decided to begin a mass recruitment 
drive in the state administration, pushing numbers to unprecedented 
levels. Today, in early 2011, there are some 130,000-140,000 state 
employees (excluding staff in public enterprises). The real figures are 
unknown to anyone outside the highest levels of government and when 
questioned on the matter the political authorities give deliberately vague 
answers. The number of ministries, state agencies and various other state 
bodies has grown significantly, making Macedonia a regional leader 
in high-, mid- and low-ranking state officials.4 The number of drivers, 
secretaries, office assistants, assistant deputies and deputy assistants 
grew accordingly.   
In addition to this employment strategy, extensive state subsidies were 
distributed to the agricultural sector. This sector, encompassing some 
190,000 farm holdings,5 was largely ignored in the past two decades, 
and the governing party wanted to correct this historic injustice. 
These two strategies paid off for the governing party. VMRO-DPMNE 
confirmed its convincing victory in the early parliamentary elections in 
2008 and won an absolute majority in parliament on the same ‘economic 
revival’ election platform.6 In 2009, VMRO-DPMNE won both the local 
and presidential elections decisively. They installed their own people as 
mayors in most of Macedonia’s 85 municipalities and their candidate 
Gjorge Ivanov as president.
The only ‘catch’ to getting state employment or a subsidy was to have a 
membership card of one of the coalition government parties, preferably 
VMRO-DPMNE. As a result, not only did the party win the elections, 
but party membership also grew. The consequences in the public sector 
were obvious: it became heavily partisan from top to bottom.
The party’s capture of the state did not stop at the threshold of public 
institutions and administrative bodies. In an attempt to widen its 
political base and replace the elite, it soon embarked on a complete 
‘VMROisation’ of all socio-economic layers, with the governing party 
targeting the business sector, the media, the health system, the academic 
and educational community, non-governmental organisations, trade 
4.  By way of comparison, 
Slovenia (which is 
almost equal in size to 
Macedonia) has a total 
of 15 ministries, while 
Macedonia has 18 (three 
without portfolio), plus the 
prime minister’s cabinet 
and the offices of three 
deputy prime ministers.
5.  In 2009 the Macedonian 
government released some 
€70 million for agricultural 
subsidies, and it was 
announced that €100 million 
was to be distributed in 
2010. Few or no subsidies 
were available under 
previous governments. The 
agricultural sector, together 
with the food-processing 
industry, accounts for 
some 15-20 percent of 
the country’s GDP. 
6.  In 2006 VMRO-DPMNE’s 
election platform was dubbed 
‘Revival in 100 steps.’ For the 
early elections in 2008 the 
platform was conveniently 
renamed ‘Revival: 
Extended and upgraded.’
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unions, professional and sports associations, agricultural unions, etc.7 
There was little opposition. As in ‘the good old days’ of communism, if you 
wanted prosperity, you had to be a member of the governing party.
But partisan loyalty – a typical instrument for post-communist reformers 
of all parties in Macedonia – was neither the only, nor the main criterion 
of trustworthiness promoted by the current government. VMRO-
DPMNE’s leadership8 went one step further than this ‘proof’ of political 
allegiance by promoting family loyalty as a qualification to win the 
highest confidence of the leaders. Fathers, sons, brothers and sisters, 
godfathers, close relatives and other family members and friends were 
appointed by the dozen to top positions in government, including the 
secret police, customs, the justice system, ministerial and diplomatic 
posts, independent regulatory bodies, the state energy sector, state 
agencies, public companies and their managing boards. A number of 
them occupied several posts simultaneously in order to limit the number 
of decision-makers and maximise personal income. 
This omerta-style clientelism was rampant throughout all levels of 
government, from the very top down to the lowest ranks of state and 
municipal administrative structures. Four years after VMRO-DPMNE 
came to power, there were unprecedented and widespread conflicts of 
interest in Macedonia’s transitional society and what seemed to be a 
real plague of systematic corruption, favouritism in public spending 
and cronyism of the worst kind.
Governing by the polls
The second pillar of Gruevski’s formula for staying in power involves 
influencing public perceptions. The ruling party realised that by spending 
an adequate amount of money on public relations (PR) and political 
marketing techniques, public perceptions could be manipulated and they 
could thus establish ultimate authority over the country.  PR activities 
were stepped up dramatically. The public was literally overrun by 
dozens of campaigns: announcing economic reforms; promoting moral 
values; inviting foreign investors; proclaiming a clean environment and 
a green future; pleading for tolerance; combating domestic violence; 
promoting literacy; warning against the dangers of smoking, drugs 
and alcohol; encouraging regular health checks; calling for people to 
buy Macedonian products; encouraging families to have a third child; 
proclaiming education for all, education for the elderly, tennis courts in 
every town, transparency and the fight against corruption; announcing 
an ‘open day’ with the government and live TV broadcasts of government 
sessions ... At times over the past few years the government must have 
been simultaneously running around 15 campaigns per week. 
7.  This breathtaking strategy 
was best described in a 
one-liner from a personal 
friend in government circles: 
‘All we want is everything!’.
8.  In order to safeguard against 
unexpected democratic 
ideas or initiatives in the 
party, in Article 22 of 
VMRO-DPMNE’s statute it is 
clearly stated that the party 
chairman, according to his 
own judgment and will, 
‘can block implementation 
of decisions and other acts 
by the [party’s] Executive 
Committee and other [party] 
institutions and bodies.’ 
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Transparency Macedonia has estimated that Gruevski’s government was/
is spending around 1.5 percent of the annual state budget9 on domestic 
and international public relations and promotional and advertising 
campaigns, from CNN and The Financial Times to local television 
and village radio stations. Bearing in mind that Macedonia’s media 
advertising market is very small, representing some €40-50 million 
annually,10 the influx of such large amounts of government money 
caused mayhem among media owners and eliminated any semblance 
of fair market competition.  
Governing through public relations had added value for the ruling class: 
as a result of the government giving millions of euro to the owners of 
some of the main national commercial television stations, independent 
editorial policy gave way to uncritical support for government policy. 
The prime minister’s chief of cabinet and general secretary of VMRO-
DPMNE, Martin Protogjer, became the most influential spin doctor 
in the country. Censorship and self-censorship became the order of 
the day for many journalists and editors employed by state-sponsored 
media owners.
Opinion polls also became a key instrument for deciding government 
policies. Polls were commissioned on a regular basis, sometimes weekly, 
and there was an explosion of new ‘independent’ polling institutes.11 The 
pollsters looked into every possible issue; ministerial agendas depended on 
the results. Pride of place was given to the ratings of the prime minister, 
who developed an obsession with poll results.
Given this mode of government – unlimited state employment, widespread 
subsidies and relentless, round-the-clock public relations – it is not 
surprising that the machinery was soon to be oiled by a little ‘additive’: 
the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and his 
party engendered growing fear in all political and social spheres. The 
omnipresent state was in control of everything, from the ‘independent’ 
justice system and news media, through much of the economy, to 
sports clubs and theatre companies. The few remaining independent 
institutions left in the country – the Constitutional Court, the Governor 
of the National Bank, the Broadcasting Council, the new President of 
the State Anti-Corruption Commission, and several influential media 
outlets and NGOs – were put on the government’s ‘blacklist’ and now 
come under constant attack from the pro-government media and suffer 
government and party bullying. The state flexes its muscles through 
televised arrests and by deploying police in full riot gear for the smallest 
of offences. Government spokespersons give several press conferences 
a day, openly attacking (usually ad personam) anyone who disagrees 
with the official government line. Businesses deemed ‘hostile’ to the 
state are regularly subject to financial and other state inspections. Ads 
openly attacking political opponents can be seen in the daily press. 
9.  The size of the annual 
budget between 2007 and 
2010 was €2.2-2.5 billion.
10.  Since no reliable official 
statistics are available, this 
estimate should be treated 
with caution, as it is based 
purely on an approximation 
of the real income of the five 
major national commercial 
TV stations, two national 
commercial radio stations 
and the five major dailies 
which cover some 80-90 
percent of the national 
advertising market.
11.  A flurry of new 
‘independent’ news websites 
in Macedonian also flooded 
the Internet, in an attempt 
to overwhelm the main 
Internet news aggregators 
and the blogosphere with 
intensive and voluminous 
pro-government news.
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Party activists are regularly sent to demonstrate in front of the main 
headquarters of the opposition party or the EU offices in Skopje.12
The people fell silent. To voice a different opinion to that of the government 
became an act of bravery in a country which acquired EU candidate 
status in 2005. It was soon clear that instead of democracy, it was 
demokratura – a combination of democracy and dictatorship – that has 
steadily taken hold in Macedonia over the last four years.13
When disneyland meets les Champs 
elysées
In the first few years of government, Prime Minister Gruevski and his 
team were praised by many in domestic and international circles as 
promising ‘young technocrats’, as opposed to the ‘old-fashioned’ and 
‘corrupt’ social democrats that governed Macedonia for most of the post-
communist transition period from the beginning of democratisation in 
1990. Macedonia stood out as a clear outperformer in the World Bank’s 
Doing Business 2010 Report. In the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2009-2010, Macedonia – together with Albania 
and Montenegro – increased its ranking. In its Corruption Perception 
Index 2010, Transparency International ranked Macedonia 62 out 
of 178 countries (in equal position with Croatia, Ghana and Samoa), 
43 places up from 2006.14 
The last few years have seen many celebratory press conferences and 
official government announcements. Opinion polls in 2006, 2007, 2008 
and 2009 suggested that Gruevski was by far the most popular politician 
in the country15, and VMRO-DPMNE had an almost three-figure lead 
over the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). 
Gruevski’s political ratings were largely attributed to his tough and ‘strictly 
principled’ stance on the Macedonian-Greek name issue: Macedonia 
is not going to change its name, so Greece should either give in or face 
the consequences on the international scene. 
He got further support from the majority of ethnic Macedonians as a result 
of his ‘soft’ but effective nationalistic treatment of ethnic Albanians. Unlike 
VMRO-DPMNE’s previous, more aggressive and confrontational policy 
towards Albanians, Gruevski adopted a quieter and more contemptuous 
approach, applying a ‘technocratic touch’ of corporatist power-sharing 
with their political representatives.16 Making virtue out of necessity, 
Gruevski has tried all the ethnic Albanian political parties as coalition 
partners in the last four years in government, exploiting their influence 
12.  Many of these appalling 
practices were exposed 
and criticised, albeit in 
diplomatic language, in 
the regular European 
Commission progress 
reports, with no real effect 
on the government’s conduct. 
13.  Teuta Arifi, member of 
parliament and member of 
the DUI Presidency, first 
suggested demokratura as 
a definition of Gruevski’s 
method of government 
in the Macedonian daily 
press in July 2008. 
14.  The country was ranked 
105 in 2006, 84 in 2007, 
72 in 2008, 71 in 2009, 
and 62 in 2010.
15.  In many surveys, Gruevski 
was supported by up to 27-29 
percent of respondents, 
while the leader of the 
opposition SDSM, Branko 
Crvenkovski, regularly 
got below 10 percent.
16.  A good illustration of how 
Gruevski treats his Albanian 
partners in government 
is the manner in which 
Macedonia recognised 
Kosovo: after six months of 
refusing to do so, it took the 
presence of the US Defense 
Minister in Ohrid at a NATO 
conference in October 
2008 for the government to 
officially recognise Kosovo. 
Gruevski left the government 
session, leaving one of his 
deputies to preside over the 
formal decision. It took 12 
more months and a lot of 
internal Albanian pressure 
for the formal establishment 
of diplomatic relations 
between Macedonia and 
Kosovo in October 2009. 
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over their voters at will. The 2001 Framework Ohrid Agreement is 
treated more as a manual for proportional budget spending, than as a 
key interethnic political agreement for power sharing and consensus 
building as a long-term strategy.17 Right-of-centre ideologists in Skopje 
are giving serious consideration to Angela Merkel’s declaration of the 
failure of multiethnic society.  
But it was not only ‘politics as usual’. In order to confirm its ‘extended 
and upgraded’ national revival agenda, the government introduced 
the grandiose ‘Skopje 2014’ project. The idea is, by 2014, to change the 
‘socialist’ architectural face – and, by extension, soul – of the nation’s 
capital, Skopje, at a cost of hundreds of millions of euro. A number of 
neoclassical and neo-baroque buildings will be erected around Skopje’s 
main square to be inhabited by a range of state institutions and a 
handful of businesses. The ‘historic’ part of the project includes the 
construction of a large Triumphal Arch to All Macedonian Victories. 
Some 50 different monuments to the ‘glory’ of ancient, medieval and 
modern Macedonia will adorn the square. A Museum of National Struggle 
with 100 or more life-size wax models representing historical figures 
will stand next to the restored National Theatre (destroyed during 
the 1963 earthquake). There will be a monumental Orthodox church 
(conveniently called The Church of St. Nikola). A giant panoramic wheel 
is planned as an attraction on one side of the square, not too far from 
the artificial summer beaches already established on the banks of the 
river Vardar. Several fountains will play in the river itself as part of a 
‘son et lumière’ show.18    
The centrepiece of this architectural extravaganza will be the monument 
of Alexander the Great,19 over 35 metres tall, to be erected in the middle 
of the square and expected to be completed by the end of 2011.
Neither professionals nor the general public were consulted on the 
look and content of ‘Skopje 2014.’ The majority of Skopje’s inhabitants 
expressed reservations in opinion polls.20 When a large group of students 
from the Architectural Faculty in Skopje tried to protest peacefully against 
the project, they were brutally beaten – in the presence of the police 
and media – by VMRO-DPMNE hooligans. Regardless of the dramatic 
rise in poverty in the country, construction of this multimillion-euro 
project is already underway. 
The national revival agenda held some other surprises. For instance, as 
a part of the search for an ethnic identity and in recognition of newly 
discovered roots, the Prince of the Hunza people and his entourage 
were invited on an official visit to Macedonia. Full state protocol was 
accorded to this well-mannered gentleman representing his people 
from an isolated valley in the mountains of Pakistan who are famed 
for their longevity. They are believed to be descendants of Alexander 
17.  78 percent of respondents 
in the poll published by 
the Skopje-based Centre 
for Interethnic Tolerance 
and Refugees in February 
2011 believe that current 
interethnic relations in 
the country are very bad, 
while only 19 percent felt 
they were very good. 71 
percent of respondents 
think that interethnic 
intolerance is on the rise. 
According to the Centre’s 
experts, the current state 
of deteriorating interethnic 
relations compares only 
with data from a 2001 
survey during and after the 
conflict in Macedonia.  
18.  Considering the level of 
pollution in the Vardar river, 
local ecologists expressed 
concern about what will 
actually be sprayed in the air.
19.  This monument alone will 
cost around 10 million 
euro of taxpayers’ money.
20.  Ethnic Albanians in Skopje, 
whose largest municipality 
borders Skopje’s main square 
across the river Vardar, 
presented their version of a 
big modern square around 
the existing monument of 
Skanderbeg and asked for 
state money to finance this 
huge construction site, only a 
few hundred metres from the 
‘Skopje 2014’ building site. 
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the Great’s conquering army, which was deemed sufficient reason by 
the current Macedonian government to establish relations between 
modern Macedonians and their alleged ancestors. His Royal Highness 
the Prince of Hunza was even given a plot of land in Macedonia to build 
his own imperial palace. 
There was a major push to introduce educational and cultural programmes, 
generously funded by the state, to promote religious values and practices, 
ancient and pre-ancient Macedonian history, and the country’s rich 
cultural heritage. Macedonia was ambitiously building its future through 
the relentless exploration/exploitation of the past.
At the same time as devoting so much attention to the past, the government 
sought to steer a modern course through a number of ‘e-projects’: it 
launched a ‘computer for every child’ campaign in schools, and opened 
‘Internet points’ in far-flung villages; the fact that the inhabitants still 
live medieval lives without decent roads, running water or electricity 
did not stop the authorities from bringing twenty-first century virtual 
reality to their doorsteps. 
All this and more was part of the government’s grand project for the 
‘revival of Macedonia.’ Some measures, such as the ‘digital and internet 
revolution,’ did boost business in certain sectors. Others, like the 
government’s populist decision to allow the import of cheap second-hand 
cars over 10 years old, pushed the new car dealers’ import businesses 
to the verge of bankruptcy. But many of the government’s ‘innovative’ 
policies and policy decisions were implemented in haste, ill-prepared 
or unfinished, and accompanied by various financial scandals and 
occasionally comical organisational mishaps; many millions of euro 
were wasted through mismanagement or for want of proper cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Given the social fallout from never-ending economic transition and 
disillusionment engendered by previous political disasters, for a while 
Macedonians said of their prime minister: ‘Well, at least he is doing 
something!’ Gruevski’s aura shone like no one else’s before in modern 
Macedonian politics. 
Unnoticed by the government pollsters, however, more and more people 
were refusing to answer the numerous public surveys. Before long 
over 50 percent of all responses were either ‘don’t know’ or ‘don’t wish to 
answer’. In most of the 2009 and 2010 polls, this figure was constant. 
This trend did not go unnoticed by international organisations dealing 
with democratic standards in the world, but was ignored or downplayed 
by pro-government media, local think tanks and the ruling party.21 
Other statistics revealed the negative trend in public attitudes towards 
the government: while in 2008 48.1 percent of respondents trusted 
21.  The Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 2010 
states that ‘corruption in 
Macedonia is a serious 
and widespread problem 
that affects many aspects 
of the social, political 
and economic life’. BTI 
Macedonia, 2010, p. 10; see: 
http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.
de/178.0.html?L=1. The 
Freedom House Nations in 
Transit democracy score 
has fallen continuously 
since 2006 (see: http://
www.freedomhouse.org); 
Reporters Without Borders 
Press Freedom Index 2010 
ranks Macedonia in 68th 
place, down 26 notches 
from 34th place in 2009. 
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the state, only 38.7 percent (10 percent less) did in 2010; trust in the 
government dropped even further, with 51 percent in 2008, and only 
36.8 percent in 2010.22
reality check
There was only one flaw to this grand populist socio-political engineering 
project initiated in 2006 with VMRO-DPMNE’s first election victory: 
in order to be sustainable and successful, it required a constant flow of 
money – a lot of money – and close to double-digit annual growth. 
This simply did not happen.
After the first few, economically unconvincing, years in power (2007-
2008) spent preparing for and announcing the economic rebirth of 
the country, the global financial crisis erupted and the Macedonian 
government found itself in the cold.23 Lavish spending on the growing 
public sector, large sums needed for various subsidies, and unproductive 
but expensive projects: all dug a deep hole in the state budget which was 
impossible to fill with such little revenue coming in. There were also a 
large number of elections in just four years (two parliamentary elections, 
one presidential and one local election) which cost a great deal in terms 
of PR and increasingly lavish election campaigns. Some 90 percent of 
the state budget went on salaries and unproductive expenditures.
In the last five years, there has been no money left over for any major 
capital investment project. There has been no significant investment in 
roads, railways, energy, infrastructure, technology or the tourist industry. 
The government had planned nothing that could create economic added 
value in the future or start a new economic cycle. Many ceremonial 
ribbons were nevertheless cut and dozens of ceremonial holes dug – 
empty holes that remain scattered around the country in testimony to 
pre-election promises.
The biggest disappointment was the low level of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) which in the last five years has never come even close to the 
expectations of Macedonians who over and over again were promised 
billions of dollars by the government. Tax and investment incentives 
were introduced,24 ‘one-stop-shop’ investment services were promoted, 
a ‘Regulatory Guillotine’ project aimed at removing legal obstacles was 
established, a number of free economic zones were opened … Many ‘letters 
of intent’ were signed, there were ‘road shows’ in foreign countries, an 
expensive ‘Invest in Macedonia’ campaign was launched in prominent 
world media, numerous upbeat statements and press conferences were 
given. At the beginning of its mandate, the ambitious government even 
cancelled the extension of the IMF arrangement, claiming that its very 
existence sent out a bad signal to foreign investors. 
22.  ‘Trust in Macedonia’, 
Macedonian Centre for 
International Cooperation 
annual survey, Skopje, 
December 2010. 
23.  After three years (2004-
2006) of annual GDP growth 
of around 4 percent, in 2007 
growth reached 5.9 percent, 
and 5 percent in 2008. In 
2009 it dropped down to 
-0.8 percent. In 2010 GDP 
growth was 0.7 percent, and 
realistic prognoses for 2011 
are around 1-2 percent. 
24.  A flat tax structure was 
introduced at the start of 
2008 by applying a single 
rate of tax (10 percent) 
to both corporate profits 
and personal income.
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But no major investors actually came to Macedonia, not on the scale 
needed by the local economy. In 2007 the sum total of the country’s 
FDI was about €500 million; in 2008 the FDI was €399 million, while 
in 2009 it plummeted to around €150 million; in 2010 the FDI rose to 
€309 million. Compared to neighbouring Western Balkan countries, 
Macedonian FDI figures resemble pocket money.25 Those who did invest 
put their money mostly into building flamboyant shopping malls, as if 
Macedonia was set to become the Dubai of the Balkans.
These results are even more depressing considering the state structure 
that was put in place to attract FDI. Gruevski’s government created not 
one but two ministerial posts responsible for bringing in foreign investors. 
There is a full-size state Agency for Foreign Investments. An important 
part of the Finance Minister’s portfolio was to attract foreign investors, 
and likewise for the Deputy-Prime Minister in charge of economic 
affairs. Some 30 ‘economic promoters’ or ‘investment ambassadors’ 
with formal diplomatic status were sent to capitals around the world 
to attract foreign investors. At the top of this pyramid of very young 
and mostly inexperienced people, was Gruevski himself, symbol of this 
huge effort which was in fact a huge failure.
exit strategy: take out more loans
Today, with 32 percent of the population below the poverty line, and 
an official unemployment rate of 32-35 percent,26 nobody in Macedonia 
jokes about the government’s false promises. The healthcare system is 
falling apart. Payments of benefits and financial support for the most 
vulnerable parts of the population are many months overdue. The 
government cannot pay the generous farm subsidies promised in 2010, 
leading to mass roadblocks by angry farmers. The state pension fund 
is seriously depleted. Frustrated citizens are turning their backs on the 
government, in protest and disdain. Even Gruevski’s and his party’s 
ratings are taking a downturn. In December 2010 the opposition held 
a protest march which brought around 50,000 demonstrators onto the 
streets of Skopje, the largest political gathering in Macedonia in the last 
decade. Pressure for early elections was growing daily.
In order to fill the widening budget gaps, the government decided to 
turn to short-term domestic borrowing. In 2010 the government issued 
short-term state bonds – with an interest rate of 9.2 percent and six 
months maturity – amounting to €460 million, most of which was 
spent on urgent fiscal transfers for public sector salaries, pensions, and 
other social expenditure. Again on 1 February 2011 the government 
issued €42 million worth of bonds (with an interest rate of 4.1 percent) 
which, according to the Finance Minister, is still not enough to cover 
25.  In 2009 Macedonian FDI 
reached €180 million (only 
€81 per capita), while 
Croatia attracted €1.8 
billion, Serbia €1.9 billion, 
and Montenegro’s FDI 
reached €800 million.
26.  The IMF believes that 
‘real unemployment’ is 
around 25 percent.
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February’s financial obligations on previously issued state bonds.27 Social 
peace in the country depended on expensive weekly borrowings. Soon 
the government was borrowing in order to pay back previous loans, 
increased by interest due.  
However, this strategy consumed a large proportion of the free bank 
capital intended for loans to the developing domestic business community. 
This community was supposed not only to feed some 300,000 employees 
and their families, but also to provide tax revenue and raise key social 
funds. The government’s strategy produced fairly predictable results: 
commercial banks were making hefty profits, while small and medium-
sized enterprises were going bankrupt overnight, unable to cover their 
daily costs or fund development projects. 
In 2010 the state deficit reached unprecedented levels. It was never 
officially confirmed how large it was, but it was mostly likely anything 
between €500 million and €1 billion. The state could not pay electricity 
or phone bills, or even pay for hospital food. Thousands of people relying 
on state health insurance could not get vital medication. VAT returns 
were months late. Hundreds of private companies went unpaid by the 
government for outsourced services and many went bankrupt (with 
no right of appeal). 
But tax inspections and police traffic controls were as vigorous as ever. 
And construction work on ‘Skopje 2014’ never ceased. 
Five years after the last IMF agreement in Macedonia, at the end of 2010 
Gruevski’s government was forced to seek another loan. The country 
was given a credit line of €480 million over two years,28 on the pretext 
that it was a safeguard against the potential effects of exposure to the 
global economic crisis. The credit line is based on the government’s 
economic programme and on the projected 2.5 percent GDP fiscal deficit 
for 2011 – if the deficit remains lower than 2.5 percent of the GDP, the 
government will not need to withdraw funds from the IMF’s approved 
credit line. Indirectly, the IMF sent a signal to other creditors that it 
has faith in the economic stability of Macedonia, as a country that is 
making progress. But it also regained some control over the country’s 
economic development, which it lost five years ago when Gruevski 
came to power. 
The government mostly blames the global financial and economic crisis 
for the lack of foreign investors, poor general economic development 
and GDP growth. It is certainly true that the global crisis is partly to 
blame for the enormous difficulties. 
However, many local economic experts argue that the country is 
becoming less attractive for investors and is economically ‘frozen’, not 
27.  ‘The Government has hardly 
endured one month without 
state bonds’, Utrinski vesnik 
daily, 2 February 2011.
28.  Macedonia is the first 
country in the world to use 
the new IMF tool known 
as the Precautionary 
Credit Line (PCL) which is 
designed to meet the needs 
of vulnerable countries 
precluded from using the 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL).
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because of its bad taxation policy and global economic trends, but rather 
because of its dysfunctional institutions, underdeveloped business and 
banking sector, widespread corruption, uncontrolled spending, and 
stalled NATO/EU accession bids, all of which are key factors for the 
stability of the country and which in the current state of play hinder 
economic growth.
Most of these issues are linked to Macedonia’s bid for Euro-Atlantic 
integration. ‘Greeks are to blame for everything,’ is the convenient 
mantra of government representatives when criticised for failed reforms 
and lack of progress.
The ‘name dispute’
Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process has been effectively 
blocked by the well-known dispute over the ‘name issue’ with Greece. 
The dispute is about to enter its third decade of fruitless diplomatic 
negotiations, currently mediated by UN special envoy Matthew Nimetz. 
Despite the fact that the Greek and Macedonian prime ministers have 
met more frequently in the last year, there has been no significant 
progress, just a series of futile photo opportunities. Both governments 
give the impression that they are either unable to find a compromise 
or are not really interested in finding one.
This is certainly true of the current Macedonian government. It has 
not taken any positive initiatives or made any goodwill gesture that 
might indicate it is ready for a compromise. On the contrary, Gruevski’s 
government has toughened its stance on the name issue by indicating 
unofficially that it is prepared to leave the negotiation process, mediated 
unsuccessfully by the UN for the last 15 years. In the early days of his 
government, Gruevski clearly stated that any compromise solution, if 
and when it came, would be put to popular referendum, and that his 
government would not support any compromise that involved changing 
or adding to the name ‘Republic of Macedonia.’ 
With its aggressive policy of  cultural and historical ‘antiquisation’ of 
Macedonia, by renaming Skopje’s Airport ‘Alexander the Great’ and 
building an over 36-metre high monument of Alexander the Great in the 
centre of Skopje, by initiating proceedings against Greece in November 
2008 in the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and through 
various other initiatives that may be deemed unnecessary nationalistic 
provocations, it seems that the government actually used the dispute 
mainly for domestic purposes: to boost its ratings among the ‘patriotic’ 
voters and to use it as an excuse for every and any political failure. 
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However, in the process, the government has lost its moral and diplomatic 
standing on the international scene, and eroded support in Brussels 
and Washington for Skopje’s arguments. Both Brussels and Washington 
insisted time and again that ‘both sides’ should make an effort to reach 
an acceptable compromise, but now more often than not the finger is 
pointed at Macedonia for refusing to compromise. 
At the end of February 2011, Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio 
Milošoski publicly admitted sending a letter to the UN Secretary General 
in which he reiterated that Macedonia was ready to discuss a compromise 
name: ‘Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)’, the same one that was on the 
table at NATO’s 2006 Bucharest Summit. This move was an anxious 
reaction to Gruevski’s diplomatically disastrous visit to Washington 
D.C. on 16 February 2011, when he openly spurned the United States’ 
encouragement and offer to help resolve the name dispute.29 After separate 
meetings with Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
and Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, according to the official 
statement from the State Department, Gruevski and his hosts had discussed 
‘a wide range of bilateral and regional issues’ and Americans ‘expressed 
concerns about trends regarding rule of law, independent media, and 
civil society’ in Macedonia; Hillary Clinton ‘reiterated [their] hope that 
Macedonia and Greece resolve together the longstanding name issue so 
that Macedonia can move forward on seeking NATO membership and 
fulfilling its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.’30 
Gruevski was not invited to make a common press statement with Vice-
President Biden or Secretary of State Clinton, but gave his statement to 
a handful of Macedonian journalists31 on a pavement outside the State 
Department building.
At home, the Social Democratic opposition party, accused again and 
again by VMRO-DPMNE of being an ‘internal traitor’ because of their 
pro-compromise position, decided to refrain from making any public 
comments on the way Gruevski was handling the dispute. They simply 
declared that they would ‘support any acceptable solution for Gruevski’ 
which would resolve the dispute and speed up Macedonia’s Euro-
Atlantic integration. VMRO-DPMNE’s coalition partner, the Albanian 
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), has no power to steer Gruevski 
towards a compromise.
These developments – or, rather, non-developments – served as a 
good excuse in Brussels for further inactivity regarding Macedonia’s 
integration. A number of countries in the EU, either overwhelmed by 
enlargement fatigue or openly supporting the Greek side in the dispute 
(France, Cyprus), use this situation as a justification for the slow pace 
of Macedonia’s progress towards full membership.
29.  The author has drawn 
this conclusion from 
reliable diplomatic sources 
present at the meetings 
between Macedonian and 
American dignitaries. 
30.  See: http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/
dpb/2011/02/156407.htm.
31.  The government covered 
the expenses of a few 
selected media outlets 
from Macedonia for the 
trip to Washington D.C. 
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sharp divisions on eU perspectives
Gruevski and his associates have never been over-enthusiastic about 
Macedonia’s integration into the EU. Or, to be more precise, their attitude 
can be summed up as: integration – yes, but not under EU terms. 
European bureaucrats and their close monitoring of the reform processes 
were seen as major obstacles to the ‘VMROisation’ of Macedonia which 
the governing party had in mind and which was their main priority 
rather than EU integration. They had to make up for years lost  in 
opposition, while Brussels was insisting on professionalism, efficiency, 
tolerance, political dialogue, a sound economy, and independent state 
institutions, an autonomous judicial system, free media, etc.
Like all populists, the only policy that Gruevski understands is a domestic 
one, one that brings in votes here and now. Bowing and scraping in 
Brussels and promises of a better future in a few years or decades are a 
recipe to lose elections. Moreover, being very sensitive to any criticism 
of his style of government, Gruevski easily took offence at any sign of 
disapproval from Brussels.32
The government’s immediate tactic was to talk loudly about EU reforms 
and put constant pressure on Brussels to speed up the integration 
process.33 But the promised reforms were highly selective and only in 
areas and to an extent compatible with the party’s priorities. In this 
context, the dispute with Greece served as a perfect excuse for any and 
every stumbling block in Macedonia’s path to NATO/EU integration. 
Still, the leadership in Skopje makes every effort not to antagonise 
the international community, especially when it comes to regional 
strategic issues. They maintain just the right level of involvement in 
regional initiatives, particularly as regards American interests or issues 
relating to Albanians in the Balkans, and manage to stay just below the 
international radar of special attention devoted to troublemakers.
However, it seems that this strategy also keeps them below any radar. 
Once – five years ago – a leading Western Balkan candidate for EU 
membership, today Macedonia is at the very end of the queue in this 
regional process. Using the European monetary and constitutional crisis 
as a pretext, various pro-government actors started to develop conspiracy 
theories: since the EU is falling apart anyway, and the eurozone is in 
its death throes, Macedonia should stay out of the EU like Norway or 
perhaps offer a confederation pact to its neighbour Bulgaria, or join the 
Non-Aligned Movement, become neutral like Switzerland or turn to 
China as the world’s next superpower ... In 2011 and 2012 Macedonia 
is opening new embassies in Tokyo, Buenos Aires and Astana.    
32.  In the last couple of years, 
the government has stirred 
up a number of diplomatic 
incidents targeting the EU 
Ambassador in Skopje, 
a number of European 
parliamentarians and 
other foreign dignitaries 
or representatives who 
expressed any criticism 
of the government’s 
policies and actions. 
33.  For example, it should be 
noted that all three of the 
government vice presidents 
(G. Konevska, I. Bocevski, 
V. Naumovski) in charge of 
the EU integration process 
who succeeded each other 
in the last five years were 
complete VMRO-DPMNE 
outsiders (Ms. Konevska 
and Mr. Bocevski were not 
even members of the party). 
They had no meaningful 
influence over state policy 
in any sector, and certainly 
not over Gruevski. Even 
at the symbolic level 
Gruevski wanted to be 
clear how much he cares 
about EU integration.
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This confusion and the deadlock in the integration process, mainly 
due to the name dispute, has had an adverse effect on public attitudes 
towards the EU. For the first time in years, polls have showed increasingly 
anti-European feelings among ethnic Macedonians: 72 percent of 
ethnic Macedonians do not trust EU policy towards Macedonia (while 
74 percent of ethnic Albanians do); 50 percent of ethnic Macedonians 
believe that Macedonia will be the last country to join the EU. At the 
same time, a majority of respondents (51 percent) are not satisfied with 
the government’s policy on EU integration, as opposed to 47 percent 
of those who are satisfied.34 
The country is sharply divided as to which key strategic direction it 
should take.
future prospects
Macedonia’s macroeconomic projections for 2011 are more optimistic, 
showing modest improvement. Real GDP is estimated to grow around 
2 percent. The national currency, the denar (de facto pegged to the 
euro), will remain stable with moderate inflation of around 3 percent, 
provided that food and energy prices do not surge. The budget deficit 
should stabilise at about 2.5 percent of GDP. More foreign investments 
are expected to enter the country, but the government is planning a 
significant increase in capital investments. The budget is projected to 
be €2.6 billion, 85 percent of which is going to be spent on salaries, 
goods and services for the state. It is expected that domestic commercial 
banks will increase their credit supply by up to 10-15 percent. Exports 
will increase thanks to the ongoing recovery in the economies of 
Macedonia’s traditional international trading partners. Private transfers 
will continue to grow. 
All in all, the Macedonian economy will grow in 2011 and 2012, but not 
so much as to make a difference to ordinary people in their everyday 
lives. 
The government’s ratings are likely to continue falling in 2011, while 
there will be a modest increase in support for the opposition. More 
and more people from the undecided ‘silent majority’ will choose sides 
or lose their nerve. The government will become even more sensitive 
and prone to flexing its muscles, while corruption, organised crime, 
political scandals, and media witchhunts will continue to dominate 
the socio-political scene. Political dialogue will deteriorate further, 
making it impossible to build a common vision of key domestic and 
foreign challenges. Interethnic relations – as always in times of social 
and political crisis – will deteriorate overall, but this will probably not 
34.  Survey published by the 
influential daily Dnevnik 
in November 2010.
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amount to more than squabbling and name-calling with rare violent 
outbursts.35
The financial situation is likely to decide Gruevski’s political future. If 
he finds enough money to proceed with the current unsustainable (but 
politically beneficial) ‘two-pillars-and-an-additive’ formula for governing, he 
will probably wait for the next elections in mid-2012. If the government 
fails to control the budget deficit and meet the population’s growing social 
needs, then Gruevski may choose to go to early parliamentary elections 
in order to avoid even greater delegitimisation of his government. 
Since the prospect of early elections suddenly seems more likely at 
the time of writing (spring 2011), it would appear that Gruevski has 
understood that he needs to overhaul his priorities and his team, if not 
his entire method of governance. It seems clear that whoever forms the 
government will have a much smaller power base to form a governing 
coalition, with a substantially smaller majority in parliament. 
But there is also a broader regional and European reality which affects 
Macedonia’s politics. The possibility of a more dynamic EU policy 
towards the Western Balkans in the next couple of years may put 
additional pressure on the government to deal with the name issue and 
concentrate on the domestic EU agenda rather than the current domestic 
VMRO-DPMNE agenda. Since Gruevski needs funding and support to 
perpetuate his way of government, the international community has the 
means to bring its influence to bear. However, it might not be willing to 
support yet another typical populist regime in the Balkans that is failing 
to produce democracy, economic sustainability and progress. 
Being an economist by training and a technocrat by profession, it seems 
that Gruevski believes that the economy will save Macedonian politics. 
This has rarely been the case in the Balkans. History teaches us that, 
for small Balkan states like Macedonia, a clear political orientation has 
always been a more powerful drive for increased economic output, even 
for far more successful economies. 
That is why, sooner or later, Macedonia will have to follow a democratic, 
liberal, pro-European and pro-Western path. With or without the 
current government. With or without international help. But sooner 
rather than later.
35.  An ugly interethnic incident 
took place in mid-February 
2011, causing a dozen 
injuries among protesters 
and police officers, and 
was entirely provoked by 
the ethnic parties in the 
current government over 
the building of a church/
museum in the medieval 
fortress in the centre of 
Skopje. It was swiftly 
condemned and contained 
from further escalation 
by the Macedonian and 
Albanian coalition partners 
in the government.
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Chapter 6 
The unfinished state(s) in the 
Balkans and the eU: the next 
wave
Veton Surroi
anomalies resulting from kosovo’s 
contested status
Kosovo is an unfinished state. Its international legitimacy was contested 
from the moment of its birth. Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
did not have the support of the United Nations Security Council as the 
ultimate conferrer of international legitimacy. Instead, a number of UN 
member states, including permanent Security Council members Russia 
and China, opposed its independence. 
Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 there 
have been three layers of contestation. The first is basically territorial, 
i.e. Serbia claiming that Kosovo continues to be part of its territory. The 
second is one of European identity, with five of the 27 EU states refusing 
to recognise Kosovo’s independence, thus denying it legitimacy in the 
context of the Continent’s strongest post-war historical process: that of 
European integration. The third layer consists in a global/ideological 
tug-of-war in which some countries see Kosovo as a product of either 
US or Western unilateralism, with the result that Kosovo is recognised 
by 75 countries worldwide, with a low percentage of non-aligned states. 
And obviously, the country does not have UN membership.
All three layers have a common denominator: the idea that there might 
be a different status for Kosovo than the present one of independence, 
implying that the present state of affairs is unfinished, which constitutes 
a psychological burden for Kosovo in its relations with the outside 
world.
But above and beyond that collective psychological burden, Kosovo’s 
contested legitimacy has quite practical, and palpable, negative 
effects. 
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In the area of trade relations, Kosovo cannot export goods to Serbia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only two countries of the region 
that have not granted it recognition, because they do not recognise 
the export stamps. To add insult to injury, Kosovo is a member of the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and should hold 
the rotating presidency this year, but cannot preside, or for that matter 
use, the free trade agreement to export its goods, because of opposition 
from Serbia. 
In its relations with the EU, Kosovo is being treated in a hybrid fashion, 
best illustrated by the Schengen visa regime. Holders of Kosovar passports 
can acquire a Schengen visa, but the conditions clearly exclude travel 
to the non-recognising Member States. Thus Kosovo is an independent 
country for the majority of Member States, but not for five of them, and 
hence because of those five, neither is it an independent country for the 
EU as a whole. In EU parlance this is called a ‘status neutral’ attitude, 
implying that the EU does not take sides in the dispute over independence. 
However, a point is reached when the creative ambiguity of the ‘status 
neutral’ attitude no longer works, and that is when it comes to defining 
the nature of the relationship between the EU and the country/entity: in 
order to embark on the formal process of European integration (starting 
with the Stabilisation and Association Process) the country must be 
recognised as a contractual partner, but only sovereign states can be 
identified as such. Kosovo’s non-recognition as a contractual partner 
means that its relationship with the EU is not ‘status neutral’, but ‘status 
negative’, since it is the five non-recognising EU states that determine 
the nature of its relations with the EU. In a bizarre development, it is 
Cyprus and Romania (as non-recognising countries) and not France and 
Germany that are fundamentally influencing most EU policies vis-à-vis 
Kosovo, which has a further disorientating effect on the new state and 
its relationship with the outside world.
In terms of global relations, Kosovo’s lack of UN membership has 
practical consequences in a wide range of areas. The international 
dialling code for telephone calls to Kosovo is that of Serbia, or those 
of Monaco or Slovenia for mobile phones, with both financial and 
security implications. Regarding the internet, the country does not 
have a country code top-level domain. And its basketball and football 
teams cannot compete at international level. Kosovo did not participate 
in the last Olympic Games, nor is its participation foreseen in the 2012 
London Olympics.
But Kosovo is also unfinished in terms of its sovereignty. The government 
of Kosovo does not, in effect, control part of its territory (‘the North’), 
consisting of three majority Serb municipalities. Neither does the 
‘international community’: UNMIK did not fulfil its mission of establishing 
functioning democratic institutions of self-government in this part of 
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the territory. Nor did it suspend the illegal functioning of Belgrade-run 
institutions, as required by UNSC Resolution 1244. EULEX, which has 
taken over the rule-of-law prerogatives, has not established Kosovo as 
‘one legal zone’ or ‘one customs zone’. ‘The North’ functions as a hybrid 
zone where either laws are suspended, or there is selective application 
of Serbian ones. 
EULEX, which has also adopted a ‘status neutral’ policy, is in fact 
applying a ‘status negative’ policy. For example, the border crossings 
(Gates 1 and 31) were burned by Serbian mobs following the declaration 
of independence and since then no border or customs regime has been 
established, with obvious consequences in terms of security and lost 
revenues. EULEX tolerates the Serbian institutions, deemed illegal by 
UNSC Resolution 1244, in an environment that is degraded even by 
comparison with UNMIK rule.
The situation in the North is not self-made, but rather the result of 
deliberate action by Belgrade to create a ‘frozen conflict’-type situation 
similar to that in the Caucasus, as part of a policy of contesting Kosovo’s 
statehood and independence. Through the non-transparent allocation 
of budgetary funds since 1999 and under the consecutive governments 
of Milosevic, Djindjic, Kostunica and Tadic, Belgrade has kept its 
institutional foot in the door of Kosovar independence through the 
‘parallel institutions’. 
The eU’s ‘unfinished policy’
An unfinished state is, to a certain extent, the product of an unfinished 
policy. While arguably, the UN Security Council’s policy could be 
described as ‘unfinished’, that is, failing to see the declaration of 
independence as a legal and logical consequence of UNSCR 1244, 
the UNSC is hardly a club of shared values in terms of democracy, 
statehood or much else. The ‘unfinished policy’ tag might be applied 
more judiciously to the European Union. 
During the status negotiations mediated by President Ahtisaari, the 
European Union gave full support to his efforts and, ultimately his 
proposal, which was based on the condition of the acceptance of 
EULEX as a robust rule-of-law mission. But, almost three years after 
Kosovo’s independence, the EU does not have a single policy, since five 
of its Member States refuse to recognise that independence. The point 
reached by the EU’s common position is ‘status neutrality’ and as we 
have seen from its behaviour in the North, it is a policy that can move 
in reverse, towards ‘status negative’.
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An unfinished policy has left EU action in Kosovo in limbo, and with it 
Kosovo as well. Under President Ahtisaari’s proposal the EU had a double 
role in Kosovo: to supervise independence and to exercise executive 
powers in the area of the rule of law. This role of robust supervisor has 
been negotiated and renegotiated since day one of independence, to 
the point where it is no longer clear at all what the EU’s role in Kosovo 
is supposed to be. Is it to supervise independence (in accordance with 
the Ahtisaari plan)? Is it to prevent independence (in accordance with 
the view of the five non-recognising EU states)? Or is it to divide the 
job with UNMIK, a mission being kept in place by the non-recognising 
members of the Security Council?
Yet, without clarity on the EU side things cannot be further clarified on 
the side of Kosovo. Throughout the last decade UNMIK and the Kosovo 
leadership played a game in which neither assumed responsibility, with 
each blaming the other for the malfunctioning of the entity/state. With 
this unclear division of labour, and due to weak domestic leadership and 
ambiguity regarding its international status, Kosovo has not developed 
into a state under the rule of law. The EU with its EULEX mission has 
not made things any easier: three years on, the question of whether 
the court in Mitrovica should be re-opened (without negotiations) and 
what the applicable law should be remains unanswered.
Ambiguity in terms of governance and the rule-of-law deficit have left 
their scars on democracy. Non-transparent funding, links with organised 
crime and rampant corruption are widely perceived to characterise the 
way the political parties – the ruling ones at least – operate.
regional dynamics of integration and 
disintegration
Kosovo is not the only unfinished state in the region or, for that matter, in 
the world. Alongside Kosovo in a situation of constitutional provisorium is 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which functions as an internationally recognised 
country without having created internal constitutional legitimacy. The 
Dayton Agreement was supposed to provide breathing space for building 
a legitimate constitutional order with the consent of the people of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Instead, the peace agreement with its functional 
restrictions has served as the constitutional order. Serbia, by claiming 
Kosovo as part of its territory and by having a ‘special relationship’ 
with Republika Srpska in a dysfunctional Bosnia and Herzegovina, is 
another unfinished state. And, in a region where ethnic state-building 
and territorial partition along ethnic lines are still perceived as viable 
options, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is also an 
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unfinished state in terms both of its external identity as highlighted by 
the name issue and, increasingly, of its internal legitimacy, as reflected 
in its difficulties in defining the nature of the relations between its 
ethnicities. In FYROM, the ethnic divide has reached an unprecedented 
level, with ethnic Albanians as a group opting for NATO and the EU 
and a very significant group of ethnic Macedonians emotionally firmly 
attached to everything symbolised by the name ‘Macedonia’, far more 
important to them than the issues of EU-NATO integration and the 
functioning of the democratic state.
The common denominator for all four countries is that they are 
experiencing an internal contradiction between two historical processes 
that are taking place simultaneously: that of disintegration and that of 
integration. In other words, the ‘unfinished space’ made up by the four 
countries is still feeling the tremors of the disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia, while at the same time ‘the space’ as a whole as well as 
individual countries are engaged in the process of EU integration. 
That contradiction between those two divergent processes is not new; 
it has been there since the beginning of the disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia started disintegrating when it could not be 
integrated into the EU as a whole, democratic and functioning market 
economy. Instead, it is the countries emerging from the former state 
that are joining the EU, beginning with Slovenia.
The difference now, though, is that twenty years and four wars later, 
the ‘unfinished space’ has had a taste of the integration process: it is not 
starting from scratch in its relationship with the EU. Indeed, FYROM 
already has and Serbia aspires to candidate status, the citizens of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina can travel visa-free within the Schengen area and 
Kosovo has the quite distant promise of ‘European perspectives’.
Nonetheless, the question remains the same as twenty years ago: what 
road will ‘the space’ take: that of disintegration or of integration? 
For the purpose of understanding the road signs, disintegration should 
be defined as the next negative step after the present negative status quo 
(frozen conflict in Kosovo, a dysfunctional Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
a legitimacy deficit in FYROM, irredentist policies in Serbia) or even 
worse, a series of (probably violence-driven) ethnic partitions that 
would destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Republic of 
Macedonia, creating the conditions for the violent redrawing of borders, 
thus fulfilling the nationalist aspirations of the last century.
Integration, on the other hand, would entail a clear and measurable 
process of interaction between the EU and the countries of ‘the space’, 
enabling them to achieve membership on their own merits.
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Twenty years on, the dangers of disintegration and violence have not 
disappeared.
possible future scenarios
The issue that may define the way things evolve in the future is the 
relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Indeed, Kosovo and Serbia carry within them all three possible paradigms 
for the future. The first would be a status quo lasting several years in 
which there would be small improvements to their relationship, but 
these would not be in the nature of a mutually established framework of 
relations. This paradigm could culminate in the ‘frozen conflict’ of the 
North, with the probability of either low-intensity violence or negotiations 
driven by violence leading to a partition scenario. Moreover, it would 
confirm Kosovo on its path towards becoming a failed state. 
The second paradigm would be that of territorial dismemberment or 
exchange between Kosovo and Serbia along ethnic lines, creating pressure 
for the same pattern to be applied to FYROM (for the Albanians) and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (for the Serbs).
 And the third paradigm would entail establishing a negotiated framework 
of relations (a ‘normalisation of relations’ framework), whereby both Serbia 
and Kosovo would cooperate in order to strengthen their democratic 
institutions and the interaction between them. 
After the declaration of independence, the Serbian leadership proclaimed 
that it wanted to change the way Serbia had traditionally responded to 
political conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, with, as the default position, 
the use of violence. It also said that it wanted to move the Kosovo dispute 
out of the realm of politics and into the legal sphere. 
The result was a mixed set of attitudes. Its response was to organise 
controlled, albeit violent, ‘spontaneous’ demonstrations leading to the 
burning of two border crossings (Gates 1 and 31) between Kosovo and 
Serbia, creating new realities on the ground (the ‘status negative’ realities 
mentioned above). It continued funding ‘parallel institutions’, including 
the security services, both overt and covert. And, in the international 
arena, it engaged in a very dynamic campaign to contest Kosovo’s 
independence by means of a General Assembly Resolution asking for 
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
legality of the declaration of independence. In parallel to the ICJ move 
the Serbian foreign ministry (with the aid of Russia) launched a very 
energetic worldwide campaign to block Kosovo’s recognition.
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Serbia’s policy designed ‘to remove Kosovo from politics and move 
it to the legal sphere’ created several tactical advantages. It froze the 
situation on the ground in Kosovo in a status quo ante mode (with 
Gates 1 and 31 remaining without proper controls). It made Kosovo 
an issue of international dispute, creating doubts about recognition 
among countries that, for whatever reason, did not see the recognition 
of Kosovo as a priority or of immediate interest. And, indeed, it kept 
Kosovo as a disputed issue within the UN system, where Serbia could 
at least rely on Russia in the global tug-of-war. This consistent policy 
approach has enabled Serbia to efficiently maintain the ‘unfinished’ 
nature of the Kosovo state.
Its policy has remained consistent even in moments of defeat. On 22 July 
2010 the International Court of Justice issued its Advisory Opinion on the 
question of the Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration 
of independence in respect of Kosovo (request by the General Assembly of the 
UN by its Resolution 63/3 of October 2008). It pronounced the Court to be 
‘of the opinion that the declaration of independence of Kosovo, adopted 
on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law’. The ICJ went 
on to explain that the declaration of independence had taken place 
within the framework of UNSCR 1244, strengthening the case that the 
independence of Kosovo was the product of multilateralism.
Despite that advisory opinion, Serbia embarked on another international 
campaign calling for a new UN General Assembly resolution on another 
question pertaining to the independence of Kosovo. Only at the eleventh 
hour and under considerable pressure from the European Union and 
some of its Member States did Serbia and the EU arrive at a joint draft 
resolution, based on the lowest common denominator, welcoming EU-
hosted talks between Pristina and Belgrade. 
The Serbian summer campaign and the EU pressure culminating in 
the joint resolution had three outcomes. The first was that Brussels was 
starting to become the natural arena for resolving issues between Kosovo 
and Serbia; this was an important foreign policy development, following 
years in which they had been part of a UN mandate. Secondly, despite 
this perceived climbdown from the UN to the EU, Serbia managed 
to preserve Kosovo’s ‘unfinished’ status. And thirdly, EU policy has 
consistently been geared to the lowest common denominator, not only 
in relation to Serbia (as with the draft resolution) but more importantly, 
to its Member States, some of which are maintaining a ‘status negative’ 
attitude.
Kosovo, which had eagerly awaited the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, did not feel 
the benefit of its clarity. Although the ICJ stresses in unequivocal terms 
that the declaration of independence does not contravene international law 
and falls under UNSCR 1244 (which declares the Serbian government’s 
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presence in the territory of Kosovo illegal), currently, in the spring of 
2011, all options for the future remain open: a prolonged status quo, 
partition or a ‘normalisation framework’.
a change of paradigm
In the short term the auspices for the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue (this 
is what the negotiation process is called, which in itself says a lot about 
the fragility of the process) are not good. 
Belgrade is pursuing its ‘frozen conflict’ and ‘unfinished state’ policies to 
give it leverage in the process, while at the same time seeking candidate 
status in an EU which according to its values should contest both of 
those policies. Furthermore, Belgrade will need an early closure of the 
negotiations with Pristina to avoid them interfering in the elections due 
to be held in spring 2012.
Pristina’s own elections are behind it, but it will be very hard put to 
establish the legitimacy of governance it needs for a healthy negotiating 
position. Furthermore, it might be facing a period of introspection 
as issues like corruption, organised crime and political crimes come 
increasingly under the spotlight and draw the attention of the media, 
judicial authorities and international organisations alike.
Brussels can hardly be described as even-handed in its role as facilitator. It 
recognises Belgrade as a contractual party, and the next step might soon be 
for Serbia to acquire candidate status. The nature of the relationship with 
Pristina is different altogether: Brussels is exercising a ‘soft protectorate’ 
over Kosovo, including executive powers in the field of the rule of law. 
Kosovo has not taken even the first step towards a formal EU accession 
process, quite simply because it is not recognised as a sovereign state 
by all EU member countries.
Furthermore, this new facilitating role has caught Brussels at the time 
of its post-Lisbon reorganisation, when a new external affairs structure 
is still in the process of being built. An unfinished entity (the European 
External Action Service) with an unfinished policy (22 countries in 
favour of independence, five against) mediating with an unfinished 
state (Kosovo) is not a very encouraging prospect.
Seen from that perspective, it is hardly surprising that Brussels has 
opted for a ‘bottom-up approach’ as its strategy for the talks, which 
means resolving the ‘easy’ issues first (missing persons are considered 
to belong to this latter category, as well as energy and communications, 
all of which have been on the table since UNMIK started mediating 
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these talks ten years ago). The drawback of this approach is that the 
‘easy’ or ‘technical’ issues, as they are also described, are either easily 
derailed into the political realm, where they belong anyway, or else the 
talks remain stuck at the beginning with no clear perspective on where 
they are to end. The added value of this approach is that it creates the 
pretence of talks. This may benefit some parties, in this case Brussels 
(by showing that the new European diplomatic entity can function) and 
Belgrade (by allowing it to be perceived as a cooperative party). But 
while this pretence may serve Belgrade’s interests the opposite is true for 
Pristina: it will do nothing to help any of the basic statehood problems 
Kosovo is facing, such as partition, and the issues of its recognition by 
all 27 Member States and UN membership.
These dynamics need to change, in terms both of the aim and timeframe. 
Whereas the present ‘bottom-up’ approach is intended to establish 
a process of dialogue that at some point will arrive at a mutually 
acknowledged aim, an entirely different tack is required. Namely, Pristina 
and Belgrade but also Brussels need to agree on the aim beforehand, and 
that aim should be EU integration within a ten-year timeframe, which 
would not be binding on Brussels, but would provide the two societies 
with a framework within which to prepare themselves.
Such an approach would define the nature of the negotiations between 
Pristina and Belgrade (a process of normalisation of relations within the 
EU integration process) and it would define the role of the facilitator 
(as equal to the parties, and not a simple host but an agent of change 
for both societies).
The negotiating process between Kosovo and Serbia would thus be 
anchored within the European integration process. Within that process, 
the EU could use the instruments it currently has at hand, but it would 
also need to do a bit of tailoring in order to be able to define Kosovo as 
a contractual partner in the current situation of five non-recognising 
Member States. The Kosovo-Serbia ‘normalisation process’ would also 
need to be integrated within the EU’s respective negotiation processes 
with Serbia and Kosovo.
This drastic change of approach could lead to a dramatic shift for the 
better throughout the region. For Kosovo, it would be an invitation to 
deal with the ‘unfinished state’ issue in cooperation mode, both with 
Belgrade and Brussels. Moreover, its sovereignty-building would have 
a tangible end-objective: Euro-Atlantic integration. This would provide 
a goal for the Kosovar Albanians to rally around, instead of engaging 
in the debate on territorial and political unification within the region 
that is gaining ground in Kosovo and FYROM. For the Kosovar Serbs, 
this would also be a reassuring aim, in line with their natural quest to 
strengthen ties within the Serbian cultural area.
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For the ‘unfinished space’, normalisation of the relations between Kosovo 
and Serbia would be a change of paradigm. Instead of the status quo 
leading to disintegration, the paradigm would be one of integration, 
within the Euro-Atlantic framework. 
The European integration process would thus enter its third historic 
wave. In the first wave, the post-dictatorship countries Greece, Spain and 
Portugal were welcomed into the European community of democracies. 
In the second wave, the post-communist countries from the Baltic 
States to Bulgaria re-energised the European Union. Now the European 
Union should welcome the post-nationalist countries that have emerged 
from their mutual conflicts and understood the values of peace and 
cooperation, albeit, to paraphrase the song, ‘with a lot of help from 
their friends’.
part Two: 
horizontal perspectives

123
Chapter 7 
The european Union and 
citizenship regimes in the 
Western Balkans
Igor Štiks
Introduction
The geopolitical landscape in the Western Balkans is not as uniform or 
homogenous as the umbrella term might suggest. The region christened 
‘the Western Balkans’ by Brussels is basically a space squeezed between 
EU Member States, supposedly destined to join them but without a 
clear accession timetable. The analysis in this chapter covers a larger 
territorial area, including all former Yugoslav republics plus Albania. 
Slovenia might be excluded from the ‘Western Balkans’ family, as 
defined bureaucratically, but is certainly part of and is still closely 
linked to the rest of the post-Yugoslav space. This enlarged Western 
Balkans is clearly subject to a strong albeit differentiated influence 
from its supra-national neighbour. It comprises one EU Member State 
(Slovenia), three EU accession candidates (Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia – hereafter referred to as Macedonia – and, as 
of recently, Montenegro), a protectorate (Kosovo), a semi-protectorate 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina), and a country (Serbia) that wants to join the EU 
but has a major disagreement with the majority of the EU Member States 
over its own territorial shape and population in relation to the matter 
of Kosovo. Albania clearly has a special status. On the one hand, it is 
connected to the post-Yugoslav space via Kosovo and the Macedonian 
Albanian population, and, on the other hand, to the EU via its diaspora 
in Greece and Italy and many Greek/EU passport-holders in Albania. 
All of this adds up to a rather variegated landscape.
 How does citizenship fit into the picture? Citizenship is here generally 
understood as the major cohesive tool of any polity that binds citizens 
together and defines not only their relationship with the state, involving 
rights and duties, but also their political status. Due to colossal changes 
over the last two decades, the nature of citizenship has changed 
significantly throughout the region, in such a way that the role of citizens 
and their rights have been radically redefined, and they find themselves 
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treated very differently by the new states and new regimes. This chapter 
seeks to analyse the EU’s considerable though under-researched role in 
shaping the present citizenship regimes in the Western Balkans. If we 
take into account the fact that since early the 1990s the EU was a major 
external partner exerting considerable transformative power over the 
region, it is only natural to ask how this process affected citizenship as 
a central component of any political community.
The eU and citizenship regimes in the 
Western Balkans
By citizenship regime is meant not only the laws, regulations and 
administrative practices regarding the status and rights of citizens 
(as well as of non-citizens) within a given polity but also existing 
mechanisms governing their political participation. More precisely, a 
citizenship regime is based on a given country’s legislation defining the 
body of citizens (i.e. who is entitled to citizenship and all duties and 
rights attached to that status), on government policies for dealing with 
citizenship matters and the status of individuals, and, finally, on the 
official or non-official dynamic of political inclusion and exclusion. ‘In 
the citizenship context, therefore, the concept encompasses a range of 
different legal statuses, viewed in their wider political context, which are 
central to the exercise of civil rights, political membership and – in many 
cases – full socio-economic membership in a particular territory’.1
When it comes to the EU’s role in influencing, managing, defining and 
re-defining the citizenship regimes in the Western Balkans, this chapter 
shows how diverse the EU’s actions and results are and how often, 
alongside obvious improvements, they appear problematic, counter-
productive or fruitless. It must first be noted that the EU often acts 
in this region in cooperation with or in parallel to other international 
organisations such as the UN or OSCE. There is also a myriad of 
international norms (conventions, adopted or not, and regulations) and 
bodies that influence citizenship regimes in these countries such as the 
Council of Europe and its Venice Commission, and the European Court 
for Human Rights.2 In this respect, Europeanisation of the Western 
Balkans and the citizenship regimes in place there cannot be identified 
only with the ‘EU-isation’ of the region, even though the two are generally 
conflated. Nonetheless, the overall orientation of the Western Balkans 
towards political, legal and economic integration into the EU gives the 
Union a major role in actively transforming not just these countries as 
such but also their citizenship regimes. 
1.  Jo Shaw and Igor Štiks, 
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School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2010.
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Does the EU have a coherent policy in the vital domain of citizenship, 
which is, clearly, crucial for the functioning of ‘new democracies’? 
Does it follow any particular norm? It appears that there is certainly 
no consistent citizenship policy towards future members. This comes 
as no surprise since the previous enlargements showed limited EU 
influence on national citizenship regimes of the candidate countries, as 
exemplified by the EU’s tolerance of the prevalence of statelessness in 
the Baltic countries and the case of the ‘erased people’ in Slovenia.3 And 
yet, in sharp contrast to Central and Eastern Europe, the EU appears 
to be quite actively involved in managing post-Yugoslav citizenship 
regimes.
Broadly speaking, the EU’s influence on citizenship regimes in the 
Western Balkans could be defined as either direct or limited. When it comes 
to direct influence this is doubtless strongest in Kosovo, very strong in 
Bosnia and, finally, significant in Macedonia. Those are the countries 
where the EU actually intervened militarily and administratively (in 
Kosovo and in Bosnia) or where it influenced significant constitutional 
and political changes that directly affected citizenship regimes as well 
(as in Macedonia after the 2001 conflict and the EU-sponsored Ohrid 
Framework Agreement). In these countries the citizenship legislation 
was either proposed to local actors or imposed ready-made by the 
international actors (with the EU in the driver’s seat) or else changes in 
legislation affecting citizenship were introduced according to the EU’s 
stated preferences (as in Macedonia).
In contrast, the EU’s limited influence can be observed in Montenegro 
and Croatia. In Montenegro the governing structures are keen to 
please the EU but are also very careful to preserve, via the country’s 
citizenship regime, fragile ethnic (and therefore electoral) balances 
in that tiny mountainous republic. The case of successful candidate 
country and, as is expected, soon-to-be EU member Croatia surely 
deserves a different kind of attention for being the first post-socialist, 
post-partition and post-conflict country to enter the EU with a legacy of 
war that significantly complicated its accession process. The Albanian 
citizenship regime, although the most stable and long-established 
one, was also influenced in a limited manner by the visa liberalisation 
process. Finally, Slovenia as an EU member needs special treatment, 
since joining a new supra-national union also entailed introducing a 
new supra-national dimension of citizenship as an additional layer of 
the national citizenship regime.  
Serbia seems to stand between the direct influence group and the 
limited influence group depending on how one perceives the EU’s 
role in the territory of that country, i.e. how one perceives what is 
actually its territory. On the one hand, the EU has a limited influence 
on Serbia’s citizenship legislation and practices, mostly through the 
3.  For more information on 
the case, see footnote 14.
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visa liberalisation process, but, on the other, the EU’s role in Kosovo, 
where a new separate citizenship regime has been created with the 
direct assistance of the EU (and also other international bodies), could 
be equally seen as having a direct and major influence on the Serbian 
citizenship regime as a whole. 
In previous works4 this author has concentrated on how the political 
elites in the new states (mis)manage their citizenship regimes. This 
chapter focuses on what he sees as five major ways whereby the EU itself 
(mis)manages these citizenship regimes across the Western Balkans: (i) 
direct intervention and supervision; (ii) the visa liberalisation process; 
(iii) the pre-accession influence; (iv) the post-accession influence, and, 
finally, (v) the influence exerted by individual EU Member States. 
five ways to (mis)manage citizenship 
regimes in the Western Balkans
direct intervention and supervision
Kosovo
The EU’s actions with regard to citizenship are most visible in Kosovo. 
The NATO bombings in 1999 brought an end to Serbian rule over 
Kosovo. Kosovo was turned into a de facto protectorate under the UN 
mission (UNMIK) and with a heavy NATO and EU presence. The EU 
took complete control when EULEX replaced UNMIK in 2008. However, 
in spite of the complete separation from Serbia, Kosovans remained 
de jure citizens of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
and, between 2003 and 2006, citizens of the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro. After the disintegration of the State Union in 2006, 
Kosovans were technically transformed into citizens of the Republic 
of Serbia exclusively. Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
in February 2008, a new Constitution based on the Ahtisaari plan was 
adopted defining Kosovo as ‘a state of its citizens’. On the same date the 
new law on Kosovo citizenship came into effect as well. The main aim 
was to establish the body of Kosovo citizens by using a highly inclusive 
and liberal ‘new-state’ model5 that grants citizenship to all permanent 
residents on the territory of the new state (in this case the former FRY 
citizens residing in Kosovo back in 1998 and/or holders of UNMIK 
documents).6 Although the first Kosovo passports were issued in summer 
2008, the Serb-majority municipalities, especially in northern Kosovo 
around the town of Mitrovica, refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Kosovan authorities. In these enclaves, Serbia’s legislation is still in 
force. If in the 1990s we saw the widespread political exclusion of ethnic 
4.  See Igor Štiks, ‘Nationality 
and Citizenship in the 
Former Yugoslavia: From 
Disintegration to European 
Integration’, South East 
European and Black Sea 
Studies, vol. 6, no. 4, 
2006, pp. 483-500; and 
Igor Štiks, ‘A Laboratory 
of Citizenship: Shifting 
Conceptions of Citizenship 
in Yugoslavia and its 
Successor States’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 2010/02, 
School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2010.
5.  See Rogers W. Brubaker, 
‘Citizenship Struggles in 
Soviet Successor States’, 
International Migration 
Review, vol. 26, no. 2, 
1992, pp. 269-91. 
6.  The first major intervention 
affecting the totality of 
Serbian citizens on the 
territory of internationally-
administered Kosovo and 
the first move towards the 
establishment of a separate 
body of Kosovo residents/
citizens was initiated already 
in 2000. UNMIK issued a 
regulation establishing the 
Central Civic Registry for 
‘residents of Kosovo’ and had 
been issuing new Kosovo 
identification cards and 
travel documents that, as it 
was stated, did not determine 
a resident’s citizenship. See 
Shpend Imeri, (ed.), Rule of 
Law in the Countries of the 
Former SFR Yugoslavia and 
Albania: Between Theory 
and Practice (Gostivar: 
Association for Democratic 
Initiatives, 2006), pp. 149-
62. See also Gezim Krasniqi, 
‘Citizenship as a Tool of 
State-Building in Kosovo: 
Status, Rights, and Identity 
in the New State’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 2010/10, 
School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2010.
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Albanians and their political self-exclusion from Serbian citizenship and 
creation of a parallel society, since 2008 the situation has been reversed: 
now many members of the Serb minority refuse to be integrated into 
Kosovo or to accept Kosovan citizenship, judging it illegitimate, and have 
created a new parallel society. The international bodies also induced 
a redrawing of Kosovo’s internal map and the creation of new highly 
autonomous Serb municipalities. In exchange for political integration 
into new Kosovo structures, a high degree of autonomy is offered to 
these municipalities without demands being made on Serbs to abandon 
their Serbian citizenship and the ties with Belgrade. 
As with the Constitution itself, the Kosovo citizenship law was drafted 
by the international bodies supervising Kosovo, namely the International 
Civilian Mission whose head was also the EU representative in Kosovo. 
The local politicians promptly accepted the documents with little local 
debate or initiative. State-building in Kosovo is thus designed and 
supervised by the international community and, since the EULEX 
mission started to operate directly, by the EU itself. This oxymoronic 
‘supervised independence’ amounts to a neo-colonial situation without 
a clear roadmap towards total local control and/or EU membership. 
Conflicting signals therefore have been sent out: the EU is heavily 
present in Kosovo but the country’s eventual EU accession process is not 
expected to start anytime soon. At the same time, the EU effectively runs 
the place but cannot speak or act unanimously since five EU Member 
States still refuse to recognise an independent Kosovo. Without a clear 
perspective of joining the EU, which in itself would have to result from 
an EU-led effort, without a prospect of breaking the visa deadlock, and 
without solving some of the pressing issues between Kosovo and Serbia 
(such as economic normalisation, border issues, and management of the 
Mitrovica region) the Kosovan citizenship regime will remain highly 
unstable for the years to come.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been a theatre of major EU external involvement 
for more than 15 years. As in Kosovo, a gradual transfer of competences 
from the international bodies towards the EU has taken place. The Office 
of High Representative (OHR), endowed by the extensive so-called Bonn 
powers with the authority to basically rule Bosnia, was headed since 
the beginning by EU Member State politicians and since 2002 the High 
Representative also serves as the EU Special Representative in Bosnia. 
Since the Dayton Peace Agreement and an ensuing peacekeeping operation 
in which both the US and the EU played a major role, Bosnia has been 
under direct supervision, making it effectively a semi-protectorate. The 
new Dayton law on citizenship was introduced, or rather imposed, much 
later in 1997 by the High Representative. It annulled all existing wartime 
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legislation adopted by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the non-
recognised breakaway Serb republic between 1992 and 1995.7
If the citizenship situation was quite chaotic during the war, the 
citizenship landscape after the war remained highly complex. The 
‘Dayton’ Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV) defined 
citizenship of the country, similarly to socialist Yugoslav citizenship, as 
dual or two-tiered. Citizens possess both state citizenship and citizenship 
of one of the two entities. The Dayton Agreement thus introduced dual, 
or two-level, and, politically speaking, multiethnic citizenship.8 There is 
also the curious case of citizens from the self-governing district of Brčko, 
functioning de facto as Bosnia’s third entity. Brčko is ‘shared’ by the entities, 
although under direct Bosnian sovereignty, and its citizens may choose 
which entity citizenship they wish to have. Bosnia’s citizenship could 
be defined as multi-ethnic insofar as almost all political participation of 
citizens is based on their ethnic affiliation. Bosnia’s Dayton-enshrined 
ethnopolitics not only consolidated ethnic division and led to permanent 
institutional paralysis but also provoked widespread discrimination 
against so-called ‘others’, i.e. those not belonging to any of the three 
ethnic groups or not wishing to state their ethnic background.9 When 
dealing with the citizenship issue in Bosnia and the EU’s influence, 
the fact must be mentioned that a considerable number of Bosnian 
citizens possess citizenship of another, usually neighbouring, state as 
well, but also of many EU states where they settled during and after 
the conflict. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The reason that Macedonia ranks among the group of countries where 
the EU has a direct influence is the aftermath of the short-lived conflict 
between the Macedonian government and Albanian rebels in 2001. 
The EU backed the Ohrid Framework Agreement and sent a military 
and police mission to the country. The Ohrid Agreement transformed 
Macedonia from a nation-state dominated by its ethnic majority into 
a state functioning on consociational principles designed to guarantee 
a balance between the Macedonian majority and 25 percent-strong 
Albanian minority. The EU played a major part in these constitutional 
transformations that directly affected the Macedonian citizenship 
regime.10
Macedonian citizenship as defined in the 1990s was seen as a key factor 
in exacerbating the conflict in 2001, since the Albanian representatives 
claimed it prevented a large number of Albanians (who came to Macedonia 
during socialist times) from acquiring full citizenship rights and that, 
even upon acquisition of citizenship, the constitutional set-up rendered 
Albanians second-class citizens. By signing the Ohrid Agreement in 
August 2001, ethnic Macedonian and Albanian parties committed 
7.  For more on wartime and 
post-war developments, see 
Eldar Sarajlić, ‘A Citizenship 
Beyond the Nation-
State: Dilemmas of the 
“Europeanisation” of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 2010/09, 
School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2010.
8.  Igor Štiks, ‘Being a 
Citizen the Bosnian 
Way: Transformations of 
Citizenship and Political 
Identities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina’, Transitions, 
vol. 50, no. 2, 2011.
9.  In 2010 the European Court 
for Human Rights, in the 
case of Finci and Sejdić vs. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, ordered 
Bosnia to change that part 
of its electoral law, which 
forbids those not belonging 
to the three constituent 
peoples to run for office in 
the collective presidency 
and in the House of Peoples 
of the Bosnian parliament. 
See also Asim Mujkić, ‘We, 
the citizens of Ethnopolis’, 
Constellations, vol. 14, no. 1, 
2007, pp.112-28; and Eldar 
Sarajlić, op. cit. in note 6.
10.  Ljubica Spaskovska, 
‘In Search of a Demos: 
Transformations of 
Citizenship and Belonging 
in the Republic of 
Macedonia’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 2010/11, 
School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2010.
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themselves to a multiethnic Macedonia. Albanian demands for a reform 
of both the Constitution and, subsequently, the citizenship law were 
met as well. The agreement also included the country’s decentralisation, 
administrative reorganisation and a change of linguistic policies. The 
Albanian language was recognised as an official language in the majority 
Albanian areas, and greater representation of ethnic Albanians in the 
state sector was affirmed. 
 Although Macedonia is not a country under EU supervision like Bosnia 
or Kosovo, its relationship to the EU is seen as crucial for the country’s 
stability. However, the EU’s intervention in order to ensure stability and 
Greece’s blocking of Macedonia's accession, despite the fact that it has 
been officially recognised as a candidate for EU membership since 2005, 
provoked even further instability. The inter-ethnic balance as defined by 
the Ohrid Agreement (the subject of a lot of grievances on both sides) is 
seen as fragile, the relationship between the two communities, without 
any unifying supra-ethnic political platform, is far from perfect, and the 
perspective of EU accession, regarded as the only guarantor of future 
peace and the country’s consolidation, remains unclear.
The visa liberalisation process
The EU successfully applied visa liberalisation as a tool of legal and 
administrative engineering in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia, 
and Albania. Not only was visa liberalisation used to consolidate 
civic registers and to introduce new security measures via biometric 
passports, but it was also used to alter existing legal provisions related 
to criminal law and the functioning of the police, customs and border 
control. However, the process itself was followed by many unintended 
political and practical consequences.
It could be said that the visa liberalisation process constitutes the 
most visible and tangible example of the EU’s influence for citizens of 
the Western Balkans, unlike a distant membership prospect offered 
in return for an undertaking to implement often painful reforms. The 
EU used the visa liberalisation process as a way of applying leverage. 
To fulfil the conditions, the countries on the Schengen ‘blacklist’ (to 
which they could be relegated at any given moment) had to revise 
parts of their legislation concerning their citizenship regimes (laws 
on foreigners and asylum), including the penal code in some cases, as 
well as to implement significant police and administrative reforms. The 
process itself, especially the evaluation of the benchmarks as well as 
the decision to allow visa-free travel to holders of Macedonian, Serbian 
and Montenegrin passports at the end of 2009 but not to citizens and 
residents of Kosovo (even those possessing Serbian citizenship and 
passports), or Albanian and Bosnian citizens (included at the end of 
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2010), became mired in controversy and reinforced the bitter sense of 
isolation among those who were left behind. 
Not only is Kosovo excluded from visa liberalisation but, furthermore, 
at the EU’s insistence, Serbia agreed to exclude from the benefits of 
visa liberalisation those Serbian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, who 
reside on the territory of Kosovo. Serbia was thus forced by the EU to 
discriminate against one group of its citizens (not only Serbs but many 
Albanians still have Serbian identity documents and passports. One of 
the stated reasons is that since 1999 Serbia has not exerted control over 
the territory and individuals in Kosovo. Regardless of this fact, the policy 
breaches the right of every citizen to possess valid travel documents of 
his or her state and to be treated equally by that state – the right that 
Serbia, under EU pressure, denied to people it claims are its citizens in 
Kosovo. It seems however that the EU was primarily concerned with a 
possible influx of asylum-seekers or illegal migrants from impoverished 
Kosovo and the readmission process.11 In addition, Kosovans were left 
with no alternative, thus further devaluing the attractiveness of Kosovo 
citizenship (especially for Kosovo Serbs) and rendering Kosovo’s new 
symbols of independence (such as the Kosovan passport) more or less 
useless. In sum, the EU was attempting to reinforce Kosovo statehood 
and to win the allegiance of Kosovo minorities (namely, the Serbs) to 
the new state on the one hand and, on the other, undertaking initiatives 
that undermine these efforts and effectively force people to search for 
less legitimate ways to acquire useful travel documents.12 
It was not until November 2010 that the EU Council of Ministers gave 
the green light for visa liberalisation for Bosnia and Albania after they 
had completed all necessary reforms. The visa liberalisation strategy 
proved to be highly effective in forcing local politicians to adopt certain 
administrative reforms following their dismay when in December 2009 
Bosnia was left out of the visa liberalisation scheme. The majority of 
the Bosniaks were hit hardest by this decision. Croatian passports 
already permit those (almost all ethnic Croats but some members of 
other groups too) holding these documents to travel without visas and 
it was assumed that many Serbs either already possessed or would try 
to acquire visa-free Serbian passports. Again the EU’s bureaucratic 
insensitivity proved problematic on the ground and created even 
deeper divisions in Bosnia. On the other hand, during the election 
year, Bosnian politicians were ready to accept reforms that were not 
necessarily related to citizenship issues or administrative practices. 
By using visa-liberalisation to exercise leverage, the EU pressed for 
effective police coordination, harmonisation of the criminal codes in 
both entities and in Brčko with the state criminal code, as well as for 
additional measures in fighting corruption and organised crime.
11.  In early 2010, Belgium faced 
the problem of many asylum-
seekers from Macedonia 
(mainly ethnic Albanians). 
Recently the issue of large 
numbers of (mainly Roma) 
asylum-seekers from Serbia 
was raised in the European 
Parliament as well as the 
possibility of putting some 
states back on the Schengen 
‘blacklist’. See CITSEE blog, 
‘Escaping the Balkans? After 
visa liberalization’. Available 
at: http://www.citsee.eu/
blog/escaping-balkans-
after-visa-liberalisation.
12.  There is a lot of anecdotal 
evidence that Kosovans 
go to southern Serbian 
municipalities and obtain 
biometric visa-free 
Serbian passports there. 
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Montenegro also readily satisfied all the conditions for visa-free travel, 
including amending its law on foreigners. Here again it was clear that 
the EU’s policies could lead to some problematic outcomes. Insistence 
on satisfying strict criteria for visa liberalisation in the context of recent 
conflict and disintegration and the restrictive citizenship policies such as 
those in Montenegro resulted in the marginalisation of the Roma refugees 
from Kosovo and their de facto statelessness. With their FRY documents 
invalidated and with no financial and practical means of acquiring new 
Serbian or rather travel-restrictive Kosovo identity documents, with 
no prospects of returning home and in a situation where they cannot 
hope to acquire Montenegrin citizenship (due to the criterion of 10-year 
permanent residence that the majority of them do not have), they linger 
in an administrative limbo, which results in complete socio-economic 
marginalisation and, in many cases, extreme poverty.13
The pre-accession influence
The general pre-accession influence of the EU on the candidate countries, 
when the EU dictates the tone of negotiations, is obvious. So far only 
Slovenia and Croatia have gone through the process. However, their 
experience shows that the EU’s influence on these countries’ citizenship 
regimes, although indeed potentially considerable, does not necessarily 
result in profound reforms being initiated. Two Baltic states, Latvia and 
Estonia, managed to enter the EU despite the widespread statelessness 
of their substantial Russophone minority populations. Slovenia also 
practised human rights abuses and social and political discrimination 
and exclusion, though on a much smaller scale than in the Baltics, 
towards those citizens of the former federation originating from other 
republics who did not mange to resolve their citizenship status in the 
newly independent state and were literally erased from civic registries 
by an administrative decision in February 1992.14 Slovenia did not solve 
the issue of ‘the erased people’ before entering the EU, but, on the other 
hand, it had to adapt its legislation to the EU’s acquis and prepare the 
ground for the introduction of EU citizenship.
Croatia offers an instructive example of the kind of ethnic engineering15 
that occurred in almost all successor states of the former Yugoslavia. 
Its 1991 law explicitly accorded a privileged position to individuals 
of Croat ethnic origin residing in and outside Croatia and not having 
Croatian republican-level citizenship from socialist times. This paved 
the way for ethnic Croats, mostly from Bosnia-Herzegovina but also 
for members of the Croatian diaspora, to obtain Croatian citizenship 
through facilitated naturalisation. At the same time, Croatian Serb 
refugees, who were forced to leave or who fled the breakaway Krajina 
region before, during and after the Croatian military takeover in 1995 
and found themselves in Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina (in the Serb 
entity), were in an especially difficult situation. They were all legally 
13.  See Jelena Džankić, 
‘Lineages of Citizenship 
in Montenegro’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 2010/14, 
School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2010.
14.  The case involves some 
25,000 individuals. It is 
expected that the ‘erased’ 
chapter will soon be closed 
after the European Court 
for Human Rights in July 
2010 found Slovenia guilty 
of breaching the European 
Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms in the case of 
eleven applicants. See 
Tomaž Deželan, ‘Citizenship 
in Slovenia: the regime 
of a nationalising or a 
Europeanising state?’, 
CITSEE Working Paper 
2010/16, School of 
Law, University of 
Edinburgh, 2011.
15.  By ethnic engineering is 
meant here the intentional 
policy of governments and 
lawmakers to influence by 
legal means and related 
administrative practices the 
ethnic composition of their 
populations in favour of their 
ethnic core group. See Igor 
Štiks, 2006, op. cit in note 4.
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Croatian citizens but a huge number of them could not obtain the 
certificate giving proof of Croatian citizenship (domovnica). Croatian 
authorities put enormous obstacles in the way of these people acquiring 
valid documents in order to prevent their return to Croatia.16 During 
the accession period Croatia showed much more inclusiveness, both 
administrative and political, towards the Serb minority. It also showed 
that the EU influence was acceptable but not in all areas (keeping its 
1991 citizenship law intact and not adopting the European Convention 
on Nationality) and that there was more willingness to change legislation 
in politically less sensitive areas (e.g. the asylum law). 
However, this administrative and political inclusiveness, constituting 
perhaps the EU’s most important legacy in the context of the Croatian 
accession process, did not alter the ethnocentric character of the state 
and its citizenship regime.17 The ‘EU-isation’ of Croatian citizenship 
demonstrated how candidate countries could ‘satisfy’ general EU criteria 
without actually reforming the fundamental substance of their policies.18 
In fact, no significant legal changes in the Croatian citizenship law have 
occurred since 1991,19 but the Croatian citizenship regime, in response to 
different political circumstances, changed in character (ethnic preference 
being ‘moderated’ by minority inclusion).
The post-accession influence
Regardless of the changes in citizenship laws that remain under 
the sovereign jurisdiction of member states, joining the EU itself 
entails a significant change in the new member’s citizenship regime. 
It automatically introduces another, supra-national level to state 
citizenship with rights and duties attached to the institution of European 
citizenship. Slovenia, as the only post-Yugoslav state to join the EU, 
has therefore since 2004 had a similar two-tier citizenship regime to 
that which operated in socialist Yugoslavia. The advent of European 
citizenship in Slovenia introduced changes when it comes to EU 
citizens residing in the country with regard to their participation in 
local (involving also third-country nationals) and European elections, 
rights that are also shared by Slovenian citizens residing in other EU 
countries. This is the prospect awaiting other post-Yugoslav states 
once they join the EU, which would necessarily significantly shape 
their citizenship regimes. 
On the other hand, Slovenia demonstrates that EU membership does not 
seriously call into question the ethnocentric conception of citizenship 
and, moreover, that the EU has failed to convince its members to adopt 
more inclusive citizenship policies, if indeed it ever seriously tried to 
do so. It is hard to expect the Western Balkan states to act differently 
and to re-define their citizenship policies allowing for ever-greater 
inclusiveness and non-discrimination on an ethnic basis – criteria that 
16.  See the report on Croatia 
in Shpend Imeri (ed.), op. 
cit. in note 6, pp. 129-31.
17.  For more on Croatian 
citizenship policies see 
Igor Štiks, ‘The Citizenship 
Conundrum in Post-
Communist Europe: the 
Instructive Case of Croatia’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, 
no. 10, 2010, pp. 1621-38.
18.  See Maja Spanu, ‘Blurring 
the Boundaries of 
Membership: la citoyenneté 
en Croatie à l’aube de 
l’adhésion à l’Union 
européenne’, Master 
thesis, Institut d’Études 
Politiques de Paris, 2010.
19.  See Viktor Koska, ‘The 
evolution of the Croatian 
citizenship regime: 
from independence to 
EU integration’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 2010/15, 
School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2011.
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are not clearly stated or enforced by the EU anyhow – unless there is 
a targeted pre-accession pressure (as in the case of Croatia) or some 
form of direct intervention.
The eU Members states’ influence on citizenship 
regimes in the Western Balkans
The picture would be incomplete without describing a rather new 
phenomenon. Some EU Member States have recently started, unilaterally, 
to influence citizenship regimes in the Western Balkans (and in some 
other non-EU states) by offering citizenship to ‘co-ethnics’ in the near 
abroad. The result is that the citizenship regimes increasingly overlap 
in the Balkans today.
New EU member Bulgaria interferes directly with the Macedonian 
citizenship regime by granting Bulgarian and therefore European 
citizenship to those claiming ‘Bulgarian descent’ (more than 50,000 
people in Macedonia have acquired Bulgarian citizenship in this way 
so far). Greece has had a big impact on the Albanian citizenship regime 
by offering its citizenship to those members of the Albanian population 
claiming Greek ethnicity and belonging to the Orthodox faith, but also 
by regulating the citizenship status of numerous Albanian immigrants 
in Greece.20 A new Hungarian law on citizenship has already provoked 
fierce reactions (especially in Slovakia) but the real effects will be felt 
in Serbia. It is already expected that some 80,000 Serbian citizens of 
Magyar descent will apply immediately for Hungarian and therefore EU 
citizenship.21 Mention should also be made here of Romania’s generous 
citizenship policies towards Moldovan citizens. Romania, Bulgaria, 
Greece and Hungary are therefore enlarging EU citizenship in the areas 
to which the EU itself is slow or reluctant to enlarge.
 In addition to that, Croatian accession to the EU will have a major 
impact on the rest of the Western Balkans. If it is true to say that the 
EU’s influence has certainly been felt in pre-accession Croatia, it is 
equally certain that two decades of Croatia’s citizenship policies will 
affect the EU itself. At the moment of its adhesion Croatia will bring to 
the EU almost one million future EU citizens living in the neighbouring 
post-Yugoslav but non-EU countries such as Bosnia (up to 800,000), 
Serbia and Montenegro combined (around 100,000), and Macedonia 
(around 10,000).
20.  See Gezim Krasniqi, 
‘Citizenship in an Emigrant 
Nation-State: the Case 
of Albania’, CITSEE 
Working Paper 2010/13, 
School of Law, University 
of Edinburgh, 2010.
21.  ‘Budapest expects that 
80,000 Serbians will apply 
for Hungarian citizenship’, 
Sofia Echo, 3 January 2011. 
See: http://sofiaecho.
com/2011/01/03/1019017_
budapest-expects-that-80-
000-serbians-will-apply-
for-hungarian-citizenship. 
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Conclusion
From a larger historical perspective, it is interesting to see how citizens 
of a former multinational federation with a two-level citizenship regime 
become part of another multinational union of states with a similar 
citizenship structure that will, once in place, restore to them some of the 
basic privileges they enjoyed during the Yugoslav era. There is a certain 
historical irony here. However, whatever is generally seen as ironic is 
often tragic on the ground. The twenty-year long process itself took 
the form of numerous partitions, secessions, and widespread political, 
social and material violence that turned the citizenship status of many 
former Yugoslav and many Albanian citizens into a highly complex 
and in some instances nightmarish situation. The results of economic 
devastation, war and general insecurity sent millions into exile. Today 
the process of gradually turning the people of the Western Balkans 
into European citizens is clearly under way. Slovenians have been EU 
citizens since 2004; with Croatia’s entry another 4.5 million people 
together with up to a million abroad will follow suit. Some 50,000 
Macedonians have already acquired Bulgarian citizenship. Even before 
joining the EU some Serbian citizens of Hungarian origin might want 
to secure Hungarian passports. Mention should also be made here of 
refugees from the former Yugoslavia and a huge number of Albanian 
emigrants living today within the EU Member States and enjoying EU 
citizenship.
It can also be predicted that dual citizenship will become a widespread 
phenomenon across the region. The combination of regional ethnic 
heterogeneity, although to a much lesser degree than before, with many 
ethno-centric laws in force and a historical tradition of migration, 
necessarily results in a high number of dual citizenship holders, especially 
in the core triangle between Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, but also 
between Kosovo and Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, and Serbia and 
Montenegro. There will be considerable overlapping between Albania 
and Greece as well as between Bulgaria and Macedonia, and Hungary 
and Serbia. It is difficult at this point to predict possible political 
consequences of overlapped citizenship regimes. In practical terms, 
dual citizenship could be seen as a means to overcome the mobility 
problems within the region and to facilitate travel towards the EU. Even 
if the EU integrates the whole region, being a citizen in more than one 
Balkan country might remain attractive for symbolic reasons related 
to shared ethnicity, but also for various benefits, family connections 
or property issues. However, people in the Western Balkans still have 
a long, insecure and bumpy road to travel before they become fully-
fledged European citizens.
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Chapter 8
The Western Balkans after the 
ICJ opinion
Florian Bieber
Introduction
The process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia has dragged on for nearly 
two decades. The period between the first declarations of independence 
by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and that of Kosovo in 2008 has 
been shaped both by international efforts to resolve conflict through 
the recognition of new countries and by the preservation of existing 
countries through new institutional systems. State dissolution and 
the emergence of new countries are a highly unusual outcome to 
civil conflict around the world: rather, the most likely scenarios are 
victory by one side or a settlement, most commonly in the form of 
a power-sharing arrangement.1 In Yugoslavia, however, one country 
dissolved into seven over a period of 17 years. Whether Kosovo 
concludes the dissolution of Yugoslavia or ushers in a new era of self-
determination, including in the Western Balkans, depends largely on 
one’s political perspective with regard to its independence. Although 
in terms of its actual declaration of independence Kosovo was a 
latecomer, the demand for independence from Yugoslavia on the part 
of most Kosovar Albanians arose much earlier than similar demands 
elsewhere in Yugoslavia. In that sense, Kosovo belongs to the same 
category as the republics that sought independence. However it 
stands out from the rest by being the only country which was not a 
Yugoslav republic and thus it could not claim independence on the 
basis of the Badinter Committee’s opinion.2 Instead, the argument put 
forward in support of Kosovo’s independence is that it is authorised 
by a particular set of circumstances (quasi-federal unit in Yugoslavia, 
international protectorate, international mediation on status, de facto 
independence, and massive human rights violations).3 This has often 
been called sui generis, i.e. a unique case of a country claiming the 
right to self-determination.4 However, the combination of a number of 
factors which authorise self-determination must not be confused with 
sui generis, as these circumstances can be replicated and a number of 
1.  Barbara F. Walter, 
‘Designing Transitions from 
Civil War: Demobilization, 
Democratization, and 
Commitments to Peace’, 
International Security, vol. 
24, no. 1 (Summer 1999), 
pp. 127-28; Chaim D. 
Kaufmann, ‘When All Else 
Fails: Ethnic Population 
Transfers and Partitions 
in the Twentieth Century’, 
International Security, vol. 23, 
no. 2 (Autumn 1998), p. 126.
2.  The opinions of the Badinter 
Committee have been also 
criticised for transferring 
the concept of uti possidetis 
from the post-colonial 
context to Eastern Europe 
and thus precluding the 
redrawing of administrative 
boundaries. See for example 
Peter Radan, The Breakup of 
Yugoslavia in International 
Law (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002) pp. 204-43.
3.  Written Statement by the 
United Kingdom, ‘Request 
for an Advisory Opinion of 
the ICJ on the Question “Is 
the unilateral declaration 
of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government of 
Kosovo in Accordance with 
International Law?”’, 17 April 
2009. Available at: http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/141/15638.pdf?PHP
SESSID=8aa6dc030f6fd0
180a260a041872dc4b.
4.  The declaration of 
independence also advances 
a sui generis argument. 
‘Observing that Kosovo is a 
special case arising from 
Yugoslavia’s non-consensual 
break-up and is not a 
precedent for any other 
situation’: Preamble, Kosovo 
Declaration of Independence, 
17 February 2008. Available 
at: http://www.assembly-
kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635. 
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aspiring states can and indeed have made such claims. Possibly the 
most credible candidate would be Kurdistan,5 if it were to demand 
outright independence. However, no aspiring or potential state in the 
Balkans fits the bill. 
The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, requested at 
Serbia’s urging by the UN General Assembly, provided an opportunity to 
address the ambiguities and controversies of Kosovo’s independence and 
also to broach the broader issue of self-determination, which remains 
shaped by the tension between the right to self-determination and the 
principle of territorial integrity. At first glance, the opinion seemed to 
favour Kosovo by finding the declaration of independence not to be 
in conflict with international law. However, the fact that the opinion 
assessed only the declaration of independence, not the wider question 
of Kosovo’s right to independence, meant that the decision was based 
on very narrow grounds and did not try to offer an interpretation of 
the real controversies from the standpoint of international law. Thus 
Bruno Simma, the German judge at the ICJ, noted in his declaration on 
the opinion that ‘by unduly limiting the scope of its analysis, the Court 
has not answered the question put before it in a satisfactory manner.’6 
The clear yet narrow-based opinion of the ICJ appeared to favour 
Kosovo, but left many of the questions with regard to self-determination 
unanswered. While it may have avoided opening a Pandora’s Box, it did 
not determine whether Kosovo is indeed a unique case.7 
In this chapter, we will explore the implications of this decision for the 
region. Two questions in particular stand out: what are the implications 
for the consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood and its relations with Serbia, 
and has the opinion accelerated further demands for self-determination 
in the region, in particular in Republika Srpska? 
ICJ decision: precedent or not?
Since declaring its independence in February 2008, Kosovo has found 
itself in a strange state of limbo in regard to its international recognition. 
Most countries-to-be which have sought international recognition have 
either quickly achieved widespread recognition, like Montenegro in 
2006, or they had to make do with a small number of supporters and no 
prospects of recognition by a significant number of countries. Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia would fall into the latter category. With more than 75 
recognitions by the end of April 2011, Kosovo belongs to neither category. 
A significant number of major countries have recognised Kosovo; yet a 
breakthrough towards (near-)universal global recognition is still far from 
having been achieved. In fact, there was a marked slowdown in 2010, 
5.  Brendan O’Leary, John 
McGarry and Khaled 
Salih (eds.), The Future 
of Kurdistan in Iraq 
(Philadelphia: Pennsylvania 
University Press, 2005).
6.   Declaration by Judge 
Simma, International Court 
of Justice, ‘Accordance with 
international law of the 
unilateral declaration of 
independence in respect of 
Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion) - Advisory Opinion 
of 22 July 2010’. Available 
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/141/15993.pdf.
7.  James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Not 
such a “sui generis” case 
after all: assessing the 
ICJ opinion on Kosovo’, 
Nationalities Papers, vol. 
39, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1-11.
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with only eight countries recognising Kosovo that year, none of them 
particularly significant. The ICJ’s much-anticipated advisory opinion in 
July 2010 appears to have had either no impact on the recognition rate 
or even negative repercussions. At first sight this turn of events might 
seem surprising, considering that the Court found in its opinion that ‘the 
adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did 
not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 
(1999) or the Constitutional Framework’8 and that consequently, the 
opinion appeared to remove a key obstacle to widespread international 
recognition. Even if, as noted above, the Court’s opinion addressed only 
a narrow aspect of the broader issue of independence, the fact that it 
did not find the declaration of independence to be in conflict with 
international law was more clear-cut than most observers would have 
expected. It is thus not surprising that not only the Kosovo media9 but 
also observers predicted a new wave of recognitions.10 The fact that only 
four recognitions (i.e. those of Honduras, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Qatar) 
trickled in in the six months following the opinion raises a number of 
questions on the broader implications of Kosovo’s independence.
A number of international lawyers have argued that the opinion does 
not set a precedent. One of the arguments put forward is that the ICJ 
advisory opinion is non-binding and addresses a particular case.11 More 
convincing is the argument that ‘[n]o secessionist movement can rely 
on the ICJ’s Kosovo opinion to justify a right of secession’, as it did not 
answer the question as to whether secession is the legitimate expression 
of the right to self-determination, nor did it prohibit the use by states 
of force against secessionist movements.12 In fact, the ICJ did not break 
new ground by arguing that declarations of independence do not violate 
international law as long as there is no explicit prohibition. 
It would appear, however, that the perceived precedent has been more 
significant than the implications in international law. This illustrates 
the blurred lines that exist in this case between international law and 
domestic and international politics. Irrespective of the legal fine print, 
both (potential) secessionist movements hailed the opinion as a victory, 
whereas governments that were reluctant to recognise Kosovo for fear 
of contagion expressed anxiety about it. 
That response may help explain the apparent contradiction between 
the ICJ decision in Kosovo’s favour and the limited number of new 
recognitions afterwards. It would seem that the main reason for the 
reluctance to recognise Kosovo is not the perceived breach of international 
law, but rather the domestic implications. This is hardly surprising, 
but means that while the Court’s decision may have helped Kosovo’s 
case in the light of international law, it appears to have confirmed the 
fears of those countries that do not recognise Kosovo. While it might 
be easy to dismiss this response as a misreading of the ICJ opinion, it 
8.  International Court of 
Justice, ‘Accordance with 
international law of the 
unilateral declaration of 
independence in respect 
of Kosovo’ (Request 
for Advisory Opinion) 
- Advisory Opinion - 
Advisory Opinion of 22 
July 2010, Chapter V. 
‘General Conclusion’, para. 
122. Available at: http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/141/15987.pdf?PHP
SESSID=fc602175bf500d
76db76255fd9490ab3.
9.  The Kosovo tabloid Express 
even sarcastically thanked 
Serbian Foreign Minister 
Vuk Jeremić with the 
headline ‘Hvala Vuče!’, 23 
July 2010. Available at: 
http://www.gazetaexpress.
com/?cid=1,13,35086#3.
10.  ‘Independence Day, 
Eastern Approaches’, The 
Economist, 22 July 2010, 
online. Available at: http://
www.economist.com/blogs/
easternapproaches/2010/07/
icj_ruling_kosovo; Peter 
Beaumont, ‘Kosovo’s 
independence is legal, UN 
court rules’, The Guardian, 22 
July 2010. Available athttp://
www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/jul/22/kosovo-
independence-un-ruling.  
11.  Elena Cirkovic, ‘An 
Analysis of the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo’s 
Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence’, German 
Law Journal, vol. 11, no. 7/8 
( July/August 2010), p. 906.
12.  Michael Bothe, ‘Kosovo – 
So What? The Holding of 
the International Court of 
Justice is not the Last Word 
on Kosovo’s Independence’, 
German Law Journal, 
vol. 11, no. 7/8 ( July/
August 2010), p. 837.
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points to the difficulties of divorcing a legal decision from its broader 
political (mis)interpretation. After all, the key question of precedent is 
as much a political question as it is one of international law. The ‘non-
proliferation’13 of new countries is at least as much a consequence of 
restrictions in international law as it is the result of countries unwilling 
to support the creation of new countries against the will of their previous 
host country.
The political interpretation of the ICJ opinion would thus suggest 
that the blockage of Kosovo’s international recognition can only be 
overcome through a settlement with Serbia, which would alleviate certain 
states’ concern that Kosovo might open the door to further secession. 
Consequently, it would appear that the ICJ opinion was a Pyrrhic victory 
for Kosovo. If the ICJ opinion did not resolve the questions about the 
international recognition of Kosovo, it provided even less direct guidance 
for consolidating Kosovo’s statehood. 
partition debate and future serbia-
kosovo relations
Among the different options for Kosovo’s status over the past two decades, 
the partition of Kosovo has been the elephant in the room. Already 
during the 1990s, a number of Serb nationalist intellectuals voiced the 
idea that Serbs and Albanians ought to be separated by partitioning 
Kosovo. Such plans included demographic horror-scenarios in which 
it was claimed that Serbs would be outnumbered by Albanians in all of 
Serbia unless Kosovo were partitioned.14 Since 1999, Kosovo has been 
partitioned de facto due to the inability of international peacekeepers to 
protect Serbs and other minorities from attacks. Over time, the north 
of Kosovo and scattered Serb enclaves have become a form of de facto 
autonomy within Kosovo. Even if not fully recognised, these territorial 
divisions have shaped the reality of Serb settlements in Kosovo since 
1999. The Ahtisaari plan took this into account when establishing new 
Serb municipalities and granting a range of additional competences to 
municipalities, but shied away from granting some form of territorial 
autonomy to the North.
The striking feature of the partition debate has been the lack of public or 
official support for partition, in particular in Serbia. Public statements in 
favour of partition, whether by international officials, such as Wolfgang 
Ischinger,15 or by Serbian officials,16 have usually been met with strong 
criticism, forcing them to backpedal. However, behind closed doors, 
the main supporters of partition have been Serb officials. This view has 
13.  While there have been 
a steady number of new 
countries emerging in the 
past two decades, they have 
emerged based either on the 
process of state dissolution 
(Yugoslavia), on mutual 
agreement (Sudan, Ethiopia/
Eritrea) or both (Soviet 
Union/Serbia/Montenegro) 
and are thus qualitatively 
different from secession. 
14.  Branislav Krstić, ‘Kosovo 
između istorijskog i 
ethničkog prava’ (Belgrade: 
1994), p. 243; Florian Bieber, 
Nationalismus in Serbien 
vom Tode Titos zum Ende der 
Ära Milošević (Münster: Lit 
Verlag, 2005), pp. 368-74.
15.  ‘Kosovo partition “on the 
table”’, BBC, 12 August 
2007. Available at: http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/6943442.stm.
16.  ‘Tadić hints at Kosovo 
partition’, B92, 30 
September 2010. Available 
at: http://www.b92.net/
eng/news/politics-article.
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been corroborated by the recent release by Wikileaks of cables from 
the US Embassy in Belgrade.17
Since most support for partition has been in Serbia and there is little 
visible support for it in Kosovo, it appears unlikely to provide the basis 
for a mutually acceptable compromise. However, in 2010, the idea of 
partition appeared to be given additional credence by a report of the 
International Crisis Group which carefully maps out the consequences 
of a potential swap of territories between the North of Kosovo and parts 
of the Preševo valley. The report notes that there is little prospect of 
Northern Kosovo accepting to be governed by the Kosovo authorities 
or of parts of the Albanian-populated Serb municipalities of Preševo, 
Bujanovac and Medveđa being ceded to Kosovo.18 Most critics of such 
a land swap point to the potential domino effect in Macedonia and 
Bosnia.19 The supposed knock-on effect is not entirely convincing, if 
the borders between Kosovo and Serbia were redrawn peacefully and 
the new border was mutually agreed upon. Such a border adjustment 
would not only be fully in line with international law, but would also 
preclude the unilateral redrawing of borders that might be a threat in 
either Bosnia or Macedonia. The redrawing of borders thus seems to 
offer a way out of the deadlock between Kosovo and Serbia, removing 
a small region of Kosovo with a population largely hostile to the state 
and giving Serbia a face-saving solution enabling it to accept Kosovo’s 
independence. Thus it comes as no surprise that besides the ICG a 
number of commentators have suggested this possibility.20 
While border changes are possible by mutual consent, the idea of drawing 
new international borders in the Preševo valley is troubling and it would 
appear unlikely that Kosovo would even contemplate border changes 
without the inclusion of the Albanian-populated regions of southern 
Serbia. Unlike the existing de facto border between North Kosovo and 
the remainder of Kosovo, there is no dividing line between the Serb 
and Albanian communities there, in particular in the municipality of 
Bujanovac, which has only a slight Albanian majority. Drawing boundaries 
there would inevitably be a high-risk undertaking and communities 
on the ‘wrong’ side of any future border might feel compelled or even 
be pressurised to leave their home for the ‘right’ side of the border. 
Thus, border changes would solely be feasible without risking large-
scale human suffering and conflict if only North Kosovo was included 
in the bargain. These problems are reflected in the public scepticism 
among Kosovo Serbs and Albanians with regard to this solution. Both 
communities overwhelmingly reject the partition of Kosovo, albeit 
for different reasons. Thus it remains an acceptable solution only to a 
significant number of Serbs in Serbia.21
In addition to these risks, this scenario has become less likely by virtue 
of the ICJ opinion. Had the court delivered an opinion that favoured 
17.  ‘Post ICJ Opinion: Serbia 
to Continue Obstructing 
Kosovo, Independence’, 
12 January 2010, 
Confidential, US Embassy 
Belgrade. Available at: 
http://213.251.145.96/
cable/2010/01/10BELGRADE3.
html.
18.  International Crisis Group, 
‘Kosovo and Serbia after 
the ICJ Opinion’, 26 August 
2010. Available at: http://
www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/europe/206 
Kosovo and Serbia after 
the ICJ Opinion.ashx.
19.  Daniel Serwer, ‘Kosovo: 
The Next Steps’, USIP 
Peacebrief 67, 5 November 
2010. Available at: http://
www.usip.org/files/
resources/PB%2067%20
-%20Kosovo%20The%20
Next%20Steps.pdf.
20.  Spyros Economides, James 
Ker-Lindsay and Dimitris 
Papadimitriou, ‘Kosovo: 
Four Futures’,Survival, vol. 
52, no. 5, 2010, pp. 99-116.
21.  92 percent of Kosovo 
Albanians oppose partition; 
the figure for Kosovo Serbs 
is 90 percent, much higher 
than among Serbs from 
Serbia where the figure is 
35 percent (and 43 percent 
in favour). A population 
exchange with the Preševo 
Valley is equally unpopular 
among Kosovo Albanians 
(92 percent). Gallup Balkan 
Monitor, ‘Insights and 
Perceptions: Voices of the 
Balkans’. 2010 Summary of 
the Findings, Brussels 2010, 
p. 47. Available at: http://
www.balkan-monitor.eu/
files/BalkanMonitor-2010_
Summary_of_Findings.pdf.
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neither side of the argument or had it even followed Serbia’s argument, 
renewed negotiations leading towards partition might have been more 
likely. This would have been due less to the substance of the opinion 
than to the fact that Serbia as the ‘winner’ of the case would have had 
a stronger bargaining position. 
Thus it would appear that just when the partition scenario seemed closer 
than ever to being put on the negotiating table, the ICJ opinion has 
pushed it into the background. This does not mean that a renegotiation 
of Kosovo’s internal structure is off the table. While the (‘technical’) 
talks scheduled between Kosovo and Serbia are not formally about 
re-opening the Ahtisaari package, which includes the constitution of 
Kosovo and its territorial organisation, revisiting the status of the North 
would constitute a potential opening. Arguably, it was a weakness of 
the Ahtisaari plan not to offer Northern Kosovo a degree of territorial 
autonomy beyond municipal decentralisation. This omission might 
now turn into an advantage. As I have argued elsewhere, one of the 
problems of the Ahtisaari plan was that due to Serbia rejecting the final 
recommendation, Serbia does not consider the plan to be a compromise 
between the Serb and Albanian positions, whereas the Kosovo Albanians 
view the plan as evidence of very far-reaching compromises.22 Thus, the 
different perceptions of the degree to which the parties compromised 
render future negotiations more difficult. It is improbable that a promise 
of autonomy for the North would have secured Serbian support for the 
plan when it was drafted in 2007, given that the main stumbling block 
was independence. Thus now, some form of autonomy for the North 
just might enable a compromise to be reached between Kosovo and 
Serbia that could pave the way, not for full recognition of Kosovo by 
Serbia, but for a settlement which could unblock Kosovo’s international 
recognition. 
disintegration debate in Bosnia and 
herzegovina
The ICJ opinion not only shaped Kosovo’s relations with Serbia, but 
also appeared to leave its imprint on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milorad 
Dodik, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, stated in response to the 
ICJ opinion that ‘at least it can serve as a good road sign for the RS 
for its further struggle in regard to its status and future’.23 The link 
between Republika Srpska and Kosovo had already been established 
earlier, when a resolution of the RS National Assembly condemned 
the declaration of independence and warned that ‘in case that a large 
number of members of the UN, and in particular of the EU, recognize 
… Kosovo and Metohija, the National Assembly would consider that 
22.  Florian Bieber, ‘After the 
ICJ Opinion: Ways Out of 
Deadlock’, Balkan Insight, 20 
July 2010. Available at: http://
www.balkaninsight.com/en/
article/after-the-icj-opinion-
ways-out-of-deadlock.
23.  ‘Tadić: Odluka teška 
za Srbiju, nastavak 
političke borbe’, Blic, 22 
July 2010. Available at: 
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/
Politika/199570/Tadic-
Odluka-teska-za-Srbiju-
nastavak-politicke-borbe.
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a new international principle and practices on the priority of the right 
to self-determination … has been established. In this case the National 
Assembly considers itself to have the right to determine the legal status 
through … a referendum’.24 Both the 2008 National Assembly decision 
and Dodik’s statements in 2010 would suggest a link between Kosovo’s 
independence and the ICJ opinion, on the one hand, and Republika 
Srpska’s quest for greater autonomy or even independence, on the 
other. However, this link appears to have been largely constructed by 
Republika Srpska itself and has only limited credibility. Already during 
the Montenegrin independence process, Milorad Dodik, unlike most party 
leaders in Serbia, disappointed the supporters of union in Montenegro 
by endorsing Montenegro’s right to independence and expressing the 
view that an independent Montenegro was not a threat to the Serb 
identity.25 This crucial support for Montenegrin independence reflects 
the pragmatic nationalist course that the RS leadership has followed 
since Milorad Dodik’s return to power in 2006. Arguably, Montenegro’s 
strategy of gradual de facto independence has served as a model for the 
RS since then. An observer dubbed the process of increased de facto 
independence combined with Milorad Dodik’s strong personal control 
over the entity as the ‘Montenegrinisation’ of Republika Srpska.26 In 
actual fact, Dodik had already brought up the idea of the RS holding a 
referendum on independence months before the Montenegrin referendum 
in May 2006.27
The political crisis which has paralysed most reforms in Bosnia since 
2006, including constitutional reform, thus had little to do with Kosovo’s 
independence.28 Of course, this does not mean that Kosovo’s independence 
and the ICJ opinion are irrelevant for Bosnia. Bosnia is in fact the only 
country of former Yugoslavia besides Serbia not to have recognised 
Kosovo. While there was some support in Bosnia for an independent 
Kosovo, especially among the Bosniak parties, including Haris Silajdžić’s 
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fear that recognition would 
undermine Bosnia prevailed.29 Similarly, while Republika Srpksa 
has sought to make the case that the ICJ opinion allows it to declare 
independence, outright support for Kosovo’s independence – unlike in 
the case of Montenegro – remains incompatible with the Serb nationalist 
underpinnings of the quest for more independence for RS. Bosnia therefore 
appears unlikely to recognise Kosovo before Serbia does so. 
If Republika Srpska’s demands for greater autonomy and even 
independence had little to do with Kosovo’s independence, the question 
arises as to whether or not Kosovo’s independence and the ICJ opinion 
have increased the odds of the RS becoming independent. Altogether 
there is little evidence that points in that direction. The ICJ opinion 
has clearly not opened the door to a more flexible interpretation of 
self-determination under international law. Thus, the RS cannot count 
on the ICJ opinion to justify a declaration of independence. On the 
24.  ‘Rezolucija o nepriznavanju 
jednostrano proglašene 
nezavisnosti Kosova i 
Metohije i opredjeljenjima 
Republike Srpske’, 
22 February 2008. 
Available at: http://www.
narodnaskupstinars.net/
lat/ostalaakta/ostaliakt.
php?id_akta=20.
25.  ‘Dodik razbio tezu unionista 
o antisrpskoj kampanji’, 
Oslobodjenje, 13 May 
2006, p. 15. Unlike in 
Serbia, there was broad 
acceptance of Montenegro’s 
referendum results in the 
RS. ‘Volju građana treba 
poštovati’, Nezavisne 
novine, 23 May 2006, p. 2.
26.  ‘Slobodan Šaraba, državni 
delegat i potpredsjednik 
Demokratske partije: Dodik 
vrši crnogorizaciju RS-a.,’ 
Oslobođenje, 5 February 
2010. Available at: http://
www.oslobodjenje.ba/
index.php?id=5137. 
27.  Dodik also refered to a 
referendum on independence 
during the 2006 election 
campaign, suggesting that 
‘whenever you mention the 
story that the Republika 
Srpska has to be abolished, 
you will get a referendum!’ 
Speech in Šekovići, 7 
September 2006. Govori 
Milorada Dodika u kampnji 
2006. Naprijed Srpska 
(Banja Luka: SNDS, 2006), 
p. 58. Available at: http://
www.snsd.org/dnn/
Portals/0/Dokumenti/
Milorad%20Dodik_%20
Naprijed%20Srpska%20
2006%20Govori.pdf.
28.  According to the Gallup 
Balkan Monitor, the number 
of Bosnian citizens who saw 
Kosovo as a precedent for the 
break-up of Bosnia has varied 
greatly, from 46.7 percent in 
the RS and 18.4 percent in 
the Federation in 2008, 43.4 
percent in the RS and 34.6 
percent in the Federation in 
2009, and 59.9 percent in the 
RS and 25.3 percent in the 
Federation in 2010. Note that 
the 2010 survey was carried 
out before the opinion of the 
ICJ was issued. See http://
www.balkan-monitor.eu/.
29.  ‘Dodik: Ne treba 
očekivati velike pomake 
u ustavnim promenama’, 
Press, 3 June 2010.
142
8      The Western Balkans after the ICJ opinion
contrary, the opinion sets the case of Kosovo apart from those in 
which a declaration of independence has been explicitly prohibited or 
condemned by the UN Security Council.30 This was the case for the RS 
in 1992, when the Security Council affirmed the ‘territorial integrity 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and … that any entities 
unilaterally declared or arrangements imposed in contravention thereof 
will not be accepted’.31 Even if one argues that after the Dayton Peace 
Accord Republika Srpska is no longer just a unilaterally declared entity, 
the burden of the past weighs heavily on ambitions for independence 
in the sphere of international law. 
Of equal importance to legal considerations is the political environment. 
The case of Kosovo, if anything, proves the difficulty of establishing 
new countries in the absence of a broad international consensus. Even 
with strong support from most EU Member States, the US and other key 
countries (Japan, Turkey), it has struggled for international recognition. 
An independent RS would have no such support and there are currently 
few countries that would recognise such a state. In his response to the 
ICJ opinion, Dodik also drew attention to the case of Northern Cyprus 
which had failed to gain international recognition due to the lack of 
political mentors.32 Even Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have 
been supported by Russia in their quest for independence, have been 
recognised by only four countries (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and 
Nauru) since declaring independence in 2008. Thus Republika Srpska’s 
chances of international recognition do not appear to be improved by 
Kosovo’s independence or the Court’s decision. 
A separate issue arises in connection with the possibility of border 
changes between Serbia and Kosovo. Although the likelihood of such 
a scenario appears slim, as discussed above, it is worthwhile to briefly 
consider the impact on Bosnia. It is clear that such a scenario is only 
plausible if mutually agreed upon by the governments of Kosovo and 
Serbia. Thus, even if it was interpreted as ending efforts to maintain 
multinational states in the Balkans, it would not open the door to 
unilateral secession by Republika Srpska, while a consensual dissolution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is clearly not realistic. Nonetheless, one 
should not underestimate the ‘taboo-breaking’ impact of border changes 
leading for the first time to the creation of new borders that did not exist 
previously in the form of administrative boundaries between republics 
or between provinces and republics in Yugoslavia. Such a change might 
give greater credence to the claim that the intra-Bosnian borders could 
become international borders. Again, what matters are not so much the 
practical legal implications as people’s perceptions.33 Nevertheless, the 
future of Bosnia appears to hinge less on Kosovo’s international status 
than on the degree to which the Bosnian state is able to overcome its 
domestic challenges and on the level of support it continues to enjoy 
as compared with all the alternatives.
30.  Para. 81, op. cit. in note 8.
31.  UN Security Council, 
Resolution 787 (1992) 
Adopted by the Security 
Council at its 3137th 
meeting, on 16 November 
1992, S/RES/787 
(1992), 16 November 
1992. Available at: http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3b00f16634.html.
32.  Of course he fails to mention 
that the fact that the TRNC 
was established through 
a military intervention 
and forceful population 
movements was another 
key reason for the lack 
of international support. 
‘Dodik: Mišljenje MSP 
razočaravajuće’, Nezavisne 
novine, 22 July 2010. 
33.  The main scenario by 
which RS could achieve 
independence would 
draw less on the Kosovo 
scenario, but rather on 
the experience of state 
dissolution, as occurred 
in the case of Yugoslavia. 
Thus the Badinter 
Committee Opinions pose 
a much greater threat to 
the territorial integrity 
of Bosnia than either the 
ICJ opinion or Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence.
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In what state are the Western Balkan 
states?
Kosovo’s independence and the ICJ opinion have not undermined states 
across the region or given more credibility to secessionist movements. 
As with previous domino theories, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia 
are connected but not intrinsically linked. This does not mean that all 
is well with the states of the Western Balkans. In a recent commentary, 
Ivan Krastev noted, rather dramatically, that ‘the Balkans still comprises 
an assemblage of frustrated protectorates and weak states.’34 The weak 
states are in part the result of the mismatch between popular aspirations 
and existing borders. In 2010, the regional Gallup poll found 88.4 
percent of RS citizens to be in favour of independence, while 81.1 
percent of the population in Kosovo’s majority Albanian areas support 
the establishment of a Greater Albania.35 It would be misleading to 
present these numbers as static or given. The opposition to the status 
quo in Kosovo and Bosnia is more a reflection of dissatisfaction with the 
current state of the two countries than of some unwavering nationalist 
agenda. Kosovo’s independence did not bring about universal international 
recognition and it remains excluded from the EU integration process 
and from the numerous benefits along the road to membership, such as 
visa liberalisation. In Bosnia, the constant blocking of decision-making 
and the poisonous level of political confrontation has been carefully 
cultivated by the RS leadership and contrasted with the RS and its more 
‘efficient’ decision-making processes. Thus the fundamental problem of 
the two ‘frustrated protectorates’ of Kosovo and Bosnia is that the current 
states’ weakness gives rise to public support for alternative, nation-state 
projects that in turn further weaken the internationally mediated states. 
The logical response to those dynamics therefore is not just to support 
the status quo, but also to consider ways and means of strengthening the 
existing states of the region. In the case of Kosovo, support for Greater 
Albania is likely to remain strong as long as sovereignty remains contested 
within the country and international recognition remains limited. Hence 
Greater Albania remains a tempting shortcut to EU integration, visa-free 
travel and full international recognition.36 In Bosnia, an independent 
RS would hardly be a credible shortcut to the EU, but it could offer an 
alternative to the current Bosnian state as long as the accession process 
continues to stall and full EU membership is too far off a prospect to 
serve as a strong argument for keeping Bosnia together.37 
The support for alternative states in Kosovo and Bosnia is thus not a 
priority, but rather a reflection of disappointment with those countries’ 
economic status, corruption, ineffective government and slow EU 
integration. For now, those issues trump the urgency of any status 
questions. It would seem that neither the declaration of independence 
34.  Ivan Krastev, ‘The Balkans’ 
New Normal’, Project 
Syndicate, 14 December 
2010. Available at: http://
www.project-syndicate.
org/commentary/
krastev3/English.
35.  The support for Greater 
Albania has increased in 
Kosovo and Macedonia since 
2008, whereas it slightly 
declined in Albania but 
still stood at 63 percent 
in 2010. See: http://
www.balkan-monitor.eu/
index.php/dashboard.
36.  See the programme of the 
Vetevendosje party. While 
it does not propose a full 
merger in its programme, 
it suggests pursuing a 
joint foreign policy with 
Albania, a unified national 
sports team and other forms 
of unification as well as 
removing the constitutional 
ban on unification with 
neighbouring countries: 
Lëvizja Vetevendosje!, ‘State 
building and socio-economic 
development’. See: http://
www.vetevendosje.org/
repository/docs/Programi_i_
shkurte_anglisht.pdf.
37.  The advisor to the RS 
Prime Minister Slavko 
Mitrović thus argued that 
EU membership for Bosnia 
is unrealistic due to the 
EU’s unwillingness to 
enlarge towards the Western 
Balkans. Slavko Mitrović, 
‘Razvojne koordinate 
Republike Srpske’, Argumenti, 
vol. 1, no. 1, 2007, pp. 3-4.
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nor the ICJ opinion have fundamentally altered that equation. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s and Kosovo’s success in overcoming the legitimacy 
crisis will hinge on delivering more and better ‘state’ services to their 
citizens. In addition, Kosovo will need to shore up its international 
legitimacy, a feat which only seems achievable through some form of 
settlement with Serbia. The ICJ opinion constitutes merely one more 
chapter in this long drawn-out process. 
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Chapter 9 
a house of cards? Building the 
rule of law in the Balkans
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 
The eU as a promoter of the rule of law
Although the theoretical definition of the European identity remains the 
subject of much controversy, for practical purposes that identity consists, 
in essence, in a body of laws and the commitment to enforce them. 
A new Member State’s capacity to enforce EU law is therefore critical 
for the success of its EU integration process. The EU’s enlargement to 
include ten post-communist countries meant bridging the differences 
not only in economic development between the two halves of the 
continent, but also between two distinct legal cultures. Although the 
new Member States were eager to adopt all things European in order 
to gain acceptance, their capacity for implementation and enforcement 
has always been a source of concern for certain old Member States as 
well as for the European Commission. In addition to the largely formal 
process of adopting the acquis, the applicant countries also had to engage 
in a flurry of reforms designed to increase the overall capacity of their 
legal systems. The European Commission and some old Member States 
assisted the process through monitoring, coaching and aid, together 
with a real effort to promote the rule of law.
The EU was not new to the experience of assisting rule-of-law reforms in 
aspiring Member States, although it had not dealt with former communist 
regimes before.1 This chapter briefly reviews the lessons learned from 
the efforts to build the rule of law during the EU accession processes, 
particularly in the Eastern Balkans, and applies them to the Western 
Balkans. Were EU external assistance and conditionality successful in 
advancing the rule of law in the new member countries? What emerged 
as the main obstacles to that effort?
Judicial reform and corruption were not the main themes during the 
2004 EU accessions, although for certain countries such as Latvia they 
were more of an issue. Since post-communist Member States reportedly 
1.  Erik G. Jensen distinguishes 
between five waves of rule 
of law promotion since 
the end of World War II, 
each following a distinct 
rationale and attaching 
different weight to the 
various dimensions. See 
Erik G. Jensen, ‘The Rule of 
Law and Judicial Reform’, 
in Erik G. Jensen and 
Thomas C. Heller (eds.) 
Beyond Common Knowledge. 
Empirical Approaches to 
the Rule of Law (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2003); also Ronald J. 
Daniels, Michael Trebilcock 
and Joshua Rosensweig, 
‘The Political Economy 
of Rule of Law Reform in 
Developing Countries’, 
University of Toronto, 2008.
146
9       a house of cards? Building the rule of law in the Balkans
experienced some democratic backsliding after 2004 (reflected in their 
Freedom House and Transparency International scores), conditionality 
was made more stringent between the 2004 enlargement wave and 
the accession of the Eastern Balkan countries in 2007. When Romania 
and Bulgaria joined on 1 January 2007, the Commission established 
a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) to assess the 
commitments undertaken by those late entrants in the areas of judicial 
reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime. During the 
first three years after accession, the Commission thus had the option 
of triggering the safeguard clauses included in the accession treaties 
with those two countries. What was unprecedented was its decision to 
keep the CVM active after that legal mechanism had expired: ‘The CVM 
... should only be removed when all the benchmarks it set have been 
satisfactorily fulfilled. … The CVM is a support tool in this endeavor; it 
is not an end in itself nor can it replace commitment that … authorities 
need to make in order to align the judicial system and practice with 
general EU standards.’2 That effort also received financial support. 
Total EU allocations for administrative and judicial capacity reforms 
between 1998 and 2006 amounted to €452 million for Romania and 
€260 million for Bulgaria, notwithstanding their considerable domestic 
expenditure, as their budgets were increased repeatedly.3
In 2008, the unprecedented decision was taken – as an alternative to 
resorting to the special CVM safeguard clauses4 – to cut EU agricultural 
and structural funds to Bulgaria following massive fraud, triggering 
the resignation of key government officials.5 By 2009, it had become 
clear that the Commission considered the two countries’ progress to 
be insufficient: ‘more needs to be done to deliver convincing results in 
judicial reform, tackling corruption, and in the case of Bulgaria in the fight 
against organised crime’.6 The logical next step was the postponement 
of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to the Schengen Area in 2010, 
following a letter signed jointly by the Interior Ministers of France and 
Germany deploring the persistence of widespread corruption in the 
two countries. Even tough conditionality did not deliver in these two 
difficult cases. Since they bear a closer resemblance to the Western Balkan 
states than to the first group of post-communist entrants, in terms of 
the challenges posed, they are worth studying in more detail.
explaining the evolution of the rule of 
law
When it comes to defining the rule of law, the different approaches 
can be located on a continuum ranging from ‘thin’ or procedural 
interpretations to ‘thick’ or substantive definitions.7 A distinction may 
2.  Commission of the 
European Communities, 
Frequently asked questions 
about the safeguard clauses 
included in the Treaty of 
Accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania, MEMO/05/396, 
Brussels, 25 October 2005.
3.  Commission of the 
European Communities, 
‘Support to Public 
Administrative and Judicial 
Capacity in Bulgaria 
and Romania’, Thematic 
Evaluation Report of the 
European Union Phare 
Programme, Brussels, 2006.
4.  Commission of the 
European Communities, 
Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the 
Management of EU Funds in 
Bulgaria, COM 2008 (0496), 
Brussels, 23 July 2008.
5.  See Irina Iavnova, 
‘Reuters Factbox: Seven 
Scandals from Bulgaria’, 
Reuters, 29 June 2009. 
Available at: http://www.
reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE55T02R20090630.
6.  Commission of the 
European Communities, 
Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament 
and the Council on Progress 
in Bulgaria under the Co-
operation and Verification 
Mechanism, Brussels, COM 
2009 (402) final, 22 July 
2009; Commission of the 
European Communities, 
Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament 
and the Council on 
Progress in Romania under 
the Co-operation and 
Verification Mechanism, 
COM 2009 (401) final, 
Brussels, 22 July 2009.
7.  Jensen, op. cit. in 
note 1, p. 338.
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also be drawn between instrumental approaches on the one hand, 
whereby the rule of law means having a set of appropriate laws in the 
statute book, a trustworthy, efficient and independent judiciary and 
effective law enforcement, and more ambitious, ends-driven approaches, 
on the other.8 It is simpler to assist with building the rule of law if it is 
conceived in instrumental terms, because such an approach provides 
an easy guide to assistance programming. However, any assessment of 
the final outcome – the rule of law itself – will invariably impinge on 
the broader definition. It is also this comprehensive definition of the 
rule of law, which looks at the quality of a society’s overall institutional 
framework, that has come to dominate alternative explanations of 
development.9 In the words of Daniel Kaufmann ‘an improvement in the 
rule of law by one standard deviation from the current levels in Ukraine 
to those “middling” levels prevailing in South Africa would lead to a 
fourfold increase in per capita income in the long run.’10 In principle, 
the EU should pursue mainly the ‘thick’ or substantive approach, as 
candidate countries need to satisfy a number of general democratic 
conditions (the so-called Copenhagen criteria) in order to qualify for 
membership. However, that approach is more difficult to implement: 
in addition to the lack of agreement on the essential elements that it 
entails11 it is also politically more sensitive. There are also specifically 
European complications. How is it possible to promote the ‘European 
legal model’ when a recent Council of Europe report warns readers that 
there is no such thing and perhaps never will be?12
From 1989 onwards, the process of reinstating the rule of law was similar 
in all post-communist transition countries. They had to continue to be 
governed on the basis of communist legislation due to the impossibility 
of replacing it all overnight. It could have been simply cancelled, but 
the agreement was that ‘the umbrella principle of upholding the law 
meant that however bad or inappropriate, communist laws should 
continue to apply until revoked or amended’.13 The judiciary bore a 
particularly heavy burden in the context of the ‘legal transition’. The 
statistics show a rising number of lawsuits of all kinds, while judges’ 
pay and the judicial infrastructure remained inadequate. The duration 
of lawsuits and the courts’ backlog increased. Democratisation does not 
necessarily enhance legal coherence when legislators are inexperienced 
and frequently pursuing narrow interests: in the Global Competitiveness 
Report 2008-2009, only Estonia is ranked among the top 50 countries 
according to the ‘efficiency of legal framework’ indicator, while the 
majority of Eastern European countries are in the bottom half of the 
top 50 percent of countries.14
The mixed and inconclusive nature of the results achieved thus far by 
domestic judicial reforms since 1999 is also reflected in the high rate 
of appeals to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), precisely 
during or after the accession years. East Europeans have come to see 
8.  Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, 
‘Competing Definitions of the 
Rule of Law. Implications for 
Practitioners’, Carnegie Paper 
no. 55, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2005.
9.  Dani Rodrik, Arvind 
Subramanian and Francesco 
Trebbi, ‘Institutions Rule: 
The Primacy of Institutions 
over Geography and 
Integration in Economic 
Development’, Journal of 
Economic Growth, vol. 9, 
no. 2, 2004, p. 131.
10.  Daniel Kaufmann, 
‘Governance Redux: The 
Empirical Challenge’, in 
Michael E. Porter et al. (eds.), 
The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2003-2004 (Oxford: 
Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p. 145.
11.  Jensen, op. cit. in 
note 1, p. 339. 
12.  Jean-Louis Bergel et al., 
‘L’émergence d’une culture 
judiciaire européenne. 
Avancées et difficultés d’une 
culture judiciaire européenne 
dans l’espace judiciaire 
européen’ [The Emergence of 
a European Judicial Culture. 
Progress and Difficulties 
of a European Judicial 
Culture in the European 
Judicial Space], Synthèse du 
Laboratoire de Théorie du Droit 
(Université Paul Cézanne, 
Aix-Marseille III, 2009).
13.  Frances Millard, Polish 
Politics and Society (London: 
Routledge, 1999), pp. 89-90.
14.  Michael E. Porter and Klaus 
Schwab (eds.), The Global 
Competitiveness Report 
2008-2009, World Economic 
Forum, 2008, p. 472.
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the ECHR as a sort of Supreme Court, to which they regularly appeal – 
though frequently their cases are deemed inadmissible – against what they 
perceive to be unjust rulings by their own courts.15 In the property area, 
which all economists deem crucial to the success of economic reform, 
the situation is particularly difficult in the Balkans (see Table 1).
Table 1. South-East European property cases before the EHCR
15.  European Court of Human 
Rights, Annual Report 2008, 
Registry of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 
2008; European Court 
of Human Rights, Annual 
Report 2004, Registry of 
the European Court of 
Human Rights, 2004.
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Romania is the undisputed regional leader in terms of the numbers of 
lawsuits and property violations, with nearly 10,000 cases admitted (and 
many more still deemed inadmissible). Serbia takes second place. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia have a relatively high number of pending 
applications in relation to the size of their populations; Bulgaria and 
Croatia also have numerous cases of procedural violations. The judgments 
finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in cases of property 
lost during the communist regime are not directly related to the actual 
nationalisation or confiscation of property by the authoritarian regime, as 
the Court does not recommend any specific policy in this regard. What 
they sanction is: the current governments’ failure to comply with their 
own legislation on compensation or the restoration of property; their 
failure to enforce the domestic courts’ final judicial or administrative 
decisions in the applicants’ favour, by restoring property or awarding 
compensation; their failure to grant the right to a fair trial; the excessive 
delays due to the lack of efficiency of compensatory legislation and 
proceedings; problems of access to the courts, and finally the breach 
of the principle of legal certainty, due to the quashing of final judicial 
decisions ordering the restitution of property. What those judgments 
reflect, precisely, is the lack of the rule of law.
These hard facts are confirmed by the World Bank Institute scores 
showing the aggregated perception ratings for the rule of law. Unlike 
Romania and Bulgaria, which show little evolution between 2004 and 
2010, Serbia and Albania register significant progress, although since they 
started out from the lowest level in the region (see Charts 1-2) it is still 
insufficient. All four remain below the regional average. Only Slovenia 
has an above-average score and Croatia is average. However, even in 
Slovenia there was some backsliding after 2004. EU conditionality as 
applied to the new Member States and Eastern Balkan applicants does 
not seem to work very well.
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Chart 1. Comparison of each SEE country with the regional average 
according to the World Bank Rule of Law aggregate indicator 
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Chart 2. Evolution of the World Bank Rule of Law indicator, 2004-
2009
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To understand why the EU’s influence was so limited, we have to 
look both at the supply side (the EU’s rule-of-law promotion efforts) 
and the demand side (national circumstances and factors in the 
recipient countries). The supply side – EU efforts – was not without 
problems. One problem was the speed and timing of the process: the 
time factor. In the effort to grasp the political opportunity while at 
the same time not allowing any real room for negotiation with the 
newcomers (who had to adopt the acquis in full), the whole accession 
process became a bureaucratic exercise. The European Commission’s 
detailed requirements and the related issue of conditionality created 
a relationship in which the Commission (as opposed to the domestic 
constituencies or their representatives) became the sole principal and 
the governments its agents. Reforms were not geared to policy feedback 
or impact evaluations, but instead to the need to satisfy the pressing 
bureaucratic requirements of the Commission’s regular monitoring 
reports, creating a sort of ‘prescription-based’ evaluation mechanism 
with perverse incentives. Thus countries were judged in the monitoring 
process not by the effectiveness of their reforms or even by their real 
potential for change, but by the number of ‘prescription pills’ taken. 
The more advice a ‘patient’ or assisted country accepted the higher it 
was rated, with little checking of the ‘symptoms’. Latvia was rated as 
an anti-corruption success (though it soon showed itself not to be) not 
because it had managed to curb corruption, but because it had adopted 
all the EU recommendations. This phenomenon is particularly true 
of the so-called ‘Helsinki group’ of countries which had been invited 
only in 1999 and were keen to do whatever was suggested in order 
to catch up with the first and more advanced group of countries (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). The European Council 
ordered an international audit of Romania’s whole anti-corruption 
strategy in order to assess whether or not the accession treaty could be 
signed in 2005. Freedom House International, which conducted the 
audit, delivered a critical report whose recommendations were fully 
incorporated into revised strategies for the reform of the judiciary 
and anti-corruption agency, and in March 2005 Romania signed the 
treaty with the EU. But the Romanian government was never able 
deliver half the measures included in the strategies. In June 2005, 
the Constitutional Court took most of the teeth out of the proposed 
legislative changes. An integrity agency inspired by the US Office for 
Government Ethics (OGE) and supposed to be created by the end of 
the year only came into being after Romania’s accession in 2007, and 
in 2010 the Constitutional Court stripped it of the few powers it had. 
In other words, due to the tight accession calendar, conditionality had 
to rely on promises: the content and general impact of the proposed 
action could not be checked in time and later frequently proved to be 
disappointing.
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The second problem on the supply side was the performance-based 
approach adopted on the assumption that the political will existed 
and that the problem was entirely one of capacity, which could be 
built regardless of the judiciary’s motivation for change if only certain 
organisational steps were followed. The Commission having perceived, 
correctly, that the rule of law varied from one country to another, it 
pushed for reform, mostly along the lines of ‘one size fits all’ organisational 
changes. It is easy to deduce from the European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) data on the organisation of the judiciary 
in post-communist Europe that progress is not related to a certain 
form of organisation. Although several West European legal models 
existed and had produced equally positive outcomes in their respective 
states of origin, by 2004 the French-Italian Judicial Council model 
was the main one being exported by both the World Bank and the 
European Commission in order to ensure judicial independence.16 Yet 
the evidence from Latin America had already shown that independence 
is a complex phenomenon and that the introduction of self-regulatory 
Judicial Councils does not solve the problem. Even though judges may 
be independent of direct political control, they may become dependent 
on other forces such as senior judges in a judicial hierarchy, or they may 
become plainly unaccountable and corrupt.17 Reforms in Romania and 
Bulgaria frequently had to be pushed through against the will of the 
very people who were supposed to implement them.
 The third problem, precisely, was that there was no unitary rule-of-law 
model on offer. Frequently there would be clashes on the ground between 
the German ‘twinning’ expert, the French constitutional lawyer and 
the British prosecutor sent to assist anti-corruption, over the question 
of what the European ‘standards’ actually were.18 The wide variety of 
administrative and judicial practices that exist across the EU did not 
simplify the task of those assisting the accession countries.19 Moreover, 
aid is disbursed from different sources with little coordination between 
the Commission and member countries, despite a constant effort to 
communicate. Furthermore, the fact that the three experts described 
in the abovementioned anecdote are paid from three different budgets 
(two from member countries’ ‘twinning’ programmes and one from the 
European Commission) leads in practice to a situation in which they 
are actually competing with their respective solutions for the attention 
of the national policymaker, further weakening consistency.
Fourthly, the Commission had to act blindly, as instruments to monitor 
progress were not yet quite in place. Judicial statistics were meaningless, as 
the monitoring categories were a legacy of the communist era; corruption 
is notoriously difficult to measure, the impact of anti-corruption even 
more so in the absence of thorough research. The timeframe, with six-
monthly intervals between monitoring reports, left little alternative but 
to rely on input indicators and to set performance targets as qualitative 
16.  Linn Hammergren, ‘Do 
Councils Further Judicial 
Reform? Lessons from Latin 
America’, Carnegie Rule 
of Law Series Working 
Paper, 2002, p. 28. 
17.  Owen M. Fiss, ‘The Right 
Degree of Independence’, 
in Irwin Stotzky (ed.), The 
Role of the Judiciary in the 
Transition to Democracy in 
Latin America (Westview 
Press, 1993), p. 55; Nuno 
Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, 
‘The Comparative Law 
and Economics of Judicial 
Councils’, Berkley Journal 
of International Law, vol. 
27, no. 1, 2009, p. 52. 
18.  This particular example is 
from 2007 in Romania, but 
such examples abound.
19.  Open Society Institute, 
Monitoring the EU Accession 
Process: Judicial Independence 
(Budapest: Central 
European University 
Press, 2001), p. 20; James 
Anderson and Cheryl Gray, 
‘Transforming Judicial 
Systems in Europe and 
Central Asia, January 2006, 
p. 333. Available at: http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTECAREGTOPJUDREF/
Resources/ABCDE.pdf.
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‘benchmarks’. A systematic effort to develop a comprehensive set of impact 
indicators for Europeanisation was never made. Designing governance 
and rule-of-law benchmarks is also a difficult art, especially if it is not 
anchored in a sound, evidence-based policy understanding. For instance, 
if Judicial Councils are in fact unable to deliver the expected goods 
(an accountable magistracy), creating further benchmarks in relation 
to such Judicial Councils risks becoming irrelevant, even though their 
monitoring may be both accurate and regular.
Bulgaria and Romania having embarked on the transition from the most 
disadvantaged starting-point, their lack of progress during accession 
mattered far more for them than for the other countries. Romania 
progressed in 2005-2006 after the anti-communists returned to power, 
but then lapsed back into the old practices. Bulgaria started to show 
goodwill only in 2009. Not only politicians proved to be reluctant 
‘Europeanisers’. In both Romania and Bulgaria, Judicial Councils and 
judges in general were not supportive of reform. Magistrates had been 
promoters of reform as long their independence from political intervention 
was at stake; however, once they became completely independent their 
esprit de corps flourished and there was no more incentive to pursue self-
improvement. In both Romania and Bulgaria the conservatives in the 
judiciary managed to exploit their administrative positions as heads of 
the courts in order to be elected to the Judicial Council or Constitutional 
Court. They then used their office to oppose substantive reforms to 
the judiciary’s modus operandi. The magistrates’ pay was increased to 
stimulate performance and curb corruption, but all attempts to set up 
any serious performance checks failed and accountability came to be the 
salient problem.20 By 2007, evidence to that effect was pouring in from 
more than one country, so much so that the World Bank agreed that the 
most pressing issue had become ‘ensuring judicial accountability, given 
newfound independence’.21 The European Commission then upgraded 
its benchmark, calling for a Judicial Council that was accountable as 
well as independent. But, unlike the governments, which could lose 
elections for under-performing on EU accession, the Judicial Councils 
had no EU accession stakes. The judiciary’s disregard for any interests 
other than its own became blatantly obvious during the unprecedented 
strike by the Romanian judiciary in 2009, when the judges sued for and 
ruled on a substantial pay-rise in their own favour, with reference to a 
bonus that had been legally cancelled years before at a time of dramatic 
budget deficit. Bulgaria’s judiciary took top position in the 2008 Gallup 
Corruption Barometer, a global survey by Transparency International, 
which rated it as the world’s most corrupt judiciary.22 
20.  Freedom House, ‘The 
Anticorruption Policy of the 
Romanian Government’, 
Assessment Report. 
Commissioned by the 
Romanian Ministry of 
Justice. Bucharest, 2005.
21. James Anderson and 
Cheryl Gray, ‘Transforming 
Judicial Systems in 
Europe and Central 
Asia’, 2006. See: http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTECAREGTOPJUDREF/
Resources/ABCDE.
pdf, at 333.
22.  See: http://www.
transparency-bg.org/?magic 
=0.5.0.2&year=2007.
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explaining the control of corruption
European conditionality was strongest in the area of anti-corruption, 
where EU Member States were seriously concerned and were pressing 
for drastic action by the Commission. At the time of embarking on 
their EU accession path the post-communist countries’ Transparency 
International scores were below the lowest level in Western Europe and 
their culture was frequently described as entirely corrupt.23 Surveys on 
bribery cannot fully capture the systemic nature of Eastern European 
corruption, which can best be defined as ‘governance by particularism’,24 
the systematic discretionary use of authority for the benefit of particular 
groups or individuals. Political parties, even in the most advanced 
countries of the region, seem to engage in ‘runaway state-building’, 
achieving party capacity and mobilisation primarily through clientelism 
and exploitation of the state.25 
The World Governance Control of Corruption Indicator shows some 
evolution when it comes to the Balkans (2004-2009), but again little 
of it is significant or sufficient. Only Albania and Serbia show any 
significant progress, but since they started from the bottom of the heap 
they remain well below average: only Slovenia is close to the OECD 
average and Croatia trails behind it (See charts 3-4). 
23.  William L. Miller, 
Åse B. Grødeland and 
Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, 
A Culture of Corruption? 
Coping with Government 
in Post-Communist Europe 
(Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2001).
24.  For a full description of 
particularism see Guillermo 
O’Donnell, ‘Illusions about 
Consolidation’, in Journal 
of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 
2, 1996, pp. 34-51.
25.  Conor O’Dwyer, Runaway 
State-Building: Patronage 
Politics and Democratic 
Development (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2006); Anna 
Grzymała-Busse Rebuilding 
Leviathan: Party Competition 
and State Exploitation in 
Post-Communist Europe 
(Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
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Chart 3. Comparison of each SEE country with the regional average 
according to the World Bank Control of Corruption aggregate 
indicator
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Chart 4. Evolution of Control of Corruption indicator 2004-2009
SLOVENIA
TURKEY
CROATIA
FYROM
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
SERBIA
BOSNIA-HERZOGOVINA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
KOSOVO
Control of Corruption (2009)
Comparison between 2009, 1998 (top-bottom order)
Source: D Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology 
and Analytical Issues  (2010).
Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance 
provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and 
developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of 
the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the 
World Bank Group to allocate resources.
Country's Percentile Rank (0-100)
 
158
9       a house of cards? Building the rule of law in the Balkans
A World Economic Forum survey of governance conducted in 2009 
did not find any major differences across the post-communist region, 
suggesting that differences are of scale rather than kind. The Czech 
Republic is in 110th position for government favouritism, Hungary 112th 
and Romania 113th, worse than the Kyrgyz Republic or Kazakhstan. In 
other words, neither the transition nor EU accession has managed to 
restrain the government’s capacity to distribute benefits in a particularistic 
manner. Public opinion surveys provide additional evidence of the 
definition of party politics in post-communist societies as a competition 
for state spoils; the regimes could be described as being based on 
‘competitive particularism’. 
The spoils can be divided into four basic categories: 
public jobs: the public sector is highly politicised and each winning a. 
party fills not only the political posts but also many civil service 
positions with its own people; 
public spending: for instance, the commissioning of public works, but b. 
also preferential bailouts, subsidies and loans from state banks; 
preferential concessions and privatisations of former state property; c. 
and 
market advantages in the form of preferential regulation. d. 
The discretionary nature of such allocations in post-communist 
countries is not news to the consultants assisting with those countries’ 
transformation and EU accession processes. The European Commission, 
following OECD Support for Improvement in Government and 
Management (SIGMA) advice, has long been pressing for the creation 
of policy management units within governments to take charge of the 
planning and impact evaluation of new legislation, in the hope that 
this will provide a more objective and transparent basis for policy 
formulation. Periodic reviews by SIGMA or the World Bank have shown 
that decision-making on the allocation of funds has continued to go 
through informal channels like ministers’ cabinets, completely bypassing 
the management units. There have also been strategic errors. The EU 
has spent a lot on inefficient anti-corruption awareness campaigns 
and allocated the bulk of anti-corruption funds to governments to 
enable them to pass legislation and set up institutions, even when it 
was clear, as the public was perfectly aware, that it was precisely the 
governments that needed watching.26 The underlying philosophy is 
that particularism is a natural calamity, like a volcanic eruption, rather 
than a vicious systemic form of distribution perpetuated by individuals 
to further their own interests or those of their group. Thus in order to 
reduce the risk it is deemed sufficient to inform people – including the 
26.  Martin Tisné and Daniel 
Smilov, ‘From the Ground 
Up. Assessing the Record of 
Anticorruption Assistance in 
Southeastern Europe’, CPS 
Policy Studies Series, 2004.
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civil servants who profit from the system – by distributing booklets 
and posting up a few flyers. This ‘win-win’ approach is based on the 
assumption that anti-corruption activists are like missionaries, with 
the task of spreading the word of good governance to pagans who have 
not yet had the luck to stumble on it by themselves. But some people 
are bound to lose out due to anti-corruption measures: exposing and 
targeting predators is essential for success. 
The import en masse by these countries of ‘good governance’ legislation 
prompted by the EU has not yielded the expected results. During their 
accession, Romania, Bulgaria and Former Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
became the world leaders in terms of anti-corruption regulation, according 
to the Global Integrity Index, yet their systemic particularism was barely 
affected. A compilation of anti-corruption laws and regulations27 shows 
that dozens of laws have been adopted since 1998, not only by candidate 
countries, but also by countries like Albania, which overtook some of 
the new EU Member States, actually increasing the distance between the 
‘real’ country (practices) and the ‘legal’ one (regulation) A combination 
of awareness campaigns and top-down corruption-prosecuting agencies 
did not succeed in changing an allocation mechanism for public funds 
entrenched in particularism.
 In Bulgaria, Slovakia, Serbia and Romania, civil society compensated 
in part for governments’ lack of will, pushing through freedom of 
information acts through grand coalitions and monitoring them. 
Freedom of information legislation, which scarcely exists in Western 
Europe, was part of the conditionality for NATO accession, later 
adopted by the EU as a recommendation. Together with Estonia’s 
e-government it has proved to be the most effective tool for good 
governance in Eastern Europe so far.28 Estonia remains the only great 
success in all of Eastern Europe in terms of good governance policies, 
but it can hardly be called an EU success: liberal governments and 
an assertive civil society have managed to create the ‘cleanest’ post-
communist society in barely ten years by drying up the resources 
for corruption and increasing normative constraints (Georgia is the 
other positive example, but despite having evolved the most it is 
still behind all Central European countries in World Bank scores). 
Normative constraints on public corruption remain low in the region, 
as courts are hesitant to sentence influential people even when the 
prosecution manages to charge them, and the efforts by civil society 
watchdogs are sporadic, underfunded and reliant on only a handful 
of committed activists.29 The EU seldom funds any grassroots frontal 
attacks on corruption: a review of anti-corruption projects in the 
new Member States and EU accession countries found that only 8 
percent of total projects dealt directly with corruption (monitoring, 
ranking, naming and shaming) and that none of them were EU-
funded (although a handful were financed by individual EU Member 
27.  Monica Dorhoi, 
‘Anticorruption Assessment 
Index. A Comparative 
Review of Anticorruption 
Strategies’, Paper presented 
at Midwest Political Science 
Association, Palmer 
House Hilton, Chicago, 
Illinois, 15 April 2004.
28.  According to www.
againstcooruption.eu, a civil 
society watchdog portal.
29.  Ibid.
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States: the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries).30 If the input 
into building normative constraints is close to zero, the output can 
hardly be greater. A balanced anti-corruption formula:
Corruption = Resources (Power discret ion + Mater ial resources) 
    – Constraints (Legal + Normative)
would address both diminishing resources and increasing costs, as 
systemic corruption is the state of equilibrium reached by the interaction 
between those two factors.
Under resources we must consider power discretion (the privileged 
access to and discretionary use of power that comes not only from a 
monopoly, as in the classic formula of Klitgaard,31 but also from other 
privileged power arrangements such as party cartels) and material 
resources (investment or procurement budget, foreign aid, EU funds, 
natural resources, state-owned assets, public jobs). Under constraints 
we must consider legal ones (an autonomous and effective judiciary 
able to enforce legislation), but also normative ones (existing societal 
norms that endorse ethical universalism, whereby any deviance from 
those norms is effectively sanctioned by public opinion, the media, 
civil society, voters).
Thus donor-driven anti-corruption strategies are often inefficient, mainly 
because they are forged in developed countries where corruption is 
the exception to the norm of ethical universalism, and not the other 
way around. They therefore tend to focus mostly on one term of the 
equation, for instance prosecuting bribery, which is unlikely to work 
in the absence of the others. They are norm-infringement projects, when 
they should be norm-building ones.
Anti-corruption driven by EU conditionality has proved not only to be 
a poor fit, but also difficult to sustain. Once the countries had joined 
and the accession pressure was over, the whole range of EU-sponsored 
anti-corruption institutions came under assault, with reformers being 
dismissed in Romania, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia. According to 
GRECO, the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption programme, the anti-
corruption budgets in most new EU member countries were reduced 
beyond the limit of survival.32
What to do next?
While corruption and the rule of law are two distinct concepts, in 
the presence of the systemic corruption described in this paper they 
can hardly be disentangled. Anti-corruption must therefore be seen 
30.  Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘The 
Experience of Civil Society 
as an Anticorruption Actor 
in East Central Europe’, 
Romanian Academic 
Society and Hertie School 
of Governance, September 
2010. Available at: http://
www.againstcorruption.eu/
uploads/rapoarte_finale_
PDF/The-Experience-
of-Civil-Society-as-an-
Anticorruption-Actor-in-
East-Central-Europe.pdf.
31.  Robert Klitgaard,Controlling 
Corruption (Berkeley, 
CA: University of 
California Press, 1988).
32.  President of GRECO 
Drago Kos’ statement at the 
Berlin workshop on trends 
in anticorruption, Hertie 
School of Governance, 
18 November 2008.
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as part of a general effort to establish equality before the law and a 
rule-based system of governance. Leaving aside the practical difficulties 
of putting a concept as general as the rule of law into practice and 
assessing its short- or medium-term evolution, the evidence indicates 
that the Balkans has not yet achieved the evolution by one standard 
deviation that the EU has pushed for. A widely quoted Carnegie 
Endowment review of rule-of-law assistance efforts issued somewhat 
pessimistic warnings a few years ago: ‘Rewriting constitutions, laws, 
and regulations is the easy part. […] Rule of law reform will succeed 
only if it gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to 
be ruled by the law.’33 Another recent review sees the solution not 
in abandoning rule-of-law promotion efforts, but rather in applying 
more rigorous conditionality to assistance from the West.34 Timing 
also matters: the pre-accession phase lends itself better than the 
post-accession phase to such efforts, and predetermined accession 
dates have proved to be an error. Historians of corruption also find 
evidence that major breakthroughs towards good governance are helped 
by financial crises. In Italy, it was only when the judicial campaign 
against corruption coincided with a severe budgetary crisis, depriving 
political clients of their spoils, that the equilibrium changed and the 
whole cartel of old parties collapsed.35 The current crisis could thus 
be seen as an opportunity. However, let us not forget that in the other 
famous EU example, that of Greece, the state went bankrupt before 
the political system did.
 The EU has far more instruments for new and aspiring member 
countries than it had for Greece or Italy. But so far it has been 
reluctant to put them to intelligent use. Doubt was cast recently 
on the efficiency of the CVM for Romania and Bulgaria. Yet the 
mechanism has not been totally ineffective: a simulation of where the 
countries would be today without it shows that it did play a positive, 
albeit limited, role. But it has become like an arrow without a bow, as 
conditionality only works in the field of governance in combination with 
domestic grassroots pressure from civil society, which was never strong 
and which diminished after EU accession. The EU has come to rely too 
much on its own conditionality, which only works when empowering 
the forces of change in such societies and is ineffective when they 
are weak or absent. Identifying the drivers of change requires a shift 
from the prescription-based approach described in this paper (based 
on ‘medicines’ that all patients have to take) to a political economy-
minded approach, which seeks to understand who stands to gain 
from challenging this undesirable status quo and uses both rewards 
and sanctions in order to empower promoters of change to challenge 
the existing equilibrium and establish a new one. 
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Affairs, vol. 77, no. 2, March/
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Michael J. Trebilcock, 
‘The Political Economy 
of Rule of Law Reform in 
Developing Countries’, 
in Michigan Journal of 
International Law, no. 26, 
Fall 2004, pp. 99-140..
35.  Stefano Guzinni, ‘The “Long 
Night of the First Republic”: 
years of clientelistic 
implosion in Italy’, in 
Review of International 
Political Economy, vol. 2, 
no. 1, 1995, pp. 27- 61. 
162
9       a house of cards? Building the rule of law in the Balkans
 
 
Appendix 1. 
The association between civil society and control of corruption
Freedom House Nations in Transit 2009 scores recoded (stronger civil society 
has higher scores); CPI 2009 from Transparency International (higher scores 
indicate more corruption).
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Chapter 10 
Balkan public opinion and eU 
accession
Robert Manchin
The citizens of all the Balkan states are closely monitoring the signals 
concerning their country’s relationship with the European Union. 
According to a series of opinion surveys conducted by Gallup over 
the last five years in all the countries of the region, EU-related issues 
engage the public. People of all ages and from all walks of life have an 
opinion that they freely express on the desirability of a future within 
the EU, on the most likely date for their country’s accession and the 
degree to which being European forms part of their personal identity. 
Public opinion with regard to the EU is not only an important yardstick 
for measuring the progress achieved by a society, but also an indicator 
of the kind of future the country is facing: it is a sensitive barometer 
of societal successes and failures. The level of public engagement with 
the EU accession project allows us to gauge the availability of emotional 
resources that can act as a driving force for the transition processes. 
Before examining citizens’ accession expectations in each of the Western 
Balkan countries, in order to see how united or divided public opinion is 
in its assessment of the advantages or disadvantages of EU membership, 
it is useful to look at the degree to which the citizens of the different 
states identify with Europe.
NB All tables and graphs featured in this chapter are from the Gallup Balkan 
Monitor, 2006-2010. See: http://www.balkan-monitor.eu.
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Kosovo scores even higher – indeed, the Kosovars are by far the most 
stable and committed in their identification with Europe.
The definition of ‘extremely strong’ identification with Europe depends 
largely on the context. For Kosovo, and to a certain extent for Albania, 
identifying with Europe is an important element of how the society 
defines itself. Following the recognition of Kosovo, its citizens accept 
that they must now wait until accession; however, they already define 
themselves as European, with a majority identifying ‘extremely strongly’ 
or ‘very strongly’ with Europe. 
It is the population of the country with the highest chances of early 
accession – Croatia – that distances itself the most vehemently from being 
identified with the Balkans (only 3 percent identify extremely strongly 
and a mere 6 percent very strongly). Yet although the population rejects 
a Balkan identity, the closer the country gets to a possible accession date, 
the less strongly it is able to identify emotionally with Europe.
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This lack of emotional attachment is reflected in the large number of 
Croatians who are undecided about the advantages of EU accession, 
resulting in the lowest level of support for EU membership. 
The long years of waiting for accession and the perceived loss of control 
over the eventual outcome have increased scepticism in precisely 
those societies that have made the most progress on the road toward 
accession.
eU accession still supported – but not so 
fervently
Although overall EU accession is viewed positively, the pattern is 
different for each of the Balkan states. For example, while support for 
the EU has continued to increase in Montenegro (from 67 percent in 
2009 to 73 percent in 2010), the downward trend in the other two 
countries that now enjoy visa-free travel has continued: the share of 
people who take the view that EU accession would be a good thing for 
their country has fallen from 62 percent to 60 percent in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and from 50 percent to 44 
percent in Serbia since 2010. 
A similar picture emerges for Croatia: support for the EU decreased further 
in 2010 with roughly a third (32 percent) of respondents expressing 
the opinion that EU accession would be a bad thing, compared to only 
28 percent in 2009. Furthermore, the Gallup Balkan Monitor – for 
the third time in a row − reported that a relative majority of Croatians 
remain indifferent to EU integration, with 38 percent seeing it as neither 
a good nor a bad thing.
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In Albania, which has shown high levels of support for the EU since 
2006, results were also noticeably different from the previous year, 
with the share of respondents who think that EU accession would be a 
good thing dropping from 88 percent to 81 percent in 2010. In Kosovo, 
another country with traditionally high support for the EU, the level of 
support has remained roughly unchanged.
No consistent pattern in the level of EU support – increases in BiH 
and Montenegro, but decreases elsewhere 
Generally speaking, do you think that [country]’s membership of the European 
Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?
The responses to the question about voting intentions in the event of 
an EU accession referendum remained consistent between 2009 and 
2010: in all the Balkan states, except Croatia, a majority (ranging from 
63 percent in Serbia to 93 percent in Albania) said it would vote ‘yes’. In 
Croatia − in line with the low level of support for the EU in that country 
− the proportion of those who said they would vote ‘no’ remained higher 
than those who said they would vote ‘yes’ (43 percent vs. 38 percent). 
Here a fairly stable one-fifth of the population (the highest in the whole 
region) remains to be convinced both about participating in a possible 
referendum and about which of the two options to choose.
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Virtual EU referendum would be pro-EU accession in all countries 
except Croatia
If there was a referendum on Sunday on whether [country] should join the 
European Union, which way would you vote?
The way people think their country’s prospective membership is perceived 
by public opinion in the EU varies more widely from one Balkan state 
to another. In 2010, respondents in Albania and Kosovo (69 percent 
and 65 percent respectively) were the most confident that EU citizens 
were supportive of their accession to the Union. Yet a study of the actual 
results of opinion polls in the EU Member States shows that these are 
precisely the two countries that enjoy the least support among EU 
citizens for their membership aspirations. They are the ones with the 
largest proportion of households in which one member of the immediate 
or extended family is working or living temporarily in an EU Member 
State, yet this does not affect their perceptions – in fact families with a 
member working abroad are even more likely to believe that they are 
welcomed by EU public opinion than those without such ties.
Serbs have become less confident than the citizens of the other Balkan 
states, with about 4 out of 10 (41 percent) of respondents expressing the 
belief that people in the EU are sympathetic to Serbia’s EU integration 
(a decrease of 12 percentage points since 2008). 
At the same time, despite their negative stance towards EU accession, 
an increasing number of Croats perceive EU citizens to be in favour of 
Croatia’s prospective membership: the proportion of respondents taking 
that view has increased by 13 percentage points since 2009. This could 
be a direct consequence of the fact that Slovenia’s blockade of Croatia’s 
EU integration efforts ended in September 2009, following intensive 
negotiations on the Slovenian-Croatian border dispute. 
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Serbs and Kosovars feel that EU citizens’ support for their membership 
is declining 
Do you think that the people in the European Union want [country] to join 
the European Union?
little change in expectations concerning 
the dates for eU accession – except in 
Bosnia and herzegovina 
Despite the developments in Croatia’s relations with Slovenia and 
the removal of a major obstacle on its path towards EU integration, 
Croats have not become more optimistic with regard to their accession 
date. While in 2009, 2013 was on average the date given by Croatian 
respondents for their country’s expected entry into the Union, the 
common belief in 2010 was that accession would not take place until 
2014. Paradoxically this was also the date given on average by Albanians 
for their country’s expected accession, notwithstanding the fact that 
Albania has not yet achieved official candidate status. 
In most Balkan countries, expectations concerning the speed of EU 
accession have remained relatively unchanged over the last few years: 
the average expected accession date for Montenegrins is 2016, but 2017 
for the citizens of Kosovo, FYROM and Serbia. The only country where 
expectations have shifted significantly over the past year is Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the date has moved closer, from 2022 to 2018. 
A likely explanation for peoples’ increasing optimism with regard to 
the EU integration process is the visa liberalisation issue. After being 
denied visa liberalisation during the first round in 2009, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has made great progress on the roadmap towards visa-
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free travel to the Schengen zone. As the Gallup Balkan Monitor results 
show, this has not gone unnoticed by the country’s residents, who now 
believe that EU accession is coming closer. 
Bosnians becoming more optimistic about EU accession, Albanians 
perhaps too optimistic
When, in which year do you think [country] will be a part of the European 
Union? 
Since most people in the Western Balkans are convinced that Croatia 
will be the first to join the European Union, we asked the citizens of 
all the countries which state they expected to be next in line for EU 
accession.   
The next Western Balkan country to join the EU: according to 
respondents in the Western Balkan states (by country)
After the EU accession of Croatia which, do you think, will be the next Western 
Balkan country to join the EU?
The chart – perhaps even more than for some of the other questions – 
reflects a kind of collective projection of the perceived reality. Croatians 
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keep their distance: half of them are not willing even to think about 
which country might soon find itself in the same position as that already 
achieved by Croatia. Those who do pick a country point to Serbia as 
most likely to be next in line. Serbia also appears to be the obvious 
candidate to the majority of respondents in BiH, but less so to the Serbs 
themselves, who are divided in equal proportions between those who 
think it will be their turn, and those who opt for Montenegro.
The same is not true of Montenegro, where a far larger proportion of 
respondents expect to acquire EU membership ahead of Serbia than 
believe it will be the other way round.
Finally, the countries with an Albanian population form a common 
front: even in FYROM, which has official candidate country status, 
more people believe that Albania will be next in line after Croatia than 
believe it will be their own country. In Kosovo and also Albania itself, 
a relative majority opt for Albania as the most likely second Western 
Balkan country to achieve EU membership.
Looking at the external conditions, we also asked respondents which 
EU Member State they perceived as being the biggest supporter of 
their country’s EU accession. A majority of respondents in Kosovo and 
Croatia said they felt most supported by Germany (31 percent and 27 
percent, respectively). Slovenia was the country named by the people 
of FYROM and Montenegro (24 percent and 11% percent respectively) 
as their biggest supporter, while the country chosen by roughly 3 out 
of 10 respondents in Albania was Italy. 
38 percent of Serbs, on the other hand, perceived the biggest supporter 
of their accession to the EU to be Greece. These perceptions are also 
rooted in the historical ties between individual states and of course in 
the line-up of their supporters during the various recent conflicts in 
the region. Another country where a significant number (10 percent) of 
Serbs believed there was considerable support for their EU membership 
was Spain, a country which has not recognised Kosovo either.
Unlike the respondents of most of the other Balkan states, those from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina did not opt overwhelmingly for one favourite 
patron: Austria, Germany and Slovenia were mentioned by similar 
numbers of respondents (10 percent-12 percent) as being the biggest 
supporters of their EU membership.
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Perceptions about the biggest supporters of the Balkan countries’ 
EU accession
In your opinion, which EU Member State is the biggest supporter of [country]’s 
EU accession?
People’s responses to the question about which EU Member State was 
most strongly opposed to their country’s accession also reflect the current 
state of relations between the different countries. For example, 4 out of 
10 Croatians identified Slovenia, with which Croatia has had a border 
dispute that has not yet been fully resolved, as the main opponent of 
their EU membership. Similarly, the Serbs were most critical of the 
Netherlands, possibly because it makes Serbia’s EU accession contingent 
upon its full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the same vein, respondents in Kosovo 
named Spain (33 percent), Greece and Cyprus (11 percent each), none 
of which have recognised Kosovo, as the main opponents of their EU 
membership.
Finally, the Gallup Balkan Monitor results reflect the obvious fact that 
a strong majority of Macedonians (86 percent) see Greece as the EU 
state most strongly opposed to their country’s membership, due to the 
unresolved name dispute between the two countries, which has led 
Greece to threaten to halt FYROM’s EU membership negotiations.   
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Perceptions about the main opponents to the Balkan countries’ EU 
accession
And which EU Member State is most opposed to [country]’s EU accession?
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Chapter 11 
The Us and the eU in Balkan 
kabuki
Morton Abramowitz
Introduction
Americans and Europeans have not always spoken the same language in 
the Balkans. Today things are improving, but it is not always clear what 
exactly they want to achieve and how they intend to go about it.
The main unfinished business as regards state-building in the Balkans 
revolves around Serbia. Serbia is central to the futures of Bosnia and 
Kosovo. The region will not be stable until Serbia makes up its collective 
mind on these two countries, especially Kosovo. It is a difficult decision 
both politically and emotionally, and in terms of Belgrade’s domestic 
politics. It does not appear to be close to the moment of decision. The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is another piece of 
unfinished business, but in the short term this has more to do with 
Greece; perhaps later its own ethnic divisions and developments between 
Kosovo and Serbia will come into play.
The major differences in the West are over whether Serbia has really 
made up its mind on Kosovo. Is Serbia really more concerned about 
EU admission than about the domestic political constraints posed by 
the Serbs of Bosnia and Kosovo? And will it ultimately find a way to 
accept the present political configuration in the region? The majority of 
Serbs probably believe some sort of resolution to the dilemma will be 
found; but when will the Serbian elite, including its current president, 
be prepared to trade a formal and platonic relationship with the Bosnian 
and Kosovo Serbs for EU membership? Most EU governments apparently 
also believe this will happen one day and the US government now seems 
to be thinking along the same lines. 
Now both the European Union and the United States constantly talk 
up Serbia’s goal of EU membership, the beginning of accession talks, 
and the importance of stepping up negotiations between Serbia and 
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Kosovo in the apparent hope that over time a transformation will take 
place in the way the contending parties see their differences. As long 
as the Kosovo issue remains unresolved, the question of Serbia’s EU 
admission is presumably left hanging. This wait-and-see approach, 
based mostly on intense EU encouragement of Serbia’s membership 
destiny, obviates the immediate need for difficult choices in the West 
regarding Serbia and Kosovo. It has provided the basis of the improved 
relationship between the West and Serbia.  Underlying this gradualism 
in the West is also the belief that ‘money will out’: that the peoples of 
the Balkans no longer want to jeopardise their new-found prosperity, 
substantial foreign aid and promises of a better future, and return to the 
bad old days of violent ethnic hatreds. Time, so they believe, is on the 
EU’s side. This view also supposes that prosperity is fairly distributed 
and that fewer people are prone to dance to the nationalist tune.
 lessons of the past
After numerous ups and downs and mutual public and private criticisms 
– the private put-downs will likely never end – the European Union and 
the United States have drawn closer in their approach to the Balkans. 
Presumably that is good. But before that benediction is pronounced, 
here are some personal conclusions or lessons drawn from Western 
experience in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War, which may 
help illuminate Western choices today. 
 From the very beginning Western countries have miscalculated the 
situation in the Balkans. For whatever reason – ignorance, domestic 
politics, national differences, sloth, fear of war, misunderstanding of 
ethnic nationalism, half-hearted humanitarianism, inadequate peace 
efforts and oversight, or just plain hubris – from the early stages of the 
breakup of Yugoslavia to the present day, Western policy has resembled 
a Jackson Pollock painting with occasional big splotches.
 Violence works. Violence, rather than diplomacy, has often changed 
the map of the Balkans. Early in the Bosnian war of the 1990s many 
Americans held the view that much of Europe hoped that Milosevic 
would move quickly and decisively to impose a solution and end all the 
‘unpleasantness’. But Milosevic was afraid to do so and, importantly, 
non-Serb peoples refused to give up their lands.  Given Bosniak tenacity 
coupled with the fact that outside forces were increasingly arrayed against 
him, Milosevic accepted the new map at Dayton: it at least provided 
him with the rump Serbian state he needed politically. And for a time 
the West, particularly the United States, saw Milosevic’s continuing 
political durability as critical to preserving Dayton. 
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The ragtag Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) also saw the utility of violence 
in Kosovo. Several hundred men fighting Serb forces in the Kosovo 
hinterland achieved what an American negotiator said would never 
happen:  a Western air force put an end to Serbian control of Kosovo. 
However, it took another act of violence to launch the fledgling Kosovo 
state. Fearful that their independence might slip away amidst poor 
economic growth and Allied indifference, in 2004 the radical elements 
of the Kosovar population rose up against the country’s remaining 
Serbs, scaring the inattentive West, particularly the United States, into 
establishing a process that would lead to Kosovo’s independence. Seven 
years of relative quiet seems to have convinced the West that violence, 
at least on a large scale, is now a thing of the past in the Balkans, that 
the warring parties have reached burnout and that people want their 
lives back. That may well be true; history can be too great a burden. 
But it is a perspective that produces complacency; it may also run up 
against what might become a rising tide of dissatisfied Albanians spread 
across a number of Balkan states.
Western policy has largely consisted of half measures which appear 
to solve current difficulties but end up perpetuating them or creating 
new ones. Dayton, however necessary, is an obvious case in point. The 
devastating and bloody war in Bosnia had to come to an end, but the 
Dayton Accord simply ratified the status quo at the end of the war – two de 
facto states – and gave the main perpetrator of violence the job of enforcing 
the agreement. Politically little has changed in Bosnia’s ethnically divided 
universe, but there is no violence and there has been growth thanks to 
significant and continuing amounts of aid, and many people are more 
hopeful for the future. Bosnia even assumed the Presidency of the UN 
Security Council in January. Politically the West has allowed the Office 
of High Representative (OHR), established under the Dayton Agreement, 
to lose its effectiveness as part of an effort to change Dayton; that has not 
had the anticipated results and the central government remains weak 
and compromised by its disparate elements.
The end of the Kosovo war did not produce a new state as such, but 
(for whatever practical reasons) UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 
which provided Serbia with a means to muddy the status of Kosovo 
and postponed resolution of the Kosovo issue to an uncertain date in 
the future. After the ICJ decision on Kosovo's independence in August 
2010, the West did little to enhance the fledgling state by securing 
more recognitions (only four, to add to a relatively meagre sixty-nine), 
thus encouraging the energetic Serbian diplomatic offensive aimed at 
ensuring that no progress should be made on the Kosovo issue for years 
to come. Apart from a few recent and very modest efforts, neither the 
United States nor the EU (which remains divided over Kosovo’s status) 
has made any serious attempt to challenge Belgrade’s domination of 
Northern Kosovo. 
176
11       The Us and the eU in Balkan kabuki
The West’s political and economic management of the area has been 
costly and less than impressive. Admittedly there have been some 
positive developments in Kosovo: at least for now the Serb minority 
is protected and there is some measure of democracy. But there has 
been little economic growth; what growth has occurred is largely the 
result of many years of extraordinary levels of aid to both Bosnia and 
Kosovo, and, in the case of Kosovo, large remittances from the Albanian 
diaspora – all of which continue. There has been little change in the 
workings of the economy and society. Kosovo became something of 
a colony, and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) failed 
to find the levers of social change or help generate new economic and 
political forces. The United States – Kosovo’s best friend – opted for 
stability, abetted the status quo, and did nothing to help a new leadership 
develop. Washington’s guidelines to its mission in Pristina were to keep 
the place quiet. Western countries gave the impression that serious 
change was taking place while countenancing widespread corruption. 
Unlike the other Balkan countries, there was some doubt in Europe 
that Kosovo was actually in the neighbourhood.  It has received little 
consideration for an EU future and is the only state in the region not to 
have been accorded visa-free travel in Europe. In practice, the West’s 
management method has been mostly to choose the least troublesome 
approach to the basic issues.
a new era of Western policy cooperation 
under eU leadership
Some will say that it is tendentious to rake over the past or argue that it 
has been overtaken by events: the situation in the Balkans has changed 
significantly, particularly in Belgrade, and democracy has grown, if 
unevenly, in all three countries. We can now take a longer-term, more 
relaxed approach to the remaining Balkan issues. Indeed some would 
assert we should all take pride in how far we have come in 15 years and 
many, many billions of dollars later.  The EU can now assume the long-
awaited task of managing the final stages of transition in the Balkans. 
Moreover, after years of decision-making turmoil, EU and US policy is 
finally converging.  Others, however, might prefer to sound a note of 
caution against believing that this might lead to better decision-making; 
and point out that given the history described above, it would be unwise 
to take developments in the Balkans for granted even now.
Despite all denials and visits by Vice President Biden and other high-
level officials, the most noticeable policy development has been the 
slow and steady decline of American involvement in the Balkans. Given 
that the United States has been caught up in two protracted wars, it 
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is understandable that it is happy to accept junior partner status in 
the Balkans. The US government made a major commitment to the 
region, in large part for humanitarian and domestic political reasons, 
and clearly still wants its once sizeable effort to come to final fruition. 
But the American public pays almost no attention to Bosnia or Kosovo 
and does not believe the United States has any major national security 
interest there. Moreover, as Western military forces keep declining in the 
area, Europeans – who have the money and a vested interest – should 
have another opportunity to wear the mantle of leadership, although 
there is a lingering doubt among some Americans that the EU is capable 
of exercising that leadership.
The last time the United States took the lead in the Balkans was in 
Kosovo. The US government was woken from its relative slumber by 
the 2004 riots which led to the establishment of the Ahtisaari effort and 
ultimately the creation of an independent Kosovo.  Now, as negotiations 
of some kind are soon to begin between Serbia and Kosovo under 
EU auspices, the Americans are apparently not interested in leading 
the talks but will attend most if not all meetings. Indeed, the United 
States has ceased to be inventive. In Bosnia the US effort has been a 
holding effort. The major difference between the United States and the 
EU has been the former’s insistence on maintaining the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR) in the face of European interest in doing 
away with it. Richard Holbrooke never lost interest in Bosnia and 
was instrumental in ensuring US support for the OHR for fear that it 
would be more difficult to keep Dayton intact if the OHR were to be 
abolished. The United States also remains concerned that Bosnia is the 
only place in the Balkans where mass violence could still occur – should 
Republika Srpska attempt to secede from Bosnia – and the few Western 
forces remaining in Bosnia (consisting mostly of trainers) would not 
constitute much of a deterrent.
Managing affairs in Kosovo is clearly a burden to the EU: the Union 
remains divided with five Member States still refusing to recognise 
Kosovo. This inevitably entails searching for positions to which all the 
Member States can agree, whether they are the wisest positions to take 
or not. The same divisions also complicate dealings with Serbia. For 
many EU members Serbia has always been the heart of the Balkans, 
whatever Orthodox Belgrade might be doing to the Muslims in the region. 
Many have now apparently concluded that the Serbian government 
will renounce its long-standing nationalist aspirations and overcome 
domestic political constraints, and that Belgrade can be helped, coaxed 
and bribed into pursuing the EU connection. And they have found 
a Serbian political leader – Boris Tadic – who promotes Serbia's EU 
aspirations, while expressing his willingness to work something out with 
Pristina. It is therefore important for the West that Tadic should remain 
in office. So far, however, Mr. Tadic has not shown any public interest 
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in recognising an independent Kosovo or in relinquishing Belgrade’s 
rule over Northern Kosovo. Pinning hopes on one individual can be 
dangerous. At the time of writing, the Serbian government appears to 
be divided and in trouble. Some people in Belgrade believe and some 
EU countries may have conveyed the notion that somehow Serbia could 
proceed to EU membership with a critical territorial issue unresolved, 
much as happened with Cyprus; the issue would be resolved at some 
later date, when the Kosovo/Serbia situation might have changed 
radically. Whether Tadic or other Serbs really believe this is another 
matter. Both the West and Serbia are adept at putting on a facade and 
seem to accept each other’s pretences.
This year the Kosovo issue will reach another critical juncture: when 
Kosovo and Serbia begin new negotiations over issues yet to be determined. 
It appears that the EU has tried to avoid any discussion of Kosovo’s final 
status: partition and recognition are presumably out. That, of course, 
may change depending on events and what unfolds in the negotiations. 
The focus will be on the numerous practical economic, commercial and 
legal issues between the two states. The hope is that serious negotiations 
and the resolution of practical problems will contribute to changing the 
climate of opinion in both states. This approach should appeal more to 
Serbia because it supports the present indecision on the Kosovo issue. 
For the Kosovo side there may be some practical benefits, but it does 
nothing to end their political limbo which would indeed seem to be 
reinforced by the failure to discuss final status. Both sides are precluded 
from breaking off negotiations.  
Kosovo’s negotiating position has become even more uncertain because 
of the charges recently levelled against Prime Minister Thaci regarding 
the alleged harvesting and selling of organs during the Kosovo war 
– charges which are sufficiently serious to warrant further inquiry. 
These charges (while yet to be proved) have affected Thaci’s political 
position, although he succeeded in forming a coalition and retaining 
his position as prime minister. Many in Kosovo fear that his weakened 
political position will restrict his room for manoeuvre in even limited 
negotiations in an effort to cater to Western desires.  However, the charges 
have cast a pall over Kosovo, roiled the political environment and at 
least momentarily diminished public confidence in Kosovo’s future. 
They have also had a negative impact in Europe, further deepening 
dismissive attitudes towards Kosovo, while lending weight to other 
Serbian allegations of misconduct during the Kosovo war. Kosovo has 
lost significant political ground. Today the reasons for the Kosovo war 
seem more and more remote. 
In Bosnia, Prime Minister Dodik persists in his efforts to preserve 
Republika Srpska’s autonomy and continues to evoke the prospect of a 
formal separation. The EU and the Obama administration have jointly 
Morton Abramowitz
179
undertaken several high-level efforts over the past two years to try to 
bridge the constitutional divide in Bosnia through talks with the main 
players. So far such talks have led nowhere. The OHR is unable to 
change the political situation. The EU and outside observers  believe that, 
whether the OHR stays or goes, what is needed is a robust EU mission, 
more aid, and the promise of accession, which will help transform the 
Bosnian political scene and produce greater political cooperation. The 
EU mission in Bosnia has been around a long time and has changed 
very little. Apparently it has not been sufficiently robust or its mandate is 
inadequate; that at least is the sceptical view of many concerned Americans 
both in and out of government. Whether or not a new, more dynamic 
EU mission in Bosnia can change the political situation, it certainly can 
help and should be welcomed. One might wonder why Mr. Dodik and 
many of his constituents would give up their virtual independence for a 
promise that would take a decade or more to be fulfilled. As one observer 
pithily put it: ‘Bosnia is Belgium without the money.’
More significantly, the EU treats Belgrade as if it has no influence over 
Republika Srpska and can do nothing to make Dodik more cooperative. 
For the West it is apparently enough for Belgrade to voice its support 
for Dayton, which mostly divides the country, and its opposition to 
Republika Srpska’s independence. There is some belief that as Kosovo 
recedes as part of Serbia in the popular Serb mind, nationalists in 
Belgrade are likely to focus increasingly on keeping Srpska independent 
and ultimately part of Serbia. The United States and the EU apparently 
think that patience and more focused EU involvement will produce 
more positive results in negotiations among the Bosnian parties. 
Finally, as for Serbia itself, there is little point in the West putting any 
serious pressure on Serbia regarding any key issue, perhaps until after 
Serbian elections. The US government has basically adopted the EU 
perspective, depicting the Serbian government's role both domestically 
and regionally as constructive and essential, and the pursuit of EU 
membership as key. Perhaps the only difference lies in the periodic 
high-level American admonitions to Belgrade to finally recognise the 
reality of the Kosovo state.
The hope of continued ‘progress’ in resolving major Balkan problems 
through closer EU/American joint policy supposes that everything 
is basically moving in the right direction, largely because Serbia is 
moving in the right direction, that its leadership is focused on EU 
admission and its public is increasingly more interested in its future 
than in its past and in a better standard of living. There is apparently 
no insistence that Serbia should try harder to resolve the basic issues 
of Kosovo and Bosnia. Nor is there any prospect of a trade-off between 
Serbia and Kosovo regarding Northern Kosovo and Kosovo’s admission 
to the United Nations. Nevertheless, such a trade-off could ultimately 
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emerge as the principal issue in negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo, 
much to the West’s discomfiture. It is hard to believe that any Serbian 
government would want to disengage from Kosovo without some form 
of territorial recompense.
How could such a policy bring about changes in the Balkan scene? 
In Bosnia a better functioning central government could emerge as a 
result of Western pressure, continued aid, sound political advice, and 
the lure of EU accession. Even if it does not, nothing untoward is likely 
to happen in the short term. As for Kosovo, it too can carry on with its 
uncertain status as long as outside aid keeps flowing in and EULEX, or 
its replacement, is still on the ground.  Presumably, such an approach 
by the West will also ensure success for Mr. Tadic in the next elections 
in Serbia and further commitment to Serbia’s EU future.
Hopefully this strategy will work and the problems of the Balkans will 
continue to recede. But there are many uncertainties and it is important 
to recall another lesson from the Balkan experience: the West’s addiction 
to half measures. The Serb electorate might continue to support Mr. 
Tadic’s rule, but there will come a time when a Serbian government 
must make a real choice regarding the recognition of Kosovo.  Perhaps 
over time Mr. Dodik will give up his incessant talk of independence. 
But what if the central government continues to be mired down?
The greatest uncertainty and most likely danger lies in Kosovo. Its 
stability is fragile and violence can all too easily erupt. The recent 
fraudulent elections revealed the lack of unity in the country and a 
massive distrust in government. The accusations against Mr. Thaci have 
severely weakened him, and it is unclear how the political dynamic 
will play out in Kosovo and when talks with Serbia will commence. 
It should also be noted that the politician considered most honest in 
Kosovo, namely Albin Kurti, got an impressive 13 percent of the vote 
without resorting to fraud. He advocates an Albanian nationalism 
that transcends Kosovo. To what extent such a movement spreads is 
largely dependent on how the West deals with Kosovo in the upcoming 
negotiations. It could be reinforced by fears that Kosovo is losing its 
close, and psychologically important, ties with America. Large-scale 
violence may only be a remote possibility, but political turbulence of a 
transforming nature may not. 
The West cannot resolve everything; but if the basic issues in the Balkans 
are left to fester, a whole host of new problems might arise as well as a 
recrudescence  of violence. Coordination between the EU and the United 
States seems closer than at any time since the end of the conflict, but it 
may not be enough. A little more candour would be helpful.
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annexes
abbreviations
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CEFTA  Central European Free Trade Agreement
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE  Council of Europe
CVM  Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
DOS  Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija 
  Srbije)
DPS  Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro  
  (Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore)
DS  Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka)
DSS  Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka  
  Srbije)
DUI  Democratic Union for Integration (Demokratska unija 
  za integracija)
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights
EUSR  EU Special Representative
FBiH  Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FRY  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
HDZ  Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
  zajednica)
HDZ 1990 Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (Hrvatska demokratska 
  zajednica 1990)
HoP  House of Peoples
HoR  House of Representatives
HR  High Representative
ICJ  International Court of Justice
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former  
  Yugoslavia
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPA  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
JUL  Yugoslav Left ( Jugoslovenska Levica)
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army
MAP  Membership Action Plan
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NOVA  New Serbian Democracy (Nova srpska demokratija)
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and  
  Development
OHR  Office of the High Representative
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OIDHR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human  
  Rights
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in  
  Europe
PIC SB  Peace Implementation Council Steering Board
PR  Public Relations
PZP  Movement for Changes (Pokret za promjene)
RS  Republika Srpska
SAA  Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SDA  Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske  
  akcije)
SDP  Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  (Socijaldemokratska partija)
SDSM  Socia l Democrat ic Union of Macedonia  
  (Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija)
SIGMA  Support for Improvement in Government and  
  Management
SNP  Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička narodna partija)
SNS  Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka)
SNSD  Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez  
  nezavisnih socijaldemokrata)
SPS  Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije)
SRS  Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka)
UN  United Nations
UNGA  UN General Assembly
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution
VAT  Value-Added Tax
VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation- 
  Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity party 
  (Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – 
  Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno  
  edinstvo)
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 CHAILLOT PAPERS  BOOKS
 
 
Today, more than fifteen years after the end of the wars that accompanied Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution, the ‘Balkan question’ remains more than ever a ‘European question’. In 
the eyes of many Europeans in the 1990s, Bosnia was the symbol of a collective 
failure, while Kosovo later became a catalyst for an emerging Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). In the last decade, however, the overall thrust of the EU’s 
Balkans policy has moved from an agenda dominated by security issues related to the 
war and its legacies to one focused on the perspective of the Western Balkan states’ 
accession to the European Union.
This Chaillot Paper, which features contributions from authors from various parts of 
the region, examines the current state of play in the countries of the Western Balkans 
with regard to EU accession. It brings together both views from the Balkans states 
themselves and overarching thematic perspectives.
For the first time the European Union has become involved in the formation of new 
nation-states that also aspire to become members of the Union. The EU’s transformative 
power has proved effective in integrating established states; now it is confronted 
with the challenge of integrating new and sometimes contested states. Against this 
background, this paper makes the case for a concerted regional approach to EU 
enlargement, and a renewed and sustained commitment to the European integration 
of the Western Balkans.
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